Mass Shootings in the 21st Century: An Examination through the Lens of the Interpersonal Psychological Theory of Suicide

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Mass Shootings in the 21st Century: An Examination through the Lens of the Interpersonal Psychological Theory of Suicide

Tyler Hendley,1 Email the Corresponding Author Nicholas Deas,2 Sophie Finnell,3 and Robin Kowalski3

1 Department of Psychology, Louisiana State University
2 Department of Computer Science, Columbia University
3 Department of Psychology, Clemson University

Article History: Received September 27, 2024 | Accepted December 18, 2024 | Published Online January 21, 2025

ABSTRACT

Suicide-related thoughts and behaviors (SRTBs) have become identified as common antecedent experiences of mass shooters prior to and during their shootings. To better support and inform efforts of such upstream prevention and intervention efforts of mass violence, this study aimed to provide an exploratory descriptive perspective of the interpersonal experiences of mass shooters who survived and those who died on the scene (i.e., died by self-inflicted suicide, or died by police intervention) using the interpersonal psychological theory of suicide (IPTS) as a theoretical framework. Through an open-source data collection method, researchers gathered data related to the interpersonal constructs of thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, and a capability for suicide, for N = 112 mass shooters that perpetrated their crime in the 21st century. Interpersonal constructs were observed as similar across both on-scene outcomes. The interpersonal constructs of thwarted belongingness and a capability for suicide were evidenced in a majority shooters across outcomes. These results offer initial exploratory evidence that most mass shootings may, at their core, be influenced to some extent by SRTBs as described by the IPTS. By addressing mass shootings through such a point-of-view, prevention and intervention efforts may benefit from alignment with those proven efficacious for SRTBs.

KEYWORDS
mass shootings, suicide, interpersonal risk, thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness

Acts of firearm violence pose serious threats to public safety in the United States (US). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported over 220,000 firearm-related deaths on American soil from 2018 to 2022 (CDC, 2023). Of these deaths, 61% have been linked to deaths by suicide and 36% were the result of homicide (CDC, 2023). Amongst deaths that were a result of homicide in the US, less than 1% were a consequence of a mass shooting (Peterson & Densley, 2023). While statistically rare, the effects of firearm violence on victims, families, communities, and society should not be understated (Lowe & Galea, 2017).

According to the Congressional Research Service, and, as followed by this study, mass shootings result in four or more deaths by firearm (not including the shooter), a death in a public location or locations in close geographical proximity (e.g., a school, workplace, restaurant, shopping center), and must not be related to other criminal activity or commonplace circumstance (e.g. gang activity, armed robbery, family violence; Krouse & Richardson, 2015; see also Peterson & Densley, 2019; 2023). It should be noted that, although this study followed the Congressional Research Service’s (Krouse & Richardson, 2015) definition of mass shootings, there is no universally agreed upon definition for this phenomenon, which can result in discrepancies of qualifications and frequency measurements for such shootings (Booty et al., 2019).

These types of shootings have plagued the US for decades and are becoming both more frequent and deadlier (Peterson & Densley, 2023). According to The Violence Project Database of Mass Shootings (Violence Project; Peterson & Densley, 2023), more than half of the deadliest 35 shootings over the past 100 years have occurred since 2010, with the single-most deadly taking place in 2017 at the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada.1 As seen in many mass shootings, the Las Vegas shooting resulted in the death of the perpetrator at the scene of the shooting (Shultz et al., 2017). Since 1966, 57% of mass shooters have died on the scene of their killing (Peterson & Densley, 2023). Additionally, 72% of mass shooters had expressed some degree of suicidal ideation prior to or during the shooting, and 38% died by suicide during the shooting (Peterson & Densley, 2023; Shahid & Duzor, 2021). Shooters who died on the scene of the crime, but not by suicide, perished at the hands of intervention by an external force (e.g., law enforcement). Within this category of shooter mortality, the phenomenon known as suicide-by-police may act as a driving factor (Lankford, 2015), with up to 10% of mass shooters creating a suicide-by-police situation (Lankford, 2015).

Suicide, in a general sense, is a highly complex, multi-faceted human phenomenon (de Beurs et al., 2021; Orsolini et al., 2020) that has yet to be fully understood. Many current theorists believe that the phenomenon is a result of an interplay of psychological, biological, and social risk/protective factors (de Beurs et al., 2021; Orsolini et al., 2020). Among these theories is Thomas Joiner’s (2005) interpersonal psychological theory of suicide (IPTS). According to Joiner’s (2005) IPTS, the desire to die by suicide (i.e., suicidal ideation) is a result of the simultaneous interpersonal experience of thwarted belongingness (TB) and perceived burdensomeness (PB). This theory further posits that, to transition from suicidal ideation to suicidal behavior, the individual must possess a capability to enact lethal self-injury (Joiner, 2005). This transition of ideation to behavior has led to the IPTS being considered “the first in line of ‘next generation’ theories of suicide” due to its consideration of suicidal ideation and suicidal behavior as two distinct processes (Klonsky et al., 2018, p. 38). The IPTS differs from other theories of suicide who treat ideation and behavior as two distinct processes (e.g., integrated motivational-volitional theory, three-step theory; Klonsky & May, 2015; O’connor, 2011) however, as it proposes that one must overcome the innate fear of death to transition from ideation to behavior (Klonsky et al., 2018).

It should be noted that, at the time of this study, modifications to the IPTS have been proposed. Most notably, Van Orden and colleagues (2010) theorize that suicidal ideation is the result of an intractable sense of hopelessness about one’s interpersonal states of TB and PB (see also Joiner et al., 2021). Research has shown both hopelessness and suicidal ideation to be higher among individuals labeled with a mental illness (e.g., major depressive disorder, psychosis, anxiety disorders; Oexle et al., 2017). Such individuals subsequently have shown to be at higher risk for suicide-related behaviors (Brådvik, 2018). Since the present study is one of the first to examine suicidality among mass shooters, the researchers decided to focus on the original core components of the IPTS (i.e., hopelessness was not included in the current study; Joiner, 2005). However, in light of research since the inception of the theory, the researchers also recognize both the interpersonal and intrapersonal factors that contribute to suicidal ideation and suicide attempts. Specifically, thwarted belonging is more interpersonal in nature compared to perceived burdensomeness which reflects intrapersonal perceptions and concerns. Additionally, compared to its original formulation as a purely acquired state, the capability for suicide may also stem from dispositional variables (Bayliss et al., 2022).

As described by Baumeister and Leary (1995), the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation that drives individuals to maintain relationships with peers. If this need to belong is threatened, and one does not feel they belong to a community, even if they try to connect, there may be an increased risk of psychological and physical consequences, including suicidal ideation (Joiner, 2005). Additionally, research indicates that feelings of TB can be exacerbated by interpersonal risk factors such as bullying victimization (Gunn & Goldstein, 2017), long-term rejection (e.g., Hill et al., 2017), short-term rejection (e.g., romantic dissolution; Love et al., 2018), and other negative life events (see Glenn et al., 2022). Similarly, if an individual feels they are a burden to others, it may lead to thoughts that peers, family, or society would be better off without them (Joiner, 2005; see also Van Orden et al., 2006).

The capability for suicide is due, in part, to the habituation or desensitization to the fear of death which can occur through both physical and psychological means (Joiner, 2005). Additionally, an individual must have access to means (e.g. firearm, knife, excessive amounts of medication) for a lethal or near-lethal suicide attempt to occur (Joiner, 2005).2 Physical desensitization is mostly due to an increase in physical pain tolerance, whereas psychological desensitization is said to be a result of one’s lowered fear of death and pain (Joiner, 2005). The capability to enact lethal self-injury through physical means can be heightened through various ways such as nonsuicidal self-injury (Joiner, 2005; Whitlock et al., 2013), prior injury (e.g. broken bone, concussion; Fralick et al., 2019), being a victim of assault (Sutherland et al., 2002; Tomasula et al., 2012), and even donning tattoos and piercings (Blay et al., 2023; Solís-Bravo et al., 2019). Additionally, individuals may psychologically increase the capability for suicide through means such as mentally rehearsing or preparing for their suicide attempt (George et al., 2016), viewing social media content/videos of suicide or lethal injury (Kocakaya & Arslan, 2023), or working in professions that involve violence and/or mortality (e.g. military, emergency medicine doctors; Bartram & Baldwin, 2010; Joiner, 2005).

The elements of TB, PB, and the capability for suicide map onto variables found in previous research examining the behaviors and experiences of individuals criminally involved in school and mass shootings. Leary et al. (2003) found five antecedent conditions common to many K-12 school shootings: a long-term history of rejection, an acute rejection experience, a fascination (i.e., a preoccupation of out proportion compared to the general population) with firearms, a fascination with death/violence, and a history of psychological problems. More recently, Kowalski et al. (2021) examined the degree to which these same variables were related to K-12 as well as mass shootings that had occurred since the Leary et al. (2003) study. Among K-12 shooters included in their study, 63% had experienced acute and/or long-term rejection. Among mass shooters, 20% had experienced a long-term history of rejection, with 53% reporting an acute rejection experience (see Kowalski et al., 2021). According to Chinazzo et al. (2023), such experiences of rejection can lead to negative outcomes such as suicidal ideation or suicide attempts. In addition, 35% of K-12 shooters and 61% of mass shooters demonstrated a fascination with violence, often prior mass shootings (e.g., researching and idealizing the Columbine High School shooting). Almost a fifth (17.5%) displayed a fascination with firearms, often acquiring them from family members (see Kowalski et al., 2021). Immersing themselves in prior shootings or other forms of violence and frequently having ready access to firearms feeds into a capability for suicide.

Purpose of the Research

Results, such as these from Kowalski and colleagues (2021), indicate that the interpersonal risk factors that drive suicidal ideation and suicide attempts, may also play a role in driving acts of mass murder. As SRTBs have become identified as common antecedent experiences of mass shooters prior to and during their shootings (see Joiner, 2024), researchers have called for further research into the relationship of the two distinct yet possibly related phenomena (Hagan et al., 2015; Lankford, 2015). With those perpetrating a mass shooting and simultaneously experiencing SRTBs only composing a statistically rare proportion of all individuals who experience SRTBs, it’s important to attempt to understand what may lead one to act on lethal urges toward others, and possibly themselves, rather than only themselves. This said, straying away from reactive measures (e.g., metal detectors in schools, excessive law enforcement presence), researchers believe that interventions directed towards upstream targets (i.e., SRTBs) may be beneficial in the prevention of mass violence (Hagan et al., 2015; Langman, 2017).

To better support and inform efforts of such upstream prevention and intervention efforts of mass violence, this study presents an exploratory descriptive perspective of the interpersonal experiences of mass shooters who survived and those who died on the scene (i.e., died by self- inflicted suicide, or died by police intervention) using Joiner’s (2005) IPTS as a theoretical framework. The IPTS was chosen as the framework for this study for several reasons. First, and most importantly, the IPTS is a leading theory for why individuals die by suicide, and due to the large percentage of mass shooters experiencing suicidal thought and behaviors, prior to or during the shooting (Lankford et al., 2021), the researchers felt it was important to utilize a well-studied and supported theory of suicide for this study’s framework. Secondly, it considers both interpersonal and intrapersonal factors as risk factors for suicidal ideation and behavior, a common finding of antecedent thoughts and behavior also seen in mass shooters (Lankford et al., 2021). Finally, a major component of the IPTS is the capability for suicide, which the authors believed may also be a factor in mass shooters’ ability to overcome the innate fear of ending one’s life (i.e., mass shooters may also experience aversive, traumatic, or painful events that lead to the capability of not only suicide, but lethal behaviors directed at others). Toward this end, the researchers used an open-source data collection method with hopes of better understanding antecedent behaviors and interpersonal experiences of mass shooters.

To paint a clearer picture of the interpersonal risk factors that may have impacted SRTBs, as well as the decision of the individuals to perpetrate the mass shooting, two research questions are proposed:

RQ1: Are there similarities in antecedent IPTS components (i.e., TB, PB, capability for suicide) experienced by mass shooters who live versus die at the scene of their crime?

RQ2: Do mass shooters have experiences of perceived burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and a capability to enact lethal self-injury prior to their shooting?

Method

Study Population

Focusing on the 21st century, a total of 112 individuals who perpetrated a mass shooting between January 9, 2001, and May 6, 2023, were included in the study.3 Mass shooters were identified by referencing The Violence Project Database of Mass Shootings, Version 7.0 (Peterson & Densley, 2023), which stores data of mass shooters (in accordance with the Congressional Research Service’s (Krouse & Richardson, 2015) definition of a mass shooter) from 1966 to present. Of the examined mass shooters, 95% (n = 106) were assigned male at birth. Racial and ethnic makeups of the shooters included 49% (n = 55) White, 20% (n = 22) Black, 9% (n = 10) Latinx, 8% (n = 9) Asian, 8% (n = 9) Middle Eastern, and 6% (n = 7) other. The average age of mass shooters was 34 years old with 47% (n = 53) of shooters falling between the ages of 15- and 30-years-olds, 38% (n = 43) between 31- and 50-years-old, and 14% (n = 16) 51-years-old or older. It should be noted that following in line with recommendations from organizations such as No Notoriety (n.d.) and ALERRT (n.d.), no shooters will be named in this manuscript or its data. A full list of shootings included in this study can be found in the appendix.

Measures

Demographics

Demographic information for mass shooters was informed via The Violence Project Database of Mass Shootings, Version 7.0 (Peterson & Densley, 2023). Demographic variables included location and date of the shooting, race/ethnicity, age, and sex.

Thwarted Belongingness (TB)

Experiences of TB were measured through evidence of the presence of three interpersonal risk factors which may have affected one’s sense of belonging: a history of bullying victimization (i.e., bullied), an acute short-term rejection experience, and/or a history of long-term rejection. Risk factors were coded as present if evidence for their presence were found within the sources. Risk factors were not coded for their absence, as it is not possible to truly confirm the total absence of such experiences. Individuals experiencing at least one TB risk factor were coded as showing evidence for some degree of TB prior to their shooting. Bullying victimization data was gathered from The Violence Project Database of Mass Shootings, Version 7.0 (Peterson & Densley, 2023) and included evidence of the shooter being a victim of bullying to at least some extent in any setting (e.g., school, workplace). Detailed descriptions of all other risk factors for this construct can be found in Table 1.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Perceived Burdensomeness (PB)

Experiences of PB were measured through evidence of the presence of the shooter reporting feelings of being a burden to society and/or friends/family. Risk factors were coded as present if evidence for their presence were found within the sources. Risk factors were not coded for their absence, as it is not possible to truly confirm the total absence of such experiences. Individuals experiencing at least one PB risk factor were coded as showing evidence for some degree of PB prior to their shooting. Detailed descriptions of both risk factors for this construct can be found in Table 1.

Capability for Suicide

Experiences potentially increasing one’s capability for suicide were measured through evidence of the presence of two physical and six psychological risk factors that may had desensitized one to the act of lethal self-injury. Psychological risk factors included: passive (i.e., witnessing death as a bystander) and/or active (i.e., witnessing death as a perpetrator of homicide) exposure to death, fascination with death and/or violence, fascination with guns and weapons, and traumatic events that did not result in physical pain (e.g., witnessing abuse). Physical risk factors included: exposure to physical pain (chronic or acute), traumatic event(s) that resulted in physical pain, and body enhancements (e.g., piercings or tattoos; may also be referred to as “body modifications”). It should be noted that these are solely risk factors for SRTBs and do not necessarily indicate that an individual will perpetrate a mass shooting if they, for example, don tattoos. However, the exposure to pain, such as tattoos and piercings, may act as a form of non-suicidal self-injury and have been positively linked with SRTBs (Blay et al., 2023). Risk factors were coded as present if evidence for their presence were found within the sources. Risk factors were not coded for their absence, as it is not possible to truly confirm the total absence of such experiences. Individuals experiencing at least one capability for suicide risk factor were coded as showing evidence for some degree of capability for suicide prior to their shooting. Detailed descriptions of each risk factor for this construct can be found in Table 1.

Procedures

Theoretical Framework

To examine antecedent risk factors of mass shooters, Joiner’s IPTS (2005) was selected as a theoretical framework utilizing TB, PB, and capability as constructs to guide the coding process. Due to the complex nature of such thoughts and behaviors (see de Beurs et al., 2021), and past research of mass violence and suicide (see Kowalski et al., 2021; Peterson & Densley, 2023), it was decided that these risk factors and constructs may give the greatest insight into precedent influences of the two phenomena.

Sources

Sources for coding the shootings consisted of primary sources (e.g., manifestos, journals, personal blogs), secondary sources (e.g., local news articles, police reports, court rulings), and community sources (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports). To reduce chances of source selection bias, each of four raters were randomly assigned 28 shootings in which the rater selected five sources for each shooting. This procedure also falls in line with Booty et al.’s (2019) recommendation of corroborating evidence of each mass shooting with multiple sources to help mitigate concerns with the use of multiple definitions of the

phenomenon. Additionally, the use of multiple sources, and a variety of types of sources, assisted in corroborating evidence found for individual variables. A total of 559 sources were used in the coding process.4 The sources, when possible, for each shooting were bipartisan to reduce news source bias. To increase reliability across raters, only the five selected sources were utilized during the rating process for any given shooting.

Risk Factors

To quantify the evidence found in support of the presence TB, PB, and/or a capability for suicide for shooters, a set of risk factors were developed for each interpersonal construct that represented the IPTS (Joiner, 2005; see Table 1). For example, if a mass shooter had experienced bullying victimization, this would constitute evidence of the presence of some degree of TB for that shooter. As there is no known empirical evidence supporting the use of IPTS risk factors for the quantification of individual risk level (e.g., experiencing three TB risk factors constituting a different level of suicide risk compared to experiencing two TB risk factors), this study considered an individual experiencing any number of IPTS risk factors as experiencing that specific overarching construct to some degree. This scheme was followed for PB and capability for suicide risk factors as well. All risk factors considered for each construct, along with coding definitions, can be found in Table 1. Additionally, all risk factors have shown empirical support as being related to the construct of interest.

Coding

Preceding the coding process, shooters were randomly divided and assigned to four raters. Using an open-source data collection method, mass shootings were coded by four raters for evidence suggesting the presence of PB, TB, and capability for suicide for n = 112 mass shooters. All shooters were coded by two raters such that each unique pair of raters shared an equal number of shooters (n = 18 or n = 19 each among 6 pairs). To assist with uniformity and accuracy during the coding process, a codebook was developed and adhered to by each rater. Utilizing previous literature (e.g., Hill et al., 2017; Joiner, 2005; Solis-Bravo et al., 2019; Tomasula et al., 2012), the codebook consisted of risk factors developed for each of the IPTS’ three constructs (i.e., TB, PB, and capability for suicide). Risk factors were coded present if evidence of its presence was determined within the sources by raters. If the risk factor of interest was not identified within the sources, that variable was considered lacking evidence for by the raters. When a risk factor was lacking evidence for its presence, this was only indicative of it not being cited within the sources and did not deem it confirmatory of its absence.

Outcome

Throughout analyses, whether a shooter dies at the scene of the shooting is considered as the outcome or response variable. These codes are drawn from the “On Scene Outcome” variable from The Violence Project Database of Mass Shootings, Version 7.0 (Peterson & Densley, 2023), considering both “Killed Self” and “Killed on Scene” collectively as “Died on Scene” values.

Interrater Agreeability and Discrepancy Resolution

Using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960), interrater agreeability across all variables among the four raters was calculated to assess overall variability across the raters’ interpretation of (1) the codebook criteria and (2) the selected open sources. Most variables fell at, or above, 𝜿 = .75, indicating relatively strong agreement across raters. One variable, fascination with death, had a weaker level of agreement (𝜿 = .54) due to raters’ individual perceptions of unique characteristics associated with some shooters (e.g., shooters who had become radicalized by terrorist organizations were coded by some raters as having a fascination with death, while other raters did not code this as a fascination). Any variable with a disagreement between raters was critically examined by all four raters. Following examination, a discussion was held for each discrepancy and, with reference to the codebook, a decision was made by the majority to mark the variable as either possessing evidence indicating its presence within the source or not possessing sufficient evidence to support its presence in the sources.

Analytical Strategy

Risk Factors and Shooting Outcomes

Research Question 1 asks whether there are similarities in antecedent IPTS components experienced by mass shooters who survive and die at the scene of their crime. Toward investigating this question, the proportions of shooters evidenced by indicating experiencing the IPTS components to some degree were assessed among shooters that died at the scene and survived the shooting. Additionally, similar analytic strategies were utilized to investigate similarities between the two groups for each individual IPTS risk factor. Plots developed in analysis separate Self-Perpetrated Suicide and Died by Police in the Died on Scene group, but proportions are reported for the Survived group as a whole.

Finally, the overlap between the presence of IPTS components, interpersonal risk factors, and outcome variables, are assessed. Correlations were measured using the Jaccard similarity coefficient as all variables are dichotomous (e.g., there was evidence that indicated the presence of a variable or there was no evidence that indicated the presence of a variable).

Risk Factors in Shootings

Following these analyses, Research Question 2 asks whether mass shooters have experiences of PB, TB, and a capability to enact lethal self-injury prior to their shooting. The proportions of each IPTS component and individual risk factors evidenced as present within the open sources for mass shooters were calculated among the full set of shootings in the database.

Results

Risk Factors Differences in Shooting Outcomes

To investigate Research Question 1, whether there are similarities in the prevalence of IPTS components between shooters that died on the scene and those that survived, Figure 1 shows the proportion of shooters for which evidence of each component was identified. Evidence of TB was indicated as the most commonly mentioned antecedent experience of mass shooters within the IPTS constructs for both outcomes, died on the scene (85.5%) and survived the shooting (94.3%). Evidence for a capability for suicide was indicated as the second most common IPTS antecedent experience of mass shooters for both those that died on scene (75.4%) and survived (71.4%). Finally, PB was the IPTS construct in which the least amount of evidence was found across both outcomes, died on the scene (5.8%) and survived (5.7%).

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Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows the proportion of shooters for which evidence of each interpersonal risk factor was identified between those that died on the scene and those that did not. As in Figure 1, proportions of the PB risk factors between the two groups were similar: 1.5% and 5.8% among those that died on the scene and 2.9% and 5.7% among those that did not for PB (Society) and PB (Family/Friends) respectively. Regarding TB, evidence of Short-Term Rejection and Long-Term rejection were the most commonly found antecedent experiences for both shooting outcomes, died on scene (78.3% and 44.9%, respectively) and survived (74.3% and 62.9%, respectively). Finally, for the capability for suicide risk factors, the group that died on the scene presented a higher proportion of evidence of Active Exposure to Death (5.8% vs. 2.9%), Passive Exposure to Death (20.3% vs. 14.3%), Body Enhancements (10.1% vs. 0%), Fascination with Death (30.4% vs. 22.9%), and Adult Trauma (5.8% vs. 2.9%) than among those that did not. Childhood Trauma is the sole capability for suicide factor that was evidenced as more prevalent among those that survived the shooting (37.1% vs. 31.9%).

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Finally, Figure 3 shows the Jaccard Similarity Indices between the outcome variables and both the IPTS components and risk factors. Considering whether the shooter died by self-perpetrated suicide or died on the scene, while evidence of TB (J = 0.38 and J = 0.22, respectively) and a capability for suicide (J = 0.34 and
J = 0.25) sufficiently overlapped, PB was greatly different (J = 0.09 and J = 0.00). Among TB factors, Short-Term Rejection was most similar (J = 0.40 and J = 0.21) followed by Long-Term Rejection (J = 0.25 and J = 0.17). Finally, each capability for suicide factor alone was dissimilar with whether the shooter died at the scene or not, with Fascination with Firearms (J = 0.27 and J = 0.14) and Fascination with Death (J = 0.22 and J = 0.16) being the least dissimilar.

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IPTS Risk Factors in Shooters

Toward answering Research Question 2, whether mass shooters have experiences of PB, TB, and a capability for suicide prior to their shooting, Figure 4 shows the overall prevalence of shooter outcomes, the IPTS components, and risk factors among all shooters. First, while a minority of shooters died by taking their own lives (39.4%), a majority died on the scene (66.4%). This discrepancy is accounted for by those who died by police intervention (25.0%). Among the IPTS components, PB (5.8%) was rarely evident among shooters, while evidence of TB (88.5%) and a capability for suicide (74.0%) was found in a majority of shooters. Additionally, most single risk factors were present in less than 50% of shooters, with the exception of the proportion of Long-Term Rejection (51.0%) and Short-Term Rejection (76.9%).

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Discussion

The current study intended to provide an exploratory descriptive analysis of antecedent interpersonal experiences and risk factors among mass shooters who died on the scene, and those who survived their shooting. Results aimed to provide possible insight into potential upstream targets (i.e., interpersonal processes and behaviors that occur before the act of violence) for the prevention of mass shootings. While the current study only focuses on a subset of mass shootings (i.e., only shootings in the 21st century), the researchers hope that this work will assist in developing the groundwork for future studies assessing the potential impact of SRTBs on the perpetration of mass shootings.

Addressing Research Question 1, across both groups of shooters, those who died on the scene and those who survived, TB was present in at least 80% of each group. PB, on the other hand, was present in just over 5% of shooters. The failure to find much evidence of PB should not be taken as an indication that mass shooters do not feel that they are a burden to society or to family and friends. It may simply be an artifact of the modality by which information for the current study was collected. Specifically, unless there was a direct quote in a manifesto left by a shooter, no evidence of PB was observed. Because it is the shooters’ self-perception that they are a burden (and not necessarily others’), it may be more likely to not see this variable as much as TB which can be observed by outsiders (e.g. if someone’s a loner, this will be obvious to peers/family). This is consistent with prior research examining the presence of PB and TB in suicide notes. Gunn et al. (2012) found that only 10.3% of suicide notes showed indications of PB, with 30.7% indicating TB. Lester and Gunn (2012) later examined a larger sample and found an even larger difference in the proportions,15.5% and 42.5% respectively.

The prevalence of TB among both shooters who died at the scene and those who did not highlights the importance of people’s need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). People who feel rejected have low relational value (Kowalski & Leary, 2024; Leary, 2001). As noted by Kowalski and Leary (2024, p. 241), “a good deal of aggression and violence is perpetrated by people who feel that other people inadequately value having relationships with them. In such cases, the perpetrator feels rejected, is invariably hurt and angry, and behaves aggressively.”

The higher proportion of TB evidence among shooters who survived compared to those who died on the scene was surprising. This may reflect the shooter’s motivation. Those who survived and felt that others had rejected them may have been motivated to hurt and kill as many others as they could, excluding the self. Their resentment may be other- rather than self-directed. Shooters who died on the scene, alternatively, may have had more self-hatred that better allowed them to overcome the motive for self-preservation (Lankford, 2015).

An examination of IPTS risk factors demonstrated a higher proportion of short-term rejection in shooters who died on the scene compared to those who didn’t. However, a higher proportion of long-term rejection was observed in shooters who survived than shooters who died on the scene. People who have a history of rejection may desire to enact violence to cause pain to those who have hurt them out of spite, as opposed to self-inflicted harm (Leary, 2015). It is also possible that people who have a long-term history with rejection may have developed a sense of resilience that helps maintain the desire for self-preservation in the face of adversity. Additionally, Joiner (2014) highlights the premeditation that accompanies murder-suicides. Thus, what may seem like the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back may instead create a situation where the perversion of an interpersonal virtue can occur (Joiner, 2014).

The proportion of shooters for which evidence for a capability for suicide was present was similar across both groups, those who died at the scene and those who did not. However, individual risk factors for a capability for suicide did show some differences. Specifically, shooters who died at the scene had higher proportions of active and passive exposure to death, adult trauma, and body enhancements. This falls in line with previous research, such as Pirelli and Jeglic’s (2009), which found those who had been exposed to a death by suicide or acute disease were more likely to have reported a suicide attempt compared to those who had not experienced a similar death exposure. In particular, the active and passive exposure to death may have made death seem less foreboding and, perhaps, a welcome respite from the pain and trauma of life.

The Jaccard Similarity Indices allowed a direct comparison between shooters who died by suicide versus those who died on the scene either through self-inflicted suicide, suicide by police, or by being shot by another individual other than a police. Similarity indices for TB and a capability for suicide were high for the two variables. They were much lower, however, for PB. IPTS risk factors for TB showed strong similarity for short-term rejection followed by long-term rejection.

Regarding Research Question 2, the presence of TB and a capability for suicide in a majority of the shooters indicate that interpersonal constructs evidenced in mass shooters overlap with those of suicidal individuals in accordance with the IPTS. Regardless of the outcome of the shooting, TB was the most represented of the IPTS components, present to some degree in almost 90% of the shooters. While not as prominent, some degree of a capability for suicide was evident in over 75% of shooters, indicating that almost three-fourths of all shooters had experienced physical or psychological events that may have lowered their fear of death, and therefore, enhanced their ability to overcome the instinctual human behavior for self- preservation.

Within the TB construct, short- and long-term rejection constituted the most prominent IPTS risk factors, with some form of short-term rejection present in almost 80% of all mass shooters. This presence of short-term rejection as an antecedent experience in a majority of shooters may indicate a lack of proficiency in individual coping and crisis response skills (i.e., managing emotions and behaviors in events that may evoke heightened arousal). While many individuals are fired from their profession or broken up with by a romantic partner, only a statistically rare few go on to perpetrate a mass shooting. Additionally, with at least 40% of all shooters expressing a fascination with firearms, and all having access to firearms, this may indicate a missed opportunity for intervention, such as means safety. As a crucial piece of suicide safety planning interventions (see Stanley & Brown, 2012), means safety seeks to remove or limit one’s access to lethal means (e.g., firearms) before and/or during times of crises. Restricting (e.g., safe storage, universal background checks) and/or removing one’s access to lethal means has proven effective for suicide intervention (Jin et al., 2016), which yields promise for translating such an intervention to individuals deemed at risk of perpetrating a mass shooting.

Limitations and Future Research

As an exploratory descriptive analysis, the results of the current study should be interpreted with caution. First, the sample size is limited due to the rarity of occurrence of mass shootings. Second, as noted, PB was not often evidenced if the shooter did not express it prior to their shooting. It may be important to gain insight into the absence of PB in online sources that detail shooters’ antecedent thoughts and behaviors. Additionally, if a shooting was perpetrated as a result of radicalization, it may be difficult to find evidence of TB as these individuals may have swung the pendulum of belonging to an excessive amount rather than thwarted (see Joiner, 2024). Third, beyond manifestos that only a few shooters left behind, it is impossible to discern the true motives and feelings of shooters who died on the scene as truly suicidal. Thus, understanding the true impact of individual risk factors on particular shooters is difficult. Fourth, the study gathered information from open sources such as media reports and the Violence Project Database (Peterson & Densley, 2019). Media report snapshots of information that may be true in the moment until disconfirming information is later revealed in which case a story may or may not be updated. In addition, public records for juveniles are limited, which affects the nature of data accessibility. Other databases for mass shootings exist that differ slightly in the shootings reported along with other characteristics. Depending on the database used, slightly different results may emerge. Finally, this study did not code for the absence of variables, only for the evidenced presence of an interpersonal variable. This method does not allow for definite absences of variables, which may result in missing data not found within the included sources. Future research should continue to allocate efforts to better understanding the impact of suicidal ideation on perpetrating mass shootings. Additionally, future research should consider utilizing a case study research method to counter the small sample size of perpetrators and to possibly allow for a better understanding of varying risk factor experiences that may occur between persons.

Conclusion

Results support previous theory (Joiner, 2024) that components of the IPTS would likely be evidenced in antecedent behaviors and experiences (i.e., before the shooting) of most mass shooters. Though PB was not observed to the extent of TB and capability for suicide throughout the coding process, it is most likely the case that this construct would present greater through self-reports. These results offer initial exploratory evidence that most mass shootings may, at their core, be influenced to some extent by SRTBs as described by the IPTS. By addressing mass shootings through such a point-of-view, prevention and intervention efforts may benefit from alignment with those proven efficacious for SRTBs. Such efforts may include restricting and/or removing access to means (Sarchiapone et al., 2011; Wintemute et al., 2019), safety planning (see Stanley & Brown, 2012), and psychoeducation regarding crisis response skills (e.g., distress tolerance skills; see Linehan, 2014). By confronting perceived threats with upstream preventative measures, rather than reactive, the researchers believe that the frequency of mass shootings could be reduced.

NOTES

  1. These statistics should be interpreted through the lens of firearm technology and social context. Firearm technology has advanced markedly in recent years. Additionally, prior to the digital age, records were insufficient regarding incidents of mass violence and often did not include shooting massacres of people groups with limited rights, such as Native Americans.
  2. It is assumed in this study that all mass shooters had access to lethal means due to the use of a firearm in their shooting.
  3. While there may have been more recent mass shootings that fell between May 6, 2023, and the submission of this paper, a cutoff date had to be established for coding and data analysis purposes.
  4. It should be noted that the shooting which took place in Rifle, CO, only had four sources listed due its lack of news sources accessible to the raters.


ARTICLE APPENDIX
An appendix to the article containing the study’s case list is available below.

(Click table image to enlarge)

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

DATA AVAILABILITY
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, Tyler Hendley, upon reasonable request.

 

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About the Authors

Tyler Hendley is a second-year clinical psychology Ph.D. student at Louisiana State University. His research interests include suicide intervention and prevention efforts in child and adolescent populations, examining interpersonal processes as they relate to suicide-related thoughts and behaviors, and firearm violence on a mass and individual level.

Nicholas Deas is a Ph.D. candidate in the Natural Language Text Processing Lab at Columbia University. He conducts research at the intersection of Natural Language Processing and the social sciences, focusing on reasoning about and modeling attitudes and identity with language models.

Sophie Finnell is a graduate of Clemson University beginning her career in the field of social work and community-centered care. While at Clemson, Sophie worked with a team of student Senators to establish the first LGBTQIA+ Living-Learning residential Community in the state of South Carolina. In addition to advocating for the LGBTQ+ community, Sophie is also passionate about women’s empowerment, mental health, self-love and acceptance, and the power of empathy in the fight for social justice. She is currently working towards a Masters of Social Work at the University of South Carolina.

Robin Kowalski is a Centennial professor of psychology at Clemson University. She obtained her Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Her research interests focus primarily on aversive interpersonal behaviors, most notably complaining, teasing and bullying, with a particular focus on cyberbullying.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Hendley, T., Deas, N., Finnell, S., & Kowalski, R. (2025). Mass shootings in the 21st century: An examination through the lens of the interpersonal psychological theory of suicide. Journal of Mass Violence Research. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR40414

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Partisan Media Bias in the Framing of the Parkland School Shooting and the March For Our Lives Movement

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Partisan Media Bias in the Framing of the Parkland School Shooting and the March For Our Lives Movement

Mila Seppälä Email the Corresponding Author
University of Turku (Finland), John Morton Center for North American Studies and Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science

Article History: Received October 13, 2023 | Accepted August 14, 2024 | Published Online September 24, 2024

ABSTRACT

This study examines the role of partisan media bias in the reporting of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in Parkland, Florida on February 14, 2018, and on the March For Our Lives gun control protests that followed the shooting. This study posits partisan media bias at the center of the Parkland shooting. It asks how partisan bias affected the way the media constructed narratives about the shooting and the youth activists who mobilized because of their experiences of victimization. The results show that the national media’s framing of the Parkland advocates and the tragedy itself depended on their partisan orientations. Additionally, the results indicate that there are meaningful differences in the reporting that advocates can strategically use to gain positive coverage from news media.

KEYWORDS
mass shootings, partisan media bias, gun control, media framing, Parkland

The shooting at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida on February 14, 2018, sparked a nationwide student-led social movement that demanded more gun control1 measures from political leaders. The March For Our Lives (MFOL) demonstration in Washington, D.C. grew into one of the largest protests in the United States, with over 800 sibling events nationwide. Elected officials, the media, and the public praised the young Parkland students for their activism. The activists also had a significant impact in building both public and elite consensus on the issue of gun control. The Republican-led Florida Legislature passed the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act less than a month after the shooting, which tightened gun control measures in Florida. In addition, while the student-led nonprofit organization March For Our Lives was unable to convince the Trump administration to support legislative changes on a federal level, their policy suggestions were embraced by the presidential campaign of Joe Biden in 2020. This study explores the impact of the Parkland students’ activism by examining the narratives that were told about them in national news media together with narratives about guns and gun control. In particular, this study seeks to understand how narratives about guns are constructed in mass shooting reporting by an increasingly partisan news media and the opportunities activists might have in communicating their message within that landscape.

The data for this study was collected from four national news media sources, The New York Times, CNN, Fox News, and Breitbart to answer two research questions: 1) How did major news outlets frame the survivors-turned-advocates for gun control and 2) how did major news outlets frame the topic of mass shootings in the aftermath of the Parkland shooting? The analysis relied both on deductive and inductive content analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2019; Kuckartz, 2014; Morse et al., 2021; Schreier, 2012), while drawing on studies on media framing of youth political participation (Gordon, 2009; Thurlow, 2007; Wyn, 2005), mass shootings in general (Lawrence & Birkland, 2004; McCluskey, 2017; Muschert & Carr, 2006), and the Parkland shooting in particular (Holody & Shaughnessy, 2020; LaRose et al., 2021; Rohlinger et al., 2022). The findings were considered within the framework of partisan media bias (Levendusky, 2013a; Mutz, 2006; Shultziner & Stukalin, 2020, 2021) to untangle the choice of frames each news outlet was contending with from the very beginning of the shooting.

The way partisanship affects mass shooting reporting by the media has been researched to some degree (McCluskey, 2017; Muschert, 2007). However, besides the study by Holody and Shaughnessy (2020), the role of partisan media bias has been absent from the studies examining the reporting on the Parkland shooting. Arguably, the Parkland shooting presents a unique case to study due to the emergence of a strong national student movement that made explicit political claims about the shooting, inclining the news media towards a particularly partisan framing in its reporting. Researching the effects of partisan media bias on mass shooting coverage is crucial, especially as highly publicized, high-fatality shootings are becoming more frequent (Valeeva et al., 2022). At the same time, the media landscape is increasingly fragmented and partisan (Hollander, 2008; Mutz, 2006; Stroud, 2010). In addition, this study contributes to the scholarship on media representations of social movements and protests by considering the interaction between the protest paradigm and partisan media bias. The traditional protest paradigm dictates that media representations of social movements are mainly negative and sensational (McCurdy, 2012; McLeod, 2000). However, recent studies have found that if the ideological leanings of the newspaper align with the movement, the protest paradigm is less consequential (Chuang & Tyler, 2023; Kananovich, 2022). The case of the MFOL movement offers a new perspective on a student-led protest, which was highly critical of both parties in the divided government but took a partisan stance on a contentious political issue.

The Parkland students’ social media activism has gained considerable research attention (Austin et al., 2020; Cheas et al., 2020; Jenkins & Lopez, 2018; Zoller & Casteel, 2021), but little consideration has been given to how the national news media participated in either promoting their message or discrediting it. By examining how prominent news outlets represented the activists themselves and their diagnosis of the issue and its solutions, inferences can be drawn about the frames different media outlets are willing to adopt and how advocates can strategically exploit partisan media bias. In addition to studying how partisan media bias influences the framing of mass shootings, the study’s findings clarify the opportunities and challenges that partisan media poses to advocacy groups.

Literature Review

Gun Control as an Issue

Gun violence is a unique epidemic in the United States (American Public Health Association, 2022). On one hand, studies consistently show that there is a correlation between gun ownership and gun-related deaths (Leach-Kemon & Sirull, 2023; Miller et al., 2022; Studdert et al., 2022; Wallace et al., 2021). On the other hand, gun culture is steeped with historical ideas about what it means to be “American,” notions that are intertwined with individualism and the fundamental rights of citizens to be free from overreaches by the government inscribed into the Constitution. In the U.S. context, gun control is difficult as a social regulatory issue that is passively supported by the majority of the public (Gallup, 2022) but singularly opposed by an active minority (the gun control paradox, see Cook & Goss, 2014; Goss, 2006). Furthermore, the 400 million guns in circulation (Small Arms Survey, 2017) can make the problem seem insurmountable. These factors have contributed to the fact that it was only after the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting that a nationwide grassroots movement mobilized around the issue of gun control in a comprehensive way (Cook & Goss, 2014). Sustained advocacy work has only recently led to significant action by state and federal legislatures to address the problem, even though mass shootings are a constant reason for public outrage, and communities, often poor and of color, are being ravaged by everyday gun violence (Kravitz-Wirtz et al., 2022).

Partisan Media Bias and Covering Protest

Gun control messaging in the United States happens in a media landscape that is especially fragmented and politically polarized (Starr, 2012; Steppat et al., 2022; Stroud, 2011). Partisan media has been widely studied and debated. There is significant disagreement whether news media is traditionally more liberal (Groseclose, 2011) or conservative (McChesney, 2003), how much partisan preferences influence the public’s choice of news outlets (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2017; Nelson & Webster, 2017; Weeks et al., 2016), or how much media exacerbate partisan polarization of the public (Levendusky, 2013a, 2013b; Stroud 2010; Suhay et al., 2018). However, it seems clear that news media is increasingly being influenced by partisan considerations from the top of the organizational structure to the individual choices journalists make (Mutz, 2006; Shultziner & Stukalin, 2020, 2021). Partisanship does not affect every news outlet the same way, but it can influence what news gets reported, what becomes salient, and what frames are used (Shultziner & Stukalin, 2021).

When reporting on social movements and protests, the protest paradigm can complicate the logic of partisan bias. Gitlin (1980) argued that the media has a vested interest in upholding the status quo to protect its place in the power structure, and as such will not contradict the fundamental organizing principles of society. For example, when news media reports the actions of a movement protesting against its government, they reproduce social conflict “in terms derived from the dominant ideology” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 270). Indeed, scholars have found that news media’s reports of social movements often marginalize protestors, especially those of color (Harlow et al., 2017; Ismail et al., 2019; Mills, 2017), delegitimize movement claims (Ashley & Olson, 1998; Xu, 2013), emphasize individuals over the collective (Gitlin, 1980), and sensationalize violence (Brown, 2021). When the protestors are young, as was in the case of Parkland, negative tropes about youth political participation can also be employed. Young people can be seen as still “citizens in the making” who need to be taught how to “correctly” engage in politics by the adults in their lives such as their parents and teachers (Collin, 2015; Earl et al., 2017). These understandings of youth political participation can lead to media coverage that frames student activists in an infantilized manner, depoliticizing their message, or suggests that the students are being manipulated by radicalized adults (Gordon, 2009; Thurlow, 2007). Moreover, not only is youth activism sometimes seen as lacking in adult guidance, but it can also be likened to youth delinquency that is troubling and destabilizing for society (Wyn, 2005).

However, most recent studies have found that the protest paradigm misses some nuances in analyses of media coverage. Media can also portray protestors sympathetically by amplifying diverse social media voices (Elmasry & el-Nawawy, 2016) and legitimizing the claims of protestors (Li et al., 2023; Trivundža & Brlek, 2017). This is especially true if the protestors challenging the state are ideologically aligned with the partisan leanings of the news outlets (Chuang & Tyler, 2023; Kananovich, 2022; Kim & Shahin, 2019). In cases of student movements, sympathetically predisposed media coverage can also rely on positive conceptualizations of youth activism, where their participation is seen as different rather than lacking in adult guidance (Collin, 2015). These types of understandings can be tied to a notion that young people are capable of bringing about change in the world and as such become the sites where adults may project all their hopes and dreams of socioeconomic transformation (Wyn, 2005).

Framing of Mass Shootings

Gun control often gets attention in news media after a mass shooting. Scholars have extensively studied media framing of mass shootings since the Columbine shooting of 1999. Studies of mass shooting reporting have employed framing analysis from diverse perspectives. For example, Lawrence and Birkland (2004) analyzed issue-defining frames, while Holody and Daniel (2016) and Muschert and Carr (2006) considered frame salience by studying which frame was given the most attention, based on factors such as repetition or headlines. Holody and Shaughnessy (2020) examined frame valence by analyzing whether frames emphasized positive or negative qualities of the subject matter. In Columbine, the most prevalent media frames were gun control, mental illness, and violent popular culture (Lawrence & Birkland, 2004; Muschert, 2007). Mass shootings were framed through moral panics, which were particularly popular in news media discourse at the turn of the 20thcentury. The perceived rise in crime was seen as connected to young people confusing fantasy with reality and being corrupted and desensitized to violence due to TV shows and video games (Glassner, 1999). Such narratives permeated the Columbine reporting too, which played its part in popularizing the “tough on crime” policy positions that followed (Altheide, 2009; Madfis, 2016; Morrow et al., 2016).

The frames in later shootings have remained largely the same with the three key narrators offered as the most prevalent explanation to the question of why such massacres happen (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2013). Especially in the beginning of the news cycle, focus is given to the particulars of the perpetrator, their mental health, and race if it is something other than white (Holody et al., 2012). Attention is given to how culpable other actors are in the shooting, including law enforcement, the school, and the family of the perpetrator (McCluskey, 2017; Muschert, 2007). After the Aurora, Colorado theater and Sandy Hook Elementary School shootings in 2012, there was a widespread media shift to focus on the victims rather than the perpetrator (Holody & Daniel, 2016; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Studies have also found evidence that the violent popular culture frame is becoming less relevant, while ideologically motivated, terrorism-related shootings are increasingly receiving intense attention in media coverage (Silva, 2020; Silva & Capellan, 2018, 2019).

The Parkland shooting has been the subject of multiple studies. Rohlinger et al. (2022) examined claims made for gun control and gun rights after the Parkland shooting in both national and local news and found that political actors in Florida were able to amplify a unified gun control message, while gun rights groups promoted multiple competing frames to their detriment. LaRose et al. (2021) studied how media framing of the Parkland shooting changed across time and place and discovered that while the framing remained largely the same as in previous shootings, there was a particular emphasis on school security. Holody and Shaughnessy (2020) identified in their study of media frames used in national and local coverage of the Parkland shooting that gun control was the most salient frame. They concluded that the MFOL activists recognized how previously established mass shooting frames, such as mental illness and popular culture, were distractions that disrupted the gun control conversation they wished to promote (Holody & Shaughnessy, 2020). Studies on media framing of school shootings have shown that news outlets rely on well-established scripts when reporting on such tragedies. Furthermore, the studies on Parkland in particular have shown largely the same trends, with the exception of the student activists who managed to draw more focused attention to gun control. This study continues and expands this literature by considering how partisan media bias affected these narrative choices and the opportunities and challenges the activists had in this landscape. 

The Current Study

To examine partisan bias in the reporting of the Parkland school shooting and to understand how the activists and their advocacy work were represented by news media, this study posits two main research questions:

RQ1: How did major news outlets frame the survivors-turned-advocates for gun control?

RQ2: How did major news outlets frame the topic of mass shootings in the aftermath of the Parkland shooting?

Within the framework of partisan media bias and the protest paradigm, this study predicts that left-leaning news outlets (The New York Times and CNN) will frame the gun control advocates positively, while right-leaning news outlets (Fox News and Breitbart) will frame the movement negatively. Furthermore, the study predicts that partisan dynamics will also influence coverage about the shooting itself. Gun control as a solution to gun violence has been a dividing issue between the parties ever since the 1960s (Cook & Goss, 2014). Most recently, Democrats in Congress have almost unanimously supported gun control, while Republicans have remained unified in their support for gun rights (Kurtzleben, 2018). The study expects that established frames found in previous studies will be used to frame the shooting. In addition, the frames discovered in the three Parkland studies provide insights into how gun control was countered (Holody & Shaughnessy, 2020; LaRose et al., 2021; Rohlinger et al., 2022). The analysis is therefore conducted by testing two overarching hypotheses with two sub-hypotheses.

H1: The framing of the media coverage about the Parkland survivors and gun control advocates will align with the partisan leanings of the news outlet.

H1a: Fox News and Breitbart will convey a message that the survivors are uninformed and victims of liberal indoctrinations.

H1b: CNN and The New York Times will convey a message that the survivors have the power to effect change.

H2: The media framing of mass shootings will align with the partisan leanings of the news outlets.

H2a: Fox News and Breitbart will frame mass shootings as an issue of lack of school security, mental illness, and violent popular culture.

H2b: CNN and The New York Times will frame mass shootings as an issue of lack of gun control.

Method

Data Collection

The articles were collected from the websites of four national news media outlets, which were chosen because of their significant readership and to represent the partisan bias evident in U.S. media. Metrics from Comscore were used to assess the most-read national news outlets.2 In January 2020, CNN was reported to be the most popular online news media platform with the most unique visitors (148 million), while The New York Times had 109 million visitors (CNN Pressroom, 2020). Fox News had 114 million unique visitors on its website in January 2020 (CNN Pressroom, 2020). Breitbart is a less consumed news source among the wider population with 5.2 million unique visitors in February 2019 (The Righting, 2019).

How to consider partisan bias in the selection of the news sources was more complex. For comparison’s sake, the ideal scenario would include a right-wing news source that is three standard deviations to the right of center on the ideological spectrum and a left-wing news source that is three standard deviations to the left of center. Unfortunately, such precise quantitative measures of news source ideology do not exist, and more crude measures have been heavily criticized (Benjes-Small & Elwood, 2021; Mahadevan, 2023). In fact, studies of right-wing media in the U.S. find that there is no comparable media ecosystem on the left (Benkler et al., 2018).

Another option was to consider the partisan identification of the audiences reading the news outlets. Pew Research Center finds that 93% of those adults who named Fox News as their main source of political news identified as Republicans, while 91% of those respondents who named The New York Times and 79% of those who named CNN identified as Democrats (Grieco, 2020). Less than 2% of the respondents mentioned other right-leaning news sources. Notably, audiences identifying as Republicans tend to cluster around Fox News, while Democratic audiences are split among a wider array of media sources (Grieco, 2020). For this case study, Breitbart was chosen due to its unique position as a popular platform among the voices in the constellation of right-wing actors who promote so-called anti-woke, anti-liberal, anti-elite positions that are often rooted in ideas of white supremacy and misogyny (Benkler et al., 2018; Hawley, 2017). Overall, the aim was not to make definite statements about the level of partisan biases present but to account for some of the different narratives that exist both in left-wing and right-wing media. Importantly, including additional sources would not change the current interpretation of the news media analyzed here.  

The data sample was collected by searching for the phrases “Parkland school shooting” and “March For Our Lives” beginning from the shooting on February 14, 2018, and ending on February 28, 2019, with the last year mark story. This search produced 236 articles. When attempting to collect new data at a later period, two issues arose. First, some news stories were never long-term archived. Second, some news stories were actively removed from the websites. Therefore, comparability issues would exist if new data were collected at a different period, even if looking in archives. The data was further narrowed to articles with mentions of the Parkland students as well as to articles that comment on the issue of mass shootings. This search produced a final dataset of 200 articles, excluding episodic articles. The articles were divided fairly evenly, with 42 articles collected from CNN, 48 from The New York Times, 59 from Fox News, and 51 from Breitbart.  

Coding Process and Data Analysis

Emergent themes from the data were coded using the NVivo qualitative analysis tool, which allows systematic coding according to themes, sentiments, relationships, and the exploration of linkages between the three. Drawing on previous studies on media framing of both youth activism and mass shootings and in particular the Parkland shooting, both deductive and inductive content analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2019; Kuckartz, 2014; Morse et al., 2021; Schreier, 2012) were used to generate categories of frames found in the data. News articles describing either the Parkland advocates or the issue of mass shootings were considered to contain a frame if it promoted “a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The sections within an article coded for particular frames ranged from a phrase to multiple paragraphs in length. This analysis meant coded sections could contain multiple, co-occurring, and overlapping frames.

In the first phase, the data was carefully read and coded according to all the themes found in the text. From the initial codes, main framing categories were developed by combining inductive and deductive content analysis that relied on theoretical frameworks. To answer the first research question, how the news outlets framed the activists, four main categories were identified drawing on the emergent themes arising from the text and theories of media representation of youth political participation and the protest paradigm:

  1. Victims: framing the activists through their experiences of victimization
  2. Youth power: framing the activists as smart/capable/strong and/or their activism as something useful/impactful/desirable
  3. Youth deficit: framing the activists as naïve/stupid/uneducated/gullible and/or their activism as something unhelpful/bad/harmful
  4. Co-opted movement: framing the activism as deceitful/taken over by adults

To answer the second research question, how the news outlets framed the topic of mass shootings, seven main categories were identified drawing on the inductive content analysis and theories of mass shooting framing:

  1. Gun control: access to guns as the cause/gun control as the solution
  2. Special interest groups: gun lobby/political groups as the cause/obstructing the solution
  3. Government failures: lack of action/action by government agencies the cause/solution
  4. School security: lack/more school security the cause/solution (security officers, security tools, arming teachers)
  5. Mental health: mental illness the cause/improving mental health the solution
  6. Local officials: actions of local officials the cause/solution (police department, school board, teachers, superintended)
  7. Violent popular culture: violence in video games/TV shows/movies the cause/restricting consumption the solution

In addition, following the definition by Holody and Shaughnessy (2020), frame valence was considered to provide more information about how the news outlets represented gun control activism and the topic of guns. If the framing of an article was positive towards the MFOL activists or presented gun control as the solution to stopping mass shootings, it was considered positive. If the framing of the article was negative towards the advocates or delegitimized gun control as a solution, it was coded negative. In the presence of both perspectives, the salience of the frames was considered by analyzing whether one frame was used multiple times or presented in the headline, abstract, or beginning of the article. Cases where activism and/or gun control were present without any commentary, quotes, or details into the content of the suggestions were considered neutral.

The codebook drafted for the second phase included criteria for coding the articles into the four categories identified for the framing of the MFOL activists and the seven categories identified for the framing of the shooting. In addition, the instructions included guidelines for coding the valence of the articles, when activist frames and gun control frames were present. To check the quality of the coding process, intercoder reliability was tested on a 10% random sub-sample of the articles. The author and a researcher outside of the study coded the articles with the codebook using the NVivo software. The guidelines in the codebook were discussed and clarified before coding. Agreement between the coders in the test sample was 95%.Disagreements were resolved in a feedback session and the guidelines were revised accordingly. The rest of the articles were coded again by the author.

After the coding process, descriptive tables were created to offer an overall summary of the data analysis. The tables describe the number of articles coded for specific frames as well as the valence of the articles in each news source with MFOL activist frames and gun control frames. Comparisons between the number of frames and the valence of the frames were made to test the hypotheses that the framing of activism and the shooting aligned with the partisan leanings of the news sources. In addition, qualitative content analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2019; Kuckartz, 2014; Morse et al., 2021; Schreier, 2012) was used to consider how each news source employed and combined particular frames to present an overarching narrative about the Parkland school shooting and the activism that followed it.

Results

Framing of the Activists

The activist frame was the only frame that was consistently and prominently featured in all four news outlets from the very beginning of the shooting in February to the end of the year mark. The New York Times and CNN’s portrayal of the MFOL activists were overwhelmingly positive. In The New York Times, 77% of the articles that used activism frames used them positively while in CNN, 79% of the articles with activism frames were positive. CNN focused heavily on the activists immediately after the shooting, while The New York Times shifted their attention to the activism primarily in March, when the March For Our Lives protest was organized. In contrast to the more left-leaning news outlets, Fox News and Breitbart in particular overwhelmingly framed the activists negatively. In Fox News, 47% of the articles with activism frames were negative toward the activists (35% of them were neutral). In Breitbart, 69% of the articles with activism frames were negative. Breitbart,out of all the outlets, right from the beginning, was much more focused on the activism than the shooting itself—it was the only outlet that had more articles about the shooting in March than in February when it occurred. Where the other outlets for example featured the gun control frame from the beginning until the end, the focus of Breitbart remained on the activists and the political figures Breitbart drew into its narrative. None of the articles on CNN and The New York Times that had activist frames were negative. Overall, the findings confirm that the framing of the coverage that the news outlets provided about the Parkland survivors-turned-gun control advocates aligned with their partisan orientations (Table 1).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

However, there are significant discrepancies in how the different media outlets framed the narratives of the MFOL activists that need to be considered further (Table 2). The specific frames each news source chose illustrated the type of narratives they told and the different ways the partisan leanings materialized.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

From Victimization to Activism and the Power of Youth Political Participation

As survivors of a mass shooting, the Parkland students were given space to express their views in all the media under study, but CNN and The New York Times connected those aspects positively to their activism. CNN in particular framed the activists first and foremost through their experiences of victimization. Fifty-two percent of all the activism frames that represented the MFOL advocates primarily as victims appeared on CNN (see “victims” in Table 2). These articles approached the narrative through the everyday consequences a shooting leaves in a person’s life and how activism can be used to heal from that experience. Activism as a response to trauma and turning “pain into change” (Ryan, 2018) was an explicit structure CNN used multiple times (see Appendix A1).

In contrast, The New York Times featured 53% of all the youth power frames in the data. These frames focused on the power of youth activism, particularly what set them apart from those that came before them (see “youth power” in Table 2). One of the main claims made by the Parkland students, who would later organize the MFOL marches, was that gun violence is more of an intergenerational issue than a partisan one. The activists continuously juxtaposed the “adults” who have been incapable of solving the continued epidemic of gun violence and the “kids” who have been left to suffer the consequences in a way that has come to define them as “the mass shooting generation” (Burch et al., 2018). Instead of relying solely on their authority over the issue through their experiences of victimization, they emphasized their own power to affect change: “The adults who ‘have the responsibility to take care of these things’ have failed, he said. ‘It’s our generation’s responsibility’” (Turkewitz & Yee, 2018). The New York Times represented the MFOL movement in ways that set them apart in a positive manner from political decision-makers. In their narrative, young age offered a unique perspective that could have a transformative effect:

Even after a year of near continuous protesting — for women, for the environment, for immigrants and more — the emergence of people not even old enough to drive as a political force has been particularly arresting, unsettling a gun control debate that had seemed impervious to other factors. (Yee & Blinder, 2018)

The students were described as being unsullied by cynicism and traditional politics. Although inexperienced in politics, they were seen as eloquent and savvy enough to be capable of inspiring societal change (see Appendix A2).

Naïve Youth Running a Co-opted Movement

Fox News and Breitbart focused on employing the tactics of negative media coverage of youth activism, where young people were represented as not as capable of participating in civic action due to their lack of experience and knowledge (see “youth deficit” in Table 2). Forty-one percent of these types of frames appeared in Fox News, where patronizing language was used to frame the youth activists advocating for gun reform, describing them as being well-meaning but naïve and ignorant of the realities of the real world (see Appendix A3). The rest of the 59% of the articles were found in Breitbart, where the language used was even more hostile towards the students, and tropes about youth delinquency were employed. The radicalized leftist adult was seen as responsible for the brainwashed, misbehaving youth (see “co-opted movement” in Table 2). Breitbartdevoted significant attention to stories that suggested that the entire movement had been co-opted by liberal elites, claiming that “the rally first planned by high school students was quickly hijacked by the left and gun control groups, transforming it into a turn out-the-liberal-vote event” (Starr, 2018a). In Breitbart, very little explicit exposition was needed to mark MFOL as an illegitimate, adult-led movement. Michael Bloomberg and George Soros, two billionaires who have donated money to Democratic campaigns and gun control activism, were frequently mentioned with the presumption that readers would know who they were and what their association implied. The narrative of corrupt liberal elites working behind the scenes and deceiving the public to advance their own agenda was told with cues that readers who already share this worldview know to look for. 73% of the articles where the co-opted movement frame was used appeared in Breitbart, but the remaining 27% of the cases were found in Fox News (see examples in Appendix A4).

However, the negative narrative Fox News and Breitbart constructed about the MFOL activists seemed to be more motivated by partisanship and a distaste for the policies the youth were advocating for than disbelief in youth activism in general. In 27% of the negative articles about the young gun control activists, Fox News and Breitbart contrast them specifically to the few students who were vocal advocates of gun rights. Not only was the participation of these students seen as desirable, but they were also framed as heroes whose fight with their liberal classmates, the media, and the Democrats was admirable and courageous: “Being a hero of the right isn’t easy. Especially for a 16-year-old who opposes the majority of his classmates’ calls for more restrictive gun laws” (Flood, 2018).

Framing of Mass Shootings

The central claim the youth activists made was that guns were the main cause of the shooting and that the best way to prevent one in the future was to implement more gun control measures. Gun control has consistently been part of mass shooting reporting, but it was particularly prominent in the Parkland coverage due to the considerable role of the activists. As with the framing of the activists themselves, the framing of the shooting aligned with the partisan leanings of the news outlets (Table 3). Seventy-five percent of the articles that had the gun control frame were positive in The New York Times, while the same was true for 67% of the articles on CNN. Both left-leaning sources reaffirmed the claim that guns are the cause of mass shootings. Fox News framed gun control negatively in 53% of the articles that discussed the issue, while Breitbart delegitimized gun control as a solution in 83% of the articles.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Exploring the frames used to define mass shootings revealed how the partisan leanings of the news outlets influenced the vastly different stories they told about the tragedy in Parkland (Table 4). The New York Times and CNN framed the lack of gun control as the main issue, focusing on government failures and the influence of special interest groups that lobby for gun rights such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) as the reason for that oversight. Fox News and Breitbart used other common mass shooting frames to counter gun control as a solution, primarily focusing on the failures of local officials as the reason for the shooting and promoting school security and arming teachers as a solution. Contrary to expectations, violent popular culture was not a prominent part of the reporting by any of the news outlets.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Gun Control, Government Failures, and Special Interest Groups

Regardless of the political biases of the news media or the valence of the frame, each news source used the gun control frame the most often with cases found in 99 articles overall. On CNN, gun control appeared the most (31%), while on Fox News, it appeared the least (21%). All outlets, with the exception of Breitbart, also consistently featured gun control from the beginning until the end of the year mark. Both CNN and The New York Times amplified the gun control frame by writing stories about the specific policy proposals the activists were advocating for and by offering contextual information that reinforced their claims. CNN had links to the MFOL website and introduced their primary demands (banning assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, restricting ammunition sales, and closing loopholes to background checks). The New York Times wrote about the type of assault weapons used in other mass shootings to support the assault weapons ban advocated by the MFOL activists (see Appendix B1). Fox News and Breitbart framed gun control as a vague and ineffective policy at best and government infringement at worst (see Appendix B1). They explicitly criticized policy proposals that targeted specific types of guns or their features. Fox News saw no practical difference between an AR-15 rifle and a game-hunting rifle (Lott, 2018b), while Breitbarttook the argument even further claiming that a ban on any part of the weapon would lead to the banning of guns altogether (Hawkins, 2018a). In the two Breitbart articles where gun control was framed positively, Breitbart reproduced mainstream media articles quoting speeches of Democratic politicians notorious in right-wing spaces such as Hillary Clinton. This is a common tactic in right-wing alternative media where mainstream media is used as a reference to recontextualize information within their own news content and ideological agenda (Haanshuus & Ihlebæk, 2021; Mayerhöffer & Heft, 2021). No explicit negative framing was present, but within the context of the overarching narrative Breitbart has been producing about corrupt liberal elites, it was precisely the positive framing of gun control through Hillary Clinton that made the policy itself suspect.

Government failures was the second most used frame in the data, appearing in 64 articles overall. Twenty percent of the government failures frame were in CNN, which used the framing of the activists who presented the problem as intergenerational rather than partisan and reproduced their advocacy for bipartisan solutions. While The New York Times also reaffirmed the intergenerational nature of the issue, the stories also elaborated on the resistance from the Republican Party and the Trump administration to enact policy (see Appendix B3). In contrast to the other outlets that focused on government failures from the beginning until the summer, The New York Times also featured the frame for the whole duration of the one-year reporting. This focus was apparent in the number of times the frame was used as well. With 34% of the cases, government failures appeared most often in The New York Times. Both Fox News and Breitbart also used the government failures frame but with a different focus. Breitbart, with 22% of all the articles that used the frame, and Fox News with 24%, mainly described gun violence as the result of bad liberal policies. These policies enacted by various actors, such as the Obama administration and Democrats in Congress, left people unsafe and vulnerable (see Appendix B3). However, for both Fox News and Breitbart, government failures also implicated mistakes made by the FBI, particularly its failure to respond to a tip it had received about the threats the perpetrator was spreading online:

In January, the FBI had the dots connected for them by a tipster who told them all about Cruz, his fascination with firearms, and his desire to kill people — and they did absolutely nothing. This what you call a catastrophic failure of law enforcement. This is also a situation where everyday citizens did exactly what they were supposed to — they saw something and then they said something — but in an ocean of red flags, the government still failed at its primary function — to protect us. (Nolte, 2018a)

The activists highlighted the role the NRA has played in preventing the passing of gun control legislation and both The New York Times and CNN contextualized this in their reporting (see Appendix B2). The New York Times, which showed the most diversity on the framing choices out of all the news outlets, used the special interest group frame in 10 articles (21% of the cases). It was the only one to feature the frame across the yearlong reporting. On Fox News, where the frame appeared the least (17%), the NRA was only used when the speeches of the youth were reproduced and only once was blaming the NRA portrayed as a negative position to hold (see Appendix A4). NRA was defended vigorously on Breitbart. However, most of the time, when they mentioned special interest groups they were talking about entirely different organizations. In clear contrast to the other three news media outlets, Breitbart spent considerable time negatively framing the connections of the youth activists to adult-led gun control groups and used those connections as proof of the fraudulent nature of gun control as a solution (see Appendix B2). Left-wing media was accused of backing those organizations and assigned blame for mass shootings due to their refusal to enforce accountability on the real enablers and perpetrators (see Appendix B2). Breitbart’s unique focus was also reflected in the fact that Breitbart had the highest number of articles that used the special interest frame (37%).

School Security, Mental Health, and Failures by Local Officials

Three frames—school security, mental health, and local officials—were used by all the news outlets but Fox News and Breitbart explicitly positioned them to be either the cause or the solution to mass shootings instead of gun control. School security was a particularly useful example when considering the effect partisan media bias had on the reporting. For The New York Times, which used the frame the most with 10 articles (31% of the cases) and for CNN, which had it in seven articles (22%), school security meant different security enforcement tools such as metal detectors, armed law enforcement, and clear backpacks that could serve as additional measures to gun control. For Fox News, which used the frame in eight articles (25%), school security could mean those things, not as an addition but as an alternative to gun control. However, in most cases, school security meant arming teachers. For Breitbart, which used the frame as often as CNN, security and broadening the purview of gun rights to include schools and teachers was ubiquitous (see Appendix B4). Importantly, the school security frame had the most lasting power in comparison to all the counter-frames found in the reporting of all the news outlets. It was the only frame in addition to activist and gun control frames that was featured in all the news outlets from the beginning until the end of the year mark.

The mental health frame was the least prevalent out of the three that were used to counter gun control with appearances only in 24 articles across all the news sources. Mental health was featured in all the outlets only in the beginning of the reporting in February and March. While the activists who paid less attention to the topic may have influenced the lack of mental health framing, the school security (32 articles overall), and local officials frame (40 articles overall) were more prominent in countering the gun control message. As a solution, addressing mental health concerns through increased funding or in other undefined ways was mostly a promise made by lawmakers or the few prominent voices emerging out of Parkland that were self-proclaimed defenders of the Second Amendment (see Appendix B5). Breitbart in the four articles that featured the mental health frame did not dedicate any time on how it could be part of the solution and instead, only lamented on the mental illnesses of the perpetrator.

Local officials such as law enforcement and the school board were also blamed for the Parkland tragedy particularly in the beginning of the reporting. All four news outlets covered stories criticizing the police officers who had refused to enter the building during the shooting and questioned how the perpetrator had obtained a gun, given his previous run-ins with the local police department (see Appendix B6). Likewise, the news outlets reported on the troubling behavior that went ignored by the school officials, which was enough for the two parents of Parkland victims to run for the district school board (see Appendix B6). Fox News focused the most on the failures of local officials (35%), but Breitbart explicitly used those failures as proof of the need for strong gun rights so that citizens could be armed to defend themselves: “The only lesson a rational person can take away from the Parkland school massacre, is this: federal and local law enforcement is either too corrupt, inept, or hamstrung, to protect our children. Therefore, we must protect ourselves” (Nolte, 2018b). A surprising element emerging from this analysis is that unlike hypothesized, the frame of violent popular culture often found in other shootings was not relevant here. There was no mention of it in the reporting of Breitbart or CNN, and on Fox News and The New York Times, the frame appears only twice—both in February and in March about a video game that allowed players to act out school shootings. It could be that the particulars of the Parkland shooting made the violent popular culture frame less relevant. For example, the glaring mistakes by the local officials made them easy to blame for the shooting, which meant less focus was paid to other potential causes.

Discussion

The activists were prominently and consistently featured in all the outlets for the entirety of the period under study here, from the beginning of the shooting on February 14, 2018, until February 28, 2019. The fact that there is reporting about the MFOL activists throughout the year shows that their activism impacted the duration of the reporting on the Parkland shooting, which was far longer than the one month that is typical for mass shootings. This finding is in line with studies such as by Holody and Shaughnessy (2020). In addition, like Holody and Shaughnessy (2020) and LaRose et al. (2021), this study mirrored the results of other studies that found that mass shooting reporting after Columbine has stayed largely the same and that gun control continues to be the most prominent frame to be used in such media coverage. However, the effects of partisan bias on mass shooting media coverage have not been systematically explored before. Thus, this study asked how major news outlets framed the Parkland shooting and the gun control movement March For Our Lives that followed it.

First, it was hypothesized that framing of the media coverage about the Parkland survivors and gun control advocates would align with the partisan leanings of the news outlets. The findings illustrate that negative and positive framing of the activism was dependent on the partisan leanings of the news outlets. CNN and The New York Times conveyed a message that the survivors could effect change by advocating for gun control policies. They framed the young age of the activists as precisely the reason why they should be listened to, seeing them as different rather than lacking in adult guidance and in that difference holding the key to breaking the pattern of inaction in federal gun control legislation. In clear contrast to the traditional protest paradigm and building on the findings of recent research such as Chuang and Tyler (2023), Kananovich (2022), and Kim and Shahin (2019), this study provides firm evidence that when the partisan positions of the activists align with the newspapers the coverage is sympathetic and message-affirming. In the case of Parkland, where the activists were particularly young, the media coverage took advantage of tropes that emphasized the positive aspects of youth political participation and the transformational power generational shift could bring (Collin, 2015; Wyn, 2005).

Fox News and Breitbart conveyed a message that the MFOL activists were uninformed and victims of liberal indoctrinations.Employing the trope of “citizens in the making” (Collin, 2015), they framed the MFOL youth as naïve, incapable of comprehending the effects of the policy positions they were advocating for and lacking in skills to participate in politics without adult guidance. More in line with the traditional protest paradigm, their claims were delegitimized, they were infantilized and accused of being manipulated and radicalized by adults with a nefarious agenda. Yet, in conservative youth, the conservative media outlets found the same hope for their future that CNN and The New York Times found in the MFOL movement. The MFOL advocates were disparaged to discredit their claims about gun control.     Secondly, it was hypothesized that media framing of mass shootings would align with the partisan leanings of the news outlets. The findings illustrate that the different causes and solutions offered to mass shootings were dependent on the partisan leanings of the news outlets. CNN and The New York Times conveyed a message that guns and lack of gun control are the most immediate causes of mass shootings. Frames such as government failures and special interest groups were used to support that main frame by offering reasons for how and why inaction on policies restricting access has led to the current situation. In contrast, Fox News and Breitbartconveyed a message that mass shootings happen not because of easy access to guns but because of lack of security and armed staff as well as poor law enforcement responses and school policies. However, unlike in previous shootings and hypothesized, mental health was not a significant frame used to explain mass shootings. Violent popular culture was even less relevant.

Instead, Fox News and Breitbart countered gun control by prominently featuring frames such as government failures and special interest groups. However, in their narratives, these referred to the failures of lenient liberal policies, politically compromised FBI, and incompetent local officials. Their mistakes were proof of the inability of government, local or federal, to keep its citizens safe and inevitably, proof of how government regulation policies such as gun control could not work. They sought alternative solutions to mass shootings by keeping schools secure with tools such as metal detectors and by arming school officials. The importance of school security as a solution, compared to mental health or attempting to restrict access to violent popular culture, is central to the findings of this study. It is in line with studies such as McCluskey (2017) that found that Republican states often framed school shootings through the school security frame and LaRose et al. (2021) that found school security was particularly emphasized in the Parkland case. Silva (2020) and Silva and Capellan (2018, 2019) also found that ideology and terrorism-related frames seem to be replacing the violent popular culture frame. Building on this research, this study argues that the importance of mental health and violent popular culture as frames used in mass shooting reporting are waning. Concurrently, school security is being developed as a prominent counter frame to gun control. It could be that the particulars of the Parkland shooting drove these framing choices. It may also be that frames like arming teachers, which directly oppose gun control, may become increasingly appealing as right-leaning outlets prioritize “culture war” issues.

 Limitations

The data selection process of this study brought with it some limitations. The findings could have been more conclusive and shown greater variety if the study had included more news sources from a broader ideological spectrum such as Mother Jonesor the New York Post. In addition, the data did not include any local newspapers. While Holody and Shaughnessy (2020) did not find differences in the frames that community newspapers and national newspapers used, the importance of partisan media bias on local news reporting, especially in the case of mass shootings, should be further explored. Finally, partisan alignment impacts the way news media interacts with the messaging by activists, which in turn gives advocates more opportunities to influence the media framing of their issues. While those opportunities are considered in this study, more research is still needed to understand how media framing and partisan bias affect the messaging of activists. It seems clear that the MFOL activists were aware of how media framing tactics could serve as a distraction from the gun control conversation. How much that awareness affected their messaging strategies is less clear. Due to the data selection, this study can only offer findings from the way the media framed the issue and the activists.

Policy and Research Implications

The present study aimed to further the research on mass shooting reporting and the partisan media biases that influence it, particularly as mass shootings have become a prominent site for political activism. The frames used in the coverage of Parkland were not new but there were qualitative differences in how each news outlet used them. Researchers and advocates alike should understand what purpose each frame serves in media narratives. Partisan bias is not the only factor that affects journalistic choices. However, an issue that has become as polarized as guns in the United States is increasingly susceptible to such influences. Mass shootings are at the center of a policy fight that is not only deeply ingrained into partisanship but has direct, devastating, real-life consequences. Mass shootings do not happen nearly as often as gun suicides or everyday gun violence that are destroying particularly impoverished communities. Yet, mass shooting reporting is still one of the most effective ways advocates can get attention to their messaging, even or especially in the current fragmented media landscape. This study showed that positive media coverage is possible when the policy positions of advocates and protestors align with the media outlet’s partisan leanings. CNN and The New York Times consistently reaffirmed both the policy of gun control and the credibility of its advocates.

 Breitbart was unlikely to positively frame the MFOL advocates or their solutions once gun control became their primary policy goal. Fox News was inclined to positively frame solutions that targeted school security or mental health, but this came at the expense of gun control policies. Advocates should be more conscious of the overarching stories offered by different media to understand how their claims can be aligned with those stories. The results are not surprising, but they do offer nuance to the discussion about mass shooting framing and the importance of partisan media bias. Left-leaning narratives have consolidated around gun control. Future research should keep exploring how frames such as school security are being developed, employed, and consolidated as counter to gun control. Whether these trends affect local reporting should also be investigated. There the opportunities for advocates could be more favorable. 

NOTES

  1. Gun control is used throughout the article because it describes the advocated policy, and the media sources analyzed in the study use it widely. However, recently activists themselves have shifted from talking about gun control to gun violence prevention to better describe the scale of the problem and the solutions.
  2. Information about unique visitors is available through the reporting of news sources that pay companies such as Comscore to release the data. In February 2020, CNN pressroom offered comparative results about the largest news sources including CNN, Fox News and The New York Times but had no such reporting on Breitbart. The closest comparable time frame could be found in the reporting of The Righting in January 2019, which also uses Comscore data.


ARTICLE APPENDIX
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

FUNDING STATEMENT
This work was supported by the Helsingin Sanomat Foundation.

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About the Author

Mila Seppälä is a Ph.D. candidate at the John Morton Center for North American Studies (JMC) and the Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science at the University of Turku, Finland. Her research focuses on youth political participation and the gun violence prevention movement in the United States. She has published articles on the topic in Political Behavior (2023), Journal of American Studies (2021) and a book chapter in the open access volume Up in Arms: Gun Imaginaries in Texas (2022).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Benita Heiskanen, Dr. Kirsi Cheas, and Dr. Maiju Kannisto for their invaluable assistance with this study as part of the #TRAGE research project as well Jaakko Dickman for his generous help with the coding process. I am grateful to Associate Professor Michael Hansen, whose insightful comments and guidance were essential to the publication of this paper. Finally, I extend my thanks to the editors of this journal and the two anonymous reviewers, whose comments and suggestions greatly improved the manuscript.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Seppälä, M. (2024). Partisan media bias in the framing of the Parkland school shooting and the March For Our Lives movement. Journal of Mass Violence Research. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR53552

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Rage, Prayers, and Partisanship: US Congressional Membership’s Engagement of Twitter as a Framing Tool Following the Parkland Shooting

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Rage, Prayers, and Partisanship: US Congressional Membership's Engagement of Twitter as a Framing Tool Following the Parkland Shooting

Allen Copenhaver1 Email the Corresponding Author, Nick Bowman,2 and Christopher J. Ferguson3

1School of Justice Studies, Eastern Kentucky University
2Newhouse School of Public Communications, Syracuse University
3Department of Psychology, Stetson University

Article History: Received February 17, 2023 | Accepted September 25, 2023 | Published Online November 5, 2023

ABSTRACT

Twitter is a popular social medium for members of U.S. Congress, and the platform has become focal for framing policy discussions for constituents and the media. The current study examines the corpus of N = 5,768 Congressional tweets sent on the day of and week following the 2018 Parkland shooting, over 25 percent of which (n = 1,615) were related to the shooting. Democrats were far more likely to engage Parkland as a prominent topic in their Twitter feeds. Democrats framed Parkland discussions in terms of outrage and criticism, as well as discussions of the potential causes of and (legislative) solutions to gun violence. Republicans mostly avoided Parkland discussions and political framing.

KEYWORDS
U.S. Congress, framing theory, Parkland shooting, gun control, Twitter

On February 14, 2018, a teenage gunman shot and killed 17 people and injured 14 others at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, in what is colloquially referred to as “the Parkland shooting.”1 In response to the Parkland shooting politicians turned to various media channels and outlets, including their own social media accounts, to express grief for victims, discuss gun violence and gun control policies, and generally engage the public. Such social media engagement could be seen as a natural extension of Congressional office – engaging with constituents in an open and public space. However, this engagement can also be understood through the lens of framing theory (Goffmann, 1974), as “frames” exist as a way for politicians to quickly establish heuristics for how these issues are discussed by constituents (Conway et al., 2015) and taken up by media institutions (Shapiro & Hemphill, 2016). To this end, the current study takes a quantitative content analysis approach to analyze the frequency and qualitative content of the population of Tweets sent by members of Congress on the day of and week following the Parkland Shooting. We do this to (a) analyze the discussion frames used in those tweets and to (b) understand key Congressional variables (such as political party affiliation) that correlate with the use of some frames over others.

Literature Review

The Parkland shooting was unique and politically important because of the social significance and volume of the social movements which took place after the shooting. The Parkland shooting commanded more news coverage than any other recent school shooting both in volume and duration (Nass, 2018), with perhaps the exception of the Robb Elementary School shooting in Uvalde, Texas on May 24, 2022 in which 19 students and two teachers were killed (Osteen, 2022).2 One of the distinctive aspects of The Parkland shooting was the fact that its coverage extended beyond the normal 30-day lifespan of mass shooting coverage in the U.S. (Holody, 2020). The Parkland shooting garnered social significance in large part from survivor gun control activists. These activists engaged Florida state and federal politicians, as well as the NRA to take up legislative solutions to gun violence, such as regulations for stricter gun control. In the days after the shooting, survivors challenged politicians who offered prayers and condolences on Twitter, staged school walkouts, and even directly challenged Florida Senator Marco Rubio at a town hall meeting for his acceptance of NRA campaign contributions – much of this culminating in the March 24, 2018, nationwide “March for Our Lives” (Torres, 2018). Much of this conversation took place via Twitter (Williams et al., 2019).

Social media has influenced how politicians interact with their constituents, making it easier and faster to disseminate messages to broader audiences (Straus & Glassman, 2016). Research has identified major social media platform (Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) usage rates of between 94 and 100% for members of the Senate and between 87 and 100% for Representatives (Straus, 2018). Congressional members use social media to gauge their constituents’ opinions and communicate their own political views and activities to the public (Congressional Management Foundation, 2011), although Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers (2010) suggest that this usage tends “not to provide new insights into government or the legislative process or to improve transparency; rather, they are vehicles for self-promotion” (p. 1612). Similarly, the political stances adopted by most politicians tend to cluster broadly around conservative or liberal leanings, rather than being issue specific (Copenhaver et al., 2017).

One way to consider this Congressional engagement with social media is through the perspective of framing, or the “selection of some aspects of a perceived reality” (Entman, 1993, p. 52), which results in audiences paying attention to some elements of an event more than others. Framing efforts are purposeful and uniquely communicative in nature, as they are formed through the careful selection and omission of information (Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1981), and are politically advantageous to politicians who employ such frames. Iyengar (1990) suggests that framing efforts are a crucial tool for assigning blame or responsibility for political issues. Scholarly research on mass shootings has a history of employing framing analysis to understand how media covers mass shooting events, as well as how it further influences the public’s understanding of such events. In one example, Silva (2021) found the New York Times employed four different frames in its coverage of mass shooting events from 2000 to 2016: 1) gun access, 2) mental illness, 3) violent entertainment, and 4) terrorism. In another example, Schildkraut and Muschert (2014) found that media coverage is not stagnant over time in terms of the frames it chooses to cover such events.

Congressional members and their campaigns fuel social media conversations with potential discussion. For example, Lee and Xu (2018) found that attacks and other negative tweets sent by campaigns are more likely to be engaged, while also resulting in more followers (and thus, more users to take up and promote the candidate and campaign messages). This careful crafting of discussion frames is magnified when users engage very selective and specific political ideologies while online. Hong and Kim (2016) report that politicians who take more extreme political positions tend to have more Twitter followers. Wang et al. (2017) were able to predict Twitter users as being either Donald J. Trump or Hillary Clinton followers, based on the user’s everyday tweets and shared photos. Lee et al. (2014) demonstrate that even in groups that are not politically polarized, users still amplify political frames—likely a function of confirmation bias by which individuals with strong opinions simply reinforce these opinions through continued efforts to defend their opinions (see Guerin & Innes, 1989). In all of this, as politicians use Twitter to distribute their own political messages, those messages are taken up and distributed by ardent ideologues and thus, reinforcing the discussion frames that originate from these politicians (Hemphill et al., 2013). The Parkland shooting is a particular example of how this process works, as gun-violence policy advocates drove social media engagement across both Instagram and Twitter in the wake of the shooting (Austin et al., 2020). 

The Current Study

The current study involves two broad exploratory research questions. First, we are curious to understand (RQ1) What were the common frames in U.S. Congressional tweets in response to the Parkland Shooting? Following, we ask (RQ2) Did those frames vary as a function of (a) the political affiliation of the Congressional member (b) the amount of funding the Congressional member received from the NRA, or (c) the proximity of the Congressional member to Parkland, FL?  

Method

The data for this project includes a complete analysis of active public U.S. Congressional Twitter accounts from the day of the Parkland shooting (February 14, 2018), to one week following the shooting (February 21, 2018). English-language tweets were gathered using Twitter’s native search function via a customizable URL below:

https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=from%3A
[Insert Twitter Handle]
%20since%3A2018-02-14%20until%3A2018-02-21&src=typd&lang=en

The complete database for this project (N = 5,768 unique tweets), as well as our coding and data analyses, are freely available online: https://osf.io/h9mev/?view_only=b7c17f1d35834e9ebd4299a2cacffb70. These tweets were analyzed using a mixed methodological approach, first by using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to induce emergent themes from the data corpus (RQ1), and then using quantitative content analysis techniques (Neuendorf, 2002) to compare the frequency of those induced themes as a function of relevant independent variables (RQ2).

A total of 526 of a potential 536 (98.13%) Congress members were included in final analysis (n = 97 Senate members, n = 429 House members),3 as not all members had public Twitter accounts during our search frame. The gender breakdown of all Congress members was 114 female (21.3%) and 422 males (78.7%), and included 419 White (79.7%), 47 Black (8.9%), and Hispanic (5.5%) individuals. The average member age was 59.32 (SD = 10.80) years, with a range of 33 to 87, and they had served in Congress an average of 10.43 (SD = 9.08) years, ranging from “1” to “45.” By political party, 54.6% (n = 287) were Republicans and 45.4% (n = 239) were Democrats. By region, 185 (35.2%) were from Southern states, 94 (17.9%) from Northeastern states, 116 (22.1%) from Midwestern states, 126 (24.0%) from Western states, and 5 (1%) from other territories and regions of the U.S. with non-voting representation in US Congress. Raw NRA scores (pulled from www.votesmart.org) were translated into letter grades, with 251 (47.7%) members earning a rating of “A”, and 234 (44.5%) earning a grade of “F.” Given this bimodal distribution, we decided to break the sample into “passing” grades of “C,” “B,” and “A” (n = 278, or 53.9% of the sample), and “failing” grades of “D” and “F” (n = 238, 46.1%); 10 members did not receive an NRA score. Notably, there was a very strong correlation between political party affiliation (being a Republican coded as “1”) and both accepting NRA donations4 (r = .802, p < .001, n = 523) and receiving a passing grade from the NRA (r = .918, p < .001, n = 516) and thus, the measures are empirically isomorphic. For this reason, only political affiliation scores were retained for further analyses.

NRA grades are established by considering where a political candidate stands on the gun control issue, regardless of whether they identify politically as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, etc. The NRA reviews candidates based on a candidate’s public statements about gun control, voting record on gun control issues, and responses to the NRA-PVF or National Rifle Association-Political Victory Fund Questionnaire. Overall, the NRA grades political candidates according to how well a candidate recognizes gun control efforts as futile in crime fighting efforts, as well as infringing upon U.S. citizens’ Second Amendment rights (Votesmart, 2023). It is pertinent to note that simply receiving the grade of “A” does not automatically equate to a candidate receiving monetary support from the NRA.

Congressional members in this sample sent an average of 2.33 (SD = 4.23) tweets during the scrape period – .72 (SD = .838) on the day of the shooting, and 1.61 (SD = 3.87) on the week of the shooting. Just under 70% (n = 367) of Congressional members made at least one Parkland-related tweet. On the day of the Parkland shooting, Congressional members made 411 tweets about the event specifically (of n = 1,651 total tweets made that day, or about 25% of all Congressional tweets that day). For the entire scrape period, 1,204 tweets about Parkland were sent (about 20% of all Congressional tweets for that period).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Results

For the first research question, an emergent thematic analysis was used to uncover consistent patterns of discussion in the corpus of tweets, an inductive and qualitative analysis approach suggested by Braun & Clarke (2006). For this process, a random selection of 10% of all Twitter accounts (n = 55) was given a deep read by one author of this project, resulting in five emergent frames: expressions of outrage, policy, support, criticizing others, and causes of shootings (Table 1). These themes were independently confirmed by a different author and provide the answer to RQ1. Notably, theoretical saturation was reached within this 10% sample.

After establishing the themes above (and thus answering RQ1), the two coding authors then assigned binary codes (“0” for absence, “1” for presence) to 10% of the data corpus to prepare data for answering RQ2 (the quantitative comparison of the frequency of induced themes as a function of pre-defined variables; see Neuendorf, 2002). Coders achieved acceptable interrater reliability on each discussion frame category (calculated as Krippendorf’s a): expressions of outrage = .882, policy = .897, support = .939, criticizing others = .897, cause of shootings = .884.5 It is important to note that coding categories are not mutually exclusive, and one individual Tweet could be coded across multiple frames.

Having established the validity of these five themes, or frames, their sample-wide frequencies are reported below in Table 2 – these, based on 367 Congressional members who had at least one Parkland-related tweet. In sum there were 1,615 Congressional tweets included in the sample. All 1,615 Tweets were included in the data analysis, with results presented below in Tables 2 and 3 below.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

For the focal test of RQ2, the proportion of each of the five tweet categories (for both the day of the Parkland shooting and the week of the Parkland shooting) was regressed onto each of the eight independent variables above. For tweets sent on the day of the Parkland shooting, all five regression models were significant (see Table 3) and showed a clear pattern such that Democrats were more likely to demonstrate outrage, discuss policy, share criticism, and discuss causes of school shootings, while Republicans were more likely to tweet messages of support. These same patterns were replicated when examining each Parkland theme for the week following the Parkland shooting (although variance in engaging the support frame was non-significant).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Discussion

The Parkland shooting represented a critical moment in the modern political discourse that dominated U.S. newspaper headlines and social media discussions for weeks following the event. Social media was saturated with discussions about Parkland, including engagement from members of U.S. Congress who took to Twitter to share their views and perspectives. The goals of this project were to analyze Congressional engagement with Twitter on the day of and in the week following Parkland, and to both (a) identify common discussion frames within those Congressional tweets and (b) explore potential patterns associated with the use of those frames.

As presented in Table 1, five discussion frames emerged in our data: expressions of outrage, calls for policy, support for victims and first responders, criticizing others, and discussing the causes of such shootings. As might be expected, support frames were far more common in Parkland-related tweets on the day of the shooting (nearly 81% of all tweets), which can be broadly understood through the lens of rally effects, by which immediate reactions to crises tend to be more supportive than critical (Baker & Oneal, 2001). That said, political framing increased sharply in the days following the shooting—that is, there was an increase in the number of tweets expressing outrage, discussing policy, criticizing others (such as other politicians and entities), and debating the causes of school shootings. 

On the day of the shooting, nearly one in four Congressional tweets focused on the Parkland shooting; in one week following the shooting, nearly one in five tweets were still discussing Parkland. Such engagement clearly highlights the importance of the shooting to members of Congress, but a closer look at the political affiliation of those members shows starkly different engagement among Democrats and Republicans. After controlling for numerous other factors, Republicans were far less likely (73% less likely) to tweet about Parkland than Democrats; when they did, Congressional Republicans tweeted their support for victims on the day of the shooting and said very little afterwards. Conversely, Democrats were far more likely to engage political frames associated with outrage, policy changes, criticizing others, and causes of shootings.

Implications

From the perspective of framing theory, both patterns align with partisan politics. In particular, for the pro-gun control Democrat platform, the official stance of the Democratic National Committee is that “[w]ith 33,000 Americans dying every year, Democrats believe that we must finally take sensible action to address gun violence” (see Democratic National Committee, 2023, para. 1). For Democrats, the Parkland Shooting seems to have served as a catalyst for engaging social media to provide discussion frames towards legislative solutions to mass shootings. Democrats’ dual engagement of emotional themes (criticism and outrage), as well as more practical themes (potential causes of and solutions to gun violence), shows an effort to push dialogue around the Parkland shooting proactively, ostensibly to reinforce the party’s larger political platform. Conversely, Republican members of Congress seemed to avoid any political elaboration related to the Parkland shooting. Republicans were far more likely to show initial support for the victims and others affected by the shooting (such as first responders), often in the form of thoughts and prayers, before turning attention away from any further discussion of the Parkland shooting. One interpretation of such a finding is that Republican members chose to disengage from any further discussion of the shooting, perhaps to either (a) reduce focus on debates and discussion of gun control not central to their national platform or (b) draw focus away to other topics (although here, our current analysis does not attempt to interpret non-Parkland related tweets, and as such, these were excluded from data collection and analysis). These findings are somewhat confirmed by a broader comparison of Tweets sent as a function of political affiliation, wherein Democrats sent nearly 100% more tweets on the day of the shooting, and nearly 400% more tweets during the week following the shooting. For Democrats, the Parkland shooting provided the opportunity to engage several different discussion frames associated with gun violence.

Limitations

There are limitations to this study which must be discussed. Twitter was the focus of this study due to its centrality in modern political campaigning as well as the public structure of the platform (Lee & Xu, 2018), but future work might consider other social platforms. Additionally, two central themes of the research highlighted in this study surround: 1) number of tweets and 2) content of tweets. First, as it pertains to the number of tweets, future research should also study how the number of tweets politicians send after a tragedy affects public support for politicians as individuals. Since most constituents never have direct interactions with their representatives, the public has limited opportunities to see their politicians at work. Do tweets affect how members of the public see their leaders and affect their perceptions of the amount and quality of the work they perform? Does this further influence public policy when the public feels satisfied about a particular politician based on the impression management of their Twitter account? Second, are there differences in how politicians respond to mass shootings since the passage of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act? After the Uvalde shooting, Congress passed a historical bill designed to increase background checks for certain individuals wishing to purchase a firearm, increased community access to mental health services, and provided resources to make schools safer (see Executive Office of the President, 2022). In the current study there were important differences in whether and how members of Congress tweeted about the Parkland shooting. Given the bipartisan nature of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, which was supported by both major political parties, would similar tweeting behaviors observed in this study be seen after a mass shooting? Alternatively, would members of Congress be more akin to send similar messages after such a tragic event given that both parties adopted the Safer Communities Act?

Future work might also extend the analysis frame to a longer time-lag, which might reveal other discussion frames or the evolution of initial frames; some members of Congress (including the Republicans in this sample) might have been trying to avoid accusations of “politicizing tragedies” (Robinson, 2017) and thus, stayed silent. A particularly intriguing area for future work would be to correlate emerging discussion frames with agenda-setting effects—that is, to understand how these tweets might impact downstream media coverage and public discourse (Neuman et al., 2014). For example, Donald J. Trump’s 2016 campaign for the U.S. Presidency was successful and largely built on his ability to engage and leverage Twitter to establish issue frames (Wells et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017), and his success is a bellwether for future campaigns.

Conclusion

Overall, this study adds to the framing theory literature on how politicians use Twitter in responding to a highly publicized school shooting. This study also adds to the broader framing literature that examines how media coverage of mass shooting events is framed.  Particularly, this study furthers understanding of how politicians framed a highly politicized school shooting tragedy. Emphasized above was the fact that news media coverage of The Parkland shooting was different in terms of its salience, as measured by the extended lifespan of the event’s coverage. As such, the Parkland shooting and the social response to it, including media coverage, must be analyzed as part of a contemporary understanding of the mass shooting problem in the U.S. Furthermore, this research points to the need to study other highly publicized and politicized mass shootings and school shootings in particular, while focusing on how politicians employ frames via media in the aftermath of mass shootings.

 

NOTES

  1. We refer to the mass school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in February, 2018 as “The Parkland shooting”, as is often colloquially done in the United States.
  2. In addition to traditional national media “swarming” of school shooting locations, ABC created the news series “Uvalde:365” to provide coverage across all its network programs and platforms (Osteen, 2022).
  3. Eight Representatives did not have Twitter accounts. Two Senators did not have Twitter accounts.
  4. Only four Democrats in our study had received campaign contributions from the NRA: Sanford Bishop, Henry Cuellar, Collin Peterson, and Timothy Walz. However, Bishop and Peterson had no Twitter account active during our analysis, and Cuellar made no posts about Parkland. Peterson discussed gun control concerns and victim support in his lone Parkland tweet, sent the day of the attack: https://twitter.com/RepTimWalz/status/963909358433292290.
  5. Complete coder training details, as well as alternative metrics of intercoder reliability, are available in our online supplement files on OSF.


DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT

No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

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About the Authors

Allen Copenhaver, PhD is an Assistant Professor of criminal justice at Eastern Kentucky University.  He conducts research on violent video games, intersections between law enforcement and those on the autism spectrum, and various other areas of research.

Nick Bowman, PhD (PhD, Michigan State University) is an Associate Professor in the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communication at Syracuse University. His research examines the cognitive, emotional, social, and physical demands of interactive media, such as video games and social media.

Christopher J. Ferguson, PhD is a professor of psychology at Stetson University.  He has researched the impact of various media on behavior for 20 years.  He is a licensed psychologist and lives in Orlando with his wife and son.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Copenhaver, A., Bowman, N., & Ferguson, C. J. (2023). Rage, prayers, and and partisanship: US congressional membership’s engagement of Twitter as a framing tool following the Parkland shooting. Journal of Mass Violence Research. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR74816

Successfully Securing a Classroom Door in a Lockdown: Evaluating Two Types of Door Locks

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Successfully Securing a Classroom Door in a Lockdown: Evaluating Two Types of Door Locks

M. Hunter Martaindale1 Email the Corresponding Author, William L. Sandel,2 and Aaron Duron1

1Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center, Texas State University
2School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Missouri State University

Article History: Received December 15, 2022 | Accepted May 15, 2023 | Published Online July 24, 2023

ABSTRACT

While schools face a variety of security threats, none draw the attention of the community quite like an active shooter event. In fact, following an active shooter event in a school many states, local governments, and/or school districts will announce proposed security measures to better protect students, staff, and visitors to schools. While there are innovated security measures proposed, it is well-known that no shooter has breached a locked door. For this reason, this paper seeks to examine the efficacy of a simple security measure that could have an immediate impact on improving survivability during lockdown procedures – the type of door lock. Specifically, this paper examines two different types of door locks utilizing a randomized control trial. This research effort finds that simple, push-button door locks can be secured with fewer errors and faster than a door lock that requires a key. .

KEYWORDS
door locks, active shooter, school shooting, lockdown

On May 24, 2022, a shooter attacked Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas. The shooter shot 38 people, of whom 21 died (Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training [ALERRT], 2022a). This attack is unfortunately only one recent example of an active shooter event to take place in our nation’s schools. While schools face a variety of security threats, none draw the attention of the community quite like an active shooter. In fact, following an active shooter event in a school many states, local governments, and/or school districts will announce proposed security measures. For example, the Broward County League of Cities’ (2018) School and Community Public Safety Task Force released a 90-page report, containing over 100 recommendations, following the tragic February 14, 2018, attack at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. Some of the recommendations include, but are not limited to, improving security cameras, hiring more school-based law enforcement officers, keyless access systems, mental health teams, improved fencing, and implementing ballistic resistant material in safe spaces (Broward County League of Cities, 2018). While we believe many of the recommendations in this report are important, this manuscript provides empirical evidence for a simple security measure that can have an immediate impact on improving survivability in an active shooter event – door locks. The importance of door locks is no more evident than in the attack at Robb Elementary School.

According to the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission (2015) report, there has never been an active shooter event in which an active shooter breached a locked classroom door. There have been instances where an attacker shot through classroom windows to gain access to a controlled space; however, none have breached a locked door (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2019). This issue has become especially salient in the aftermath of the attack at Robb Elementary School. Early reports indicate that the door to Room 111 was not locked, and this enabled the shooter to gain unfettered access to the classrooms (ALERRT, 2022a; Texas Department of Public Safety [DPS], 2022). Furthermore, reports and teachers from Robb Elementary School have indicated that all classroom doors could only be secured by inserting a key from the hallway side of the door (ALERRT, 2022a; DPS, 2022). In fact, one Robb Elementary School teacher stated in an interview that she had to step into the hallway to lock her classroom door with a key while the initial gunshots were fired outside of the building (Khimm et al., 2022).

While it is important to ensure the doors are locked, can the type of door lock impact how accurately and quickly a door can be locked? This article attempts to answer this question by testing two different types of door locks utilizing a randomized control trial. One of the tested door locks is the same as the style used at Robb Elementary School.

Literature Review

While active shooter events in schools are rare,1 they are at the forefront of the public’s attention. This is especially true when the events qualify as a mass shooting or mass murder event (see Sandel & Martaindale, 2022 for distinction). Attacks like the ones carried out at Robb Elementary School and Sandy Hook Elementary School have led to the country demanding changes to ensure the safety of children at school (Addington, 2009; Burns & Crawford, 1999; Madfis, 2014; Muschert & Peguero, 2010; Rocque, 2012). Responses to these demands usually result in policymakers implementing policies that are designed to prevent school shootings and increase school safety. Examples of these school safety measures include, but are not limited to, having armed police officers present at schools, the use of metal detectors, and stricter measures controlling access to the school (Campus Safety Magazine, 2009; Fox & DeLateur, 2014; Muschert & Peguero, 2010; Newman et al., 2004; Rocque, 2012). However, researchers have shown that these measures may not be effective at preventing attacks (Madfis, 2016).

While intricate security measures continue to be introduced, one of the most effective ways to prevent multiple casualties at a school may be one of the simplest: quickly performing a lockdown to deny access. It has been found that no active shooter has ever breached a locked door in the United States (Martaindale et al., 2017; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2019). In fact, Kirkland (2018) has suggested that a simple door lock may be the most cost-effective device that can be used to prevent casualties during active shooter events.

Lockdown Drills

It is reported that as many as 95% of schools in the United States conduct lockdown drills at least once per year (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). While drills may vary, lockdown drills, generally, include locking the door, turning off lights, moving out of the line of sight from any windows, and remaining silent/not responding to prompts from outside the door (Keyes & Deffner, 2015; Trump, 2011). It is important to note that lockdown drills are not synonymous with active shooter drills (Schildkraut et al., 2020). Active shooter drills include actions to take in response to active shooter events (e.g., Avoid, Deny, Defend or Run, Hide, Fight; avoiddenydefend.org; Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]), whereas lockdown drills are intended to be used for any type of threat in, or immediately around, a school. The actions taken during a lockdown are a component of the multi-option response protocols utilized in active shooter training (Jonson et al., 2020).

Although most schools implement some form of lockdown drill, there is a paucity of research on the mechanisms of performing lockdown drills. To our knowledge, much of the limited research assesses performance or skill retention following some form of lockdown or response training (Jonson et al., 2020; Dickson & Vargo, 2017; Schildkraut & Nickerson, 2020; Zhe & Nickerson, 2007), while other scholarship focuses on participants’ perception of fear, safety, or preparedness (Schildkraut et al., 2020). In the most recent study, Schildkraut and Nickerson (2020) found, after completing lockdown training, students exhibited mastery with three of the four steps in lockdown (i.e., locking the door, turning off lights, and not responding to door knocks) and near mastery for remaining silent and out of sight. Participants also self-reported increased levels of preparedness (Schildkraut & Nickerson, 2020).

While it is important to master all aspects of lockdown procedures, the most foundational aspect repeatedly identified by scholars is successfully locking the door (Schildkraut et al., 2023). While the type of door lock may have an impact on one’s ability to be successful, it is important to understand the impact of fine motor skills and stress. As such, the following section will discuss the performance mechanism required to be successful.  

Motor Skills Learning Process

Although engaging the lock of a classroom door may seem simple, the learning of this motor skill involves a variety of cognitive processes and steps. When first beginning to learn new motor skills, such as how to operate a classroom door lock, the ability to understand and remember the correct sequence of movements involved in the action is essential (Di Nota & Huhta, 2019). A person’s brain does this by breaking down large movements into component (motor) chunks, which are small discrete movements from a larger action sequence (Zacks & Sargent, 2010). With continued training, these motor chunks can eventually be grouped together into larger action sequences that allow for a person to perform the larger action with less mental effort (Bläsing, 2015; Sakai et al., 2003).

Stress can impact the use of motor skills. Stress can be described as an individual experience that can be triggered by the environment (e.g., the presence or sounds of a firearm being discharged) and internal factors (e.g., the fear of seeing or hearing a firearm; see Di Nota & Huhta, 2019). Using attentional control theory (ACT), it has been suggested that stressful or threatening stimuli draws attention towards the threat and increases the mental effort required to perform a task (Eysenck et al., 2007). In order to offset the negative influence of stress on a person trying to perform a task, researchers have suggested that experiencing occupationally relevant stress can lead to the promotion of performance (Di Nota & Huhta, 2019; Oudejans & Pijpers, 2009, 2010). It is within reason that ongoing lockdown drills can provide much needed stress relevant practice for school personnel.  

Typical Door Lock Mechanisms

The motor learning process is the same when it comes to learning how to operate a door lock. However, depending on the type of door lock that is used in a school, the physical operation of the door lock will differ. Whalin (2015) suggests there are a couple different types of locks that can be used in schools that are building code compliant and follow the guidelines set forth by the National Association of State Fire Marshals (2018).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

One type is known as the office entry lock (see Figure 1A for an example). A door equipped with an office entry lock can be locked from the inside of the room using a thumb-turn or push of a button. The office entry lock routinely has keyed access on the outside of the lock. The next type of lock is the storeroom lock. This type of lock requires that the door be unlocked or locked using a key outside of the classroom (such as the locks used at Robb Elementary School; Figure 1B for example). The storeroom lock is also known in the industry as the classroom function lock. The storeroom / classroom function lock is popular because of its ease of access from outside the room and a reduced likelihood of accidentally locking the door (ASSA ABLOY, n.d.). Lastly, schools can also use an electronic classroom lock. This type of lock can be locked remotely using a fob worn by teachers or other staff members. The lock can always be unlocked from the inside by turning the door lever. However, electronic classroom locks can be expensive to install compared to traditional door locks.

Door Devices

More recently, devices designed to secure classroom doors in the event of a shooting have been developed. The 123 Lock-Down Latch is one such device. Osier (2018) states that this device is attached to a classroom door via screws and works similarly to a hotel door bumper. The idea is that classroom doors can always be kept locked. The 123 Lock-Down Latch keeps the door slightly open so students and teachers can enter and exit the classroom freely. However, if there is a shooter at the school, the 123 Lock-Down Latch can be quickly and easily manipulated to allow the already locked door to close.

TeacherLock® is another device that is designed to secure classrooms during a shooting (TeacherLock: Protecting students one door at a time, 2018). This device is made from aircraft aluminum and stainless steel. It is mounted beneath the door handle to the classroom door via a set of screws. There is a unique cylindrical-shaped key that is made to work with this device. In the case of an emergency, a person will insert the key into the device, which will create a deadbolt-type lock. This will prevent anyone from entering the room. When people need to exit the classroom, there is a plate that is pushed forward in order to disengage the lock. This device is ADA compliant and also allows first responders to open the door from the outside.

The JustinKase Universal In-Swings and JustinKase Out-Swing Door Arm are two other devices that were developed to prevent school shooters from entering a classroom (Justin Kase: When seconds count…, n.d.). The first device slides under the door and is then extended to fit securely around the frame of the door. The second device requires a holder that is attached to the door. The device is then slid into the holder and hooks over the door frame to keep the door from being opened.

Problems with door devices include being costly, the likely violation of fire codes, and making it difficult for first responders to bypass the device to gain access to the classroom (Dorn, 2018). Therefore, researchers have suggested that the use of a lock that does not require a key is best to prevent a shooter from entering a classroom, such as the office entry lock activated by a push button. This type of lock is recommended because it could be easier to activate under life-threatening stress (Martaindale et al., 2017). Unless the person that will be engaging the lock (e.g., teacher) is properly trained in operating the lock, which includes practicing using the lock for numerous hours and operating it under stressful conditions, it is likely that the person will struggle engaging a more complex lock. This is because fine motor skills and near vision are impaired in highly stressful situations like school shootings (Grossman & Christensen, 2007; Ripley, 2008). In instances where a key is needed, or when more steps are involved in order to lock the door, both the response time to accomplish this task and the difficulty of the task will probably increase (Blair & Martaindale, 2017; Blair et al., 2011; Luce, 1983; Martaindale et al., 2017). Despite these suggestions, researchers have not directly examined which type of door lock should be used to secure a classroom door.  

The Current Study

The literature suggests that lockdown procedures hinge on successfully locking the classroom door quickly and accurately. Furthermore, stress can negatively impact the fine motor skills needed to actuate locking mechanisms. For these reasons, our research question is simple: Does the style of door lock impact a user’s ability to quickly and accurately secure a classroom door in a stressful lockdown situation? To answer this question, the current study will test the following hypotheses:

H1: Participants will make more errors attempting to secure a door with a keyed lock than a door with a push button.

H2: Participants will take longer to secure a door with a keyed lock than a door with a push button lock.  

Methodology

Design

The randomized controlled trial utilized an independent groups design with random assignment to two conditions. The two conditions included: (1) a door lock that required a key to lock the door from the outside (i.e., storeroom / classroom function lock), and (2) a door lock that required a button to be compressed to lock the door from the inside (i.e., office entry lock). Because the design incorporated random participant assignment to conditions, the participants were blind to which condition of the experiment they were assigned.

Procedure

All procedures used in the study were reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board. Following the signing of the consent form, participants were brought to the lab to complete the study. The lab was designed to mimic local elementary school classrooms. Members of the research team visited local elementary schools to determine where to place the teacher’s desk in relation to the door. On average, the teacher’s desk was 35 feet from the classroom door; therefore, the participants were placed at a desk 35 feet from the lab door. Participants were told, if they heard sounds of gunfire, to protect all their students by rushing to the door and secure it by shutting the door and activating the lock. Participants assigned to the lock with a key were given a lanyard with a single key on it. Participants assigned to the lock with a push button were not given a lanyard. Participants were shown the door and how to lock it prior to the study beginning.

Participants were brought back to the desk to wait for the study to start. Unknown to the participants, a researcher was stationed outside of the lab with a blank gun. The blank gun simulates the sound of real gunfire. Without the participant knowing, the researcher would randomly shoot two shots with the blank gun signifying the start of the scenario. Participants would rush to the door, lock it, and shut the door. The researcher in the hallway would fire a third shot while the participant was trying to secure the door. Once the door was secured (either by shutting the door or by the participant walking away from the door as if successful) the researcher in the lab would inform everyone that the scenario was over, check if the door was successfully locked, debrief the participant, and then dismiss the participant.

Sample

Participants were recruited from criminal justice classes at a large southwestern university. The target sample was 50 participants per condition for a total sample of 100. This would give an approximate power of 0.80 to detect effects of a moderate size within the t-distribution (d = 0.50; Cohen, 1988, p. 30).

A total of 95 people completed the experiment (push button lock: n = 53; keyed lock n: = 42). For the push button condition, one participant did not provide his/her sex, age, or race. For the key condition, one participant did not provide his/her age or sex and two participants did not provide their race. Participants were of equal age in both conditions (t(91) = .48, p = .63, Cohen’s d = .11). There was no observed difference between conditions in terms of participant sex (χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1, Cramer’s V = 0.00). There was also no observed difference between conditions in terms of participant race (χ2(2) = 1.32, p = 0.52, Cramer’s V = 0.12). This sample, while slightly smaller than 100, results in a power of 0.79 to detect effects of a moderate size within the t-distribution (Cohen, 1988, p. 30).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Primary Variables

GoPro cameras were placed inside the lab and on the lab door to record each participant’s performance. These videos were then coded to capture the primary variables. A member of the research team coded 100% of the videos and a second member coded 25% to assess interrater reliability. Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) scores are provided for both primary variables.

Error

A participant made an error if he or she was unable to secure the door. In the key lock condition, an error was made if the participant 1) did not place the key inside the keyhole and lock the door, 2) left the key in the doorknob after shutting the door (meaning the key was in the hallway), or 3) successfully locked and shut the door but remained in the hallway (meaning the participant and the key were both in the hallway with the shooter). In the push button condition, an error was made if 1) the participant closed the door but failed to push the button to lock the door or 2) did not close the door completely. Furthermore, a member of the research team verified if the door was locked by attempting to open the door. The error variable was a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the participant failed to secure the door and 0 if the participant was successful at securing the door. A high degree of interrater reliability was found for this variable (ICC = 1.00).

Speed

The speed variable is a continuous measure of how long it took each participant to successfully secure the door. This was measured as the time from the first gunshot until the door was both locked and closed. If a participant failed to secure the door, he/she is excluded from this variable. The GoPro cameras record at 30 frames per second (fps) (0.03 s of data specificity; i.e., a new frame is visible every 0.03 s). A high degree of interrater reliability was found for this variable (ICC = 1.00).

Results

Errors by Lock Type

Three of the 53 participants (5%) in the push button condition failed to lock the door (95% CI 0.01, 0.17; see Table 2). Thirteen of the 42 participants (31%) in the key condition failed to lock the door (95% CI 0.18, 0.47).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

A test of the proportions of errors comparing the push button and key lock was significant and reflective of a moderate effect (χ2(1) = 6.11, p < .05, Cramer’s V = 0.26; 95% CI: 0.07, 0.45). The resulting proportions and confidence intervals are presented in Figure 1.

While the test statistic is a Chi-square, a test of proportions is not sensitive to small cell sizes. Regardless, as these are count data, a Fisher’s Exact Test was performed and was also significant and reflective of a moderate effect (Fisher’s Exact, p = 0.002, Odds Ratio = 7.31; Cramer’s V = 0.34; 95% CI 0.13, 0.54). Hypothesis 1 (participants will make more errors attempting to secure a door with a keyed lock than a door with a push button) was supported by both tests.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Speed

The 16 participants who failed to secure the door were excluded from the following analysis as they did not have a completion time. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test indicated that the participant speed data violated the normality assumption for both the push button condition (W = 0.92, p < .05) and the key condition (W = .78, p < .001). Boxplots were created and five outliers were found in the data, four in the key condition and one in the push button condition. The five participants successfully closed the door, but each took a long time to get the door secured for a variety of reasons. For example, the one push button outlier slowly walked the 35 feet to the door. The key condition outliers either walked to the door or had a hard time getting the key in the keyhole. These points were removed, and another normality test was conducted. These tests were not significant (push button: W = 0.98, p = 0.54; key: W = 0.94, p = 0.15), suggesting that the normality assumption was not violated when the outliers were removed. Participants in the push button condition took an average of 6.59 seconds to secure the door (95% CI: 6.29, 6.90; SD = 1.06), while participants in the key condition took an average of 11.18 seconds (95% CI: 10.26, 12.11; SD = 2.33). A t-test was then conducted to examine the differences between means with the outliers removed (see Figure 2). This test was significant and suggested a large effect size (t(31.99) = 9.66, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.83 [95% CI: 2.16, 3.48]).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

While we removed the outliers to correct for normality, some might prefer to deal with non-normality using a non-parametric test rather than removing the outlier data. A Mann-Whitney U-test is one appropriate non-parametric test. This test was significant (U = 192, p < .001) and suggested a large effect size (Cohen’s d = 2.17, 95% CI: 1.59, 2.75). Hypothesis 2 (participants will take longer to secure a door with a keyed lock than a door with a push button lock) was supported by both the parametric test with outliers removed and the non-parametric test with the outliers in place.

Discussion

This study found that the type of door lock used can save precious seconds that it takes to successfully secure a door should there be a threat in a school. In fact, participants assigned to the push button lock made significantly fewer errors than participants assigned to the key lock. Furthermore, a door with a simple push button style lock was able to be secured in about half the time it took for a door that required participants to insert a key to activate the lock.

These findings intuitively make sense. The key lock requires the participant to remove the lanyard from where they kept it (i.e., from around their neck or out of their pocket), step into the hallway to access the key slot, place the key in the key slot, turn the key to activate the lock, remove the key, and then return to the classroom while shutting the door, wßhereas the push button simply requires the participant to shut the door and push the button on the lock to secure it. There are many more steps involved in securing a door with a key lock and more ways to fail to secure the lock.

Doors with key locks that can only be used from the hallway are historically common in classrooms (ASSA ABLOY, n.d.). While Whalin (2015) referred to this as a storeroom lock, this locking function is also known in the industry as a classroom function lock. The reason for using this type of lock involves ease of access from the hallway and a reduction in the number of accidental lockings (ASSA ABLOY, n.d.). As shown by these results, however, the downside is that such locks increase the error rate and time for securing a classroom. Another reason these locks are so commonly used in schools is because this type of lock prevents students from locking themselves in classrooms. This can be seen as a positive or negative depending on the situation. Such a lock can prevent a student who is acting out from denying access to their location or the location of other students. Although, many of the office-entry locks also have keyed access from the outside and mitigate these concerns. At the same time, the classroom function lock prevents students from being able to lock the door in the event of a school attack. If there is no teacher around or if the teacher has been hurt, it would be up to the students to secure the classroom. This is made impossible by the classroom function lock. In this case, the only option students would have is to try and barricade the classroom door with furniture, whereas an office-entry lock would allow students to successfully lock the door without needing a key.

Some schools have moved towards having the classroom function locks perpetually in the locked position and only allowing doors to be open during passing periods. This prevents anyone from the hall entering the classroom while class is in session. Though a more secure method of operation, there are still instances where security becomes an issue. The first would be attacks that occur during passing periods when doors are open, and students are generally in the hallways. Another breach to this increased safety involves classrooms with substitute teachers. Substitute teachers are generally not given a key to the classroom; instead, the door is usually unlocked by the custodial staff in the morning and relocked after school. This means that classrooms with substitute teachers have no way of securing their rooms in an emergency situation if the doors utilize classroom function locks. Lastly, the February 14, 2018, attack at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School highlighted the issue of students evacuating their classroom due to a fire alarm and then not being able to get back into their classrooms once the gunfire started.

School is supposed to be a safe place where students are free to learn and develop. School administrators want to protect students, staff, and visitors to their campus. However, there is wide-spread community outcry following a school shooting, especially if it is an active shooter event. Many times, school administrators immediately announce proposed security changes to their facilities in hope of not only protecting their students and staff, but also assuring the community that the school district is taking security seriously. Many of the proposed security measures are prohibitively expensive (e.g., gunshot detection, panic buttons, metal detectors) that require large bond measures to pass or are never implemented. The efficacy of the various security measures generally isn’t known either. We know, based on the official active shooter data, that no shooter has ever breached a locked door by going through the door. This means that attackers have been stopped from gaining access to potential victims because of lockdown procedures where the doors were successfully locked. This experiment showed that something as simple as installing doorknobs that can be locked by the push of a button can be successfully locked with significantly fewer errors and save several seconds over a lock that can only be locked with a key.

It may seem like locking a door, regardless of stress, is something that everyone should be able to do without much practice. These findings, however, suggest otherwise. This is made clear by the fact that there were errors made by participants whose only task was to push a button to lock a door. Schools and administrators must take this into consideration when deciding what measures to take regarding classroom door lock functionality. The commonly used keyed lock (i.e., classroom function lock/storeroom lock) may work better for day-to-day life in schools; however, this can come at the cost of easy security. The simpler push button lock seems to be more effectively used in high stress situations, like an active shooter event. Students having the ability to lock a classroom could provide a more quickly secured environment during a lockdown, though it could also potentially hinder a teacher from accessing his or her classroom. However, as previously noted, many of the office-entry locks also have keyed access from the outside to mitigate this concern. That being said, based on the finding and literature, training seems to be an important part of increasing speed and reducing errors regardless of the type of lock. While research has shown that mastering a door lock during a lockdown drill can be achieved with practice, there is still room for improvement (Schildkraut & Nickerson, 2020). This is especially true when considering the potential impossibility of securely locking a room as a substitute teacher or student.

It is not our position that the other security measures cannot be effective at protecting students and staff. Rather, we believe school administrators should have data to guide their decision-making process. School security measures should also be tested through randomized controlled trials to ensure their effectiveness. School administrators, and the community, need to know that the security measures they have in place are empirically shown to be effective at improving the safety of students and staff members. There is much work to be done examining the various security measures.           

Limitations

As with all research, this study is not without limitations. For the sake of experimental control, we made the scenario simplistic and only focused on two types of door locks. The participant was informed that he or she would have to lock a door after they heard gunfire. In a real situation, the teacher would be taken completely by surprise. There is also no way to simulate the true stress felt by a teacher in a real-life scenario. It is possible that elevated levels of stress would increase the number of errors and the amount of time it takes to properly secure a classroom door. Additionally, there were no students in the scenario. The participant simply had to get to the door quickly, activate the lock, and shut the door. They had a single key on a lanyard where teachers may have many keys to contend with. There were no panicked students to run past, no students or desks between the participant and the door; rather, this was a best-case scenario for the participants and mimicked a classroom where the teacher would have unfettered access to the door.

Future Research

Further research should examine other devices that can be used to secure a door. There are several different types of door locks, wedges, and barricade items marketed for the sole purpose of securing school doors. Additional experiments should examine the efficacy of these items so school administrators can make informed decisions regarding the devices they want implemented in their respective school buildings. Furthermore, this study could be replicated with additional measures. The scenarios could adjust where the teacher’s desk is placed in the room relative to the door, where the students’ desks are placed in the room, and how the teachers are notified to perform the lockdown procedures. Future endeavors should utilize teachers and school administrators as study participants as they do undergo more lockdown drills and practice, as well as use their keys to access classroom doors, more often than the study participants here. Lastly, future research should control for participant stress. This can be accomplished either by self-report measures (e.g., Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) or through physiological measures such as heart rate variability or salivary measures of acute stress (e.g., α-amylase or secretory immunoglobulin-a). These control measures would help researchers understand the impact of stress on performance during lockdown drills.

NOTES

  1. Schildkraut (2021) contends approximately 100 of the 402 mass shootings between 1966 and 2020 occurred in schools (25%). Data sources using other definitions indicate approximately 15% of attacks may occur at schools (ALERRT, 2022b).


DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT

No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

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About the Authors

Hunter Martaindale, PhD is the Director of Research at the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University. Dr. Martaindale is responsible for the development and implementation of ALERRT’s research agenda. His research interests include active shooter events, law enforcement decision making, and the impact of stress on law enforcement performance.

William L. Sandel, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Missouri State University. He is also the director of the graduate crime prevention certificate at MSU. Dr. Sandel started his career as the Research Specialist at the ALERRT Center. His research interests include police and citizen perceptions of use-of-force, police tactics, active shooter events, and hostage negotiations.

Aaron Duron is a doctoral student and doctoral teaching assistant in the School of Criminal Justice at Texas State University. He is currently working on his dissertation involving perceptions of procedural justice and policing. His research interests are policing, mass shootings, and criminal psychology.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Martaindale, M. H., Sandel, W. L., & Duron, A. (2023). Successfully securing a classroom door in a lockdown: Evaluating two types of door locks. Journal of Mass Violence Research. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR74565

 


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Do Mass Shootings in Central and Eastern Europe Differ from U.S. Mass Shootings? Insights from the MSCEE Data

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Do Mass Shootings in Central and Eastern Europe Differ from U.S. Mass Shootings? Insights from the MSCEE Data Set

Alexei Anisin Email the Corresponding Author

School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Anglo-American University

Article History: Received July 1, 2022 | Accepted October 31, 2022 | Published Online February 6, 2023

ABSTRACT

Since transitioning out of communist socio-political orders, more than a dozen Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have experienced mass shootings. To date, scholars have yet to identify a sample of cases that occurred throughout these regions of the world. This study puts forward the first collection of data on attempted and completed mass shootings through introducing 76 cases that occurred in 15 countries from 1993 to 2021. Data comprise 24 variables including offender characteristics of age, sex, motivation, life experiences, mental illness history as well as case-level characteristics including shooting type, location, fatality and injury counts, along with motivational factors including fame seeking and extremism. These data are presented for public access and are encouraged to be used for research triangulation and cross-national social inquiry on mass murder.

KEYWORDS
Central Europe, 
Eastern Europe, mass shootings, homicide, public violence

 

Although commonly perceived as an American phenomenon, mass shootings have arisen in Canada, Norway, Germany, New Zealand, the Czech Republic, and Russia, among numerous other countries. Even though the incident rate of mass shootings is four to ten times lower in Europe or Asia when compared to the United States (Lankford, 2019), dozens of cases have occurred over the past three decades across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). To date, researchers have only examined a limited sample of cases from these regions, which makes CEE contexts incredibly understudied. On one hand, there is a major gap in knowledge of mass shootings and their associated dynamics in these regions. On the other hand, more cases appear to be occurring across some CEE states in recent years. These regions of the world have endured incredible hardships over the course of the last century and many tumultuous processes of social change including two world wars, genocides, state disintegration, gulags, and industrial disasters.

When it comes to guns, the countries under investigation do not have any constitutional right to bear arms. Additionally, they have lower rates of gun ownership than the US and, on average, tend to experience fewer homicides per capita (Anisin, 2022a). At the time of writing this study, no comprehensive source of data on mass shootings in these regions exists. For example, in a single academic article (Malkki, 2014), one book (Hurka, 2017), and one policy report (Duquet et al., 2016), less than a handful of mass shootings that arose in CEE states have been identified. Silva’s recent (2022) global analysis of developed and developing countries probed several cases of CEE regions, including the countries of Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia. This study aims to put forward a reference point for scholars and policy makers who are interested in the cross-national study of mass shootings by presenting a new sample of attempted and completed mass shootings.

I ask whether there are salient differences or similarities between cases that arose in CEE states versus those in the commonly studied context of the United States. Cross-national research on mass murder warrants continuous development, scholarly interaction, and funding. Even though scholarly communities have produced salient policy recommendations about preventing this rare form of homicide, there is still much to be learned about mass shootings. One aspect that seems to be underemphasized in scholarship on mass shootings pertains to the fact that investigating a phenomenon in one single national context may impede our ability to generalize about it or fully understand its underlying nature. Aside from Silva’s (2022) recent inquiry, two studies by Lankford (2016a, 2016b) compared the frequency of mass shootings in the US to other states. Indeed, it is not the case that researchers have only wanted to investigate the United States because of intrinsic biases, but rather most attention has been placed on the American context probably because the incident frequency of mass shootings in the US has been greater than in other countries.

There is much to be learned from comparative inquiry on mass shootings if data from different countries are gathered and made available. This study puts forward the first sample of cases stemming to CEE regions of the world. It identifies 76 different attempted and completed mass shootings that occurred throughout some European Union member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) and some non-EU states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Russian Federation, and Ukraine). These cases make up the Mass Shootings in Central and Eastern Europe (MSCEE) data set. After explaining how data were gathered and how cases were observed, this study presents descriptive statistics on case-level and offender-level characteristics. This is followed by a statistical analysis in which 48 of these cases are assessed in relation to a sample of cases (n = 101) drawn from U.S. mass shootings (1999-2020). Along with presenting new data, the study puts forward a codebook and an appendix with case summaries. The study concludes by presenting directions and recommendations for future social inquiry.

The Mass Shootings in Central and Eastern Europe Data Set

Core Concepts in MSCEE

As with any investigation of mass shootings, this phenomenon must be defined according to specific parameters. The interdisciplinary study of mass shootings has commonly differentiated mass shootings from other types of homicides, such as those related to gang or drug violence. Mass shootings are also events that must involve a certain threshold of victims that get attacked, and, importantly, the attack itself cannot be temporally elongated. This study defines a mass shooting according to criteria defined by Silva & Capellan (2019):

A mass public shooting is an incident of targeted violence where an offender has killed or attempted to kill four or more victims on a public stage. (1) the act can involve more than one offender and take place at multiple related locations within a 24-hour time period; (2) the main weapon has to be a firearm; and (3) the shooting is not related to state-sponsored or profit-driven criminal activity (e.g., drug trafficking or gang shootings). (p. 83)

This definition was used when compiling this data set. Along these lines, this study makes a differentiation between “attempted” mass shootings and “completed mass shootings.” The former are cases in which fewer than four fatalities arose (not including the offender), while the latter are cases in which four or more fatalities arose (not including the offender). For multiple reasons, it can be fruitful to investigate cases that feature less fatalities than commonly used thresholds, especially in contexts that have been understudied. Taking a comparative angle of this sort can enable researchers to identify potentially significant factors that can account for the lethality of cases across different countries. Another reason why attempted cases are included is that they constitute empirically relevant incidents of violence; often, the difference between two, three, or four fatalities is conceptually arbitrary. Finally, the inclusion of both attempted and completed cases into the data set will enable researchers to triangulate these data with cases from other contexts such as the United States. Potential inquiries of this sort probe why some cases result in more fatalities than others on a cross-national basis. They can also reveal patterns or specific tendencies that might be inherent to offenders’ attacks in different shooting location settings. In the MSCEE data set, 72% of cases resulted in four or more fatalities.

Relationship to Existing Data

At the time of when this data set was being compiled, scholars had only identified a handful of total cases that arose in CEE states. This meant that there was a systemic underrepresentation of mass shootings from CEE cases in scholarly research. The MSCEE data set was put together on a scholarly basis and hence may differ from the numerous public policy-oriented approaches to data on mass shootings, such as those put forward by Mother Jones, Everytown for Gun Safety, or the Mass Shooting Tracker. While there is nothing wrong or conceptually erroneous with these datasets, they tend to miss out on detailed offender-level characteristics and do not have as strict of a definition on what constitutes a mass shooting. As such, the present data set reflects methodological strategies that are akin to criminological inquiry on mass shootings, such as the Gun Violence Archive or the Stanford University Library’s Mass Shootings in America (MSA).

Another feature of this data set has to do with generalizability. The variables that were incorporated into the data gathering process were specified according to cultural independency. This means that there are no country-specific or culturally-specific characteristics inherent to any given variable in the data set. By cultural independence, I refer to characteristics that can be interpreted in the same manner regardless of national context. Culturally independent characteristics are not contingent on any particular qualitative or contextual condition. Indeed, it is important to consider that most variables can be influenced or affected by culture, however, a certain degree of abstraction has to be adopted in order to conduct comparative social inquiry. The inclusion of culturally independent variables in this data set will enable researchers to accomplish this. For example, if we take a culturally dependent variable such as corruption into consideration, one can observe that this factor manifests itself in qualitatively different forms in different contexts, such as the “Blat” system that developed in the late-USSR and expanded during the 1990s in Russia, or the Chinese Guanxi system (Ledeneva, 2008; Karhunen et al., 2018). Standard measures of corruption do not capture the culturally dependent characteristics that the phenomenon is reliant upon. As such, at this early point in the development of the MSCEE, the overarching aim is to place focus on culturally independent variables so they can be easily triangulated or combined with variables from other datasets.

Lastly, while the data set does feature the names of perpetrators of each of the 76 cases, this study will not directly mention or reveal offender names, which is in agreement with a recent proposition put forward by Lankford & Madfis (2018), who argue that media should refrain from naming perpetrators in order to lessen the propensity of unintended fame-attribution. Such proposals also reflect the “No Notoriety” and “Don’t Name Them” movements that are gaining prominence in public and scholarly discourses.

Creating MSCEE

The data collection process that went into identifying a sample of CEE attempted and completed mass shooting was rigorous and is a part of an ongoing collection effort based at the primary author’s home institution. Along with the help of three graduate research assistants, the primary author utilized numerous language sources, search indexes, and reports to identify cases across more than a dozen countries. In total, the research team that coded data on case observations was fluent in six languages, and where necessary, we consulted external assistants for interpretational help in languages we were not fluent in. The data gathering process took more than one year and is ongoing with the aim of keeping these data updated on an annual basis for the years to come.

In terms of the time period under attention, all cases were analyzed from 1990 through 2021. In CEE states, data predating 1990 is nearly nonexistent because every single country in the sample had a communist system of governance that included state-controlled media; censorship was rampant both internally and for foreign audiences. It is also worth considering that this overall 31-year period contains variance within it. In the 1990s, largely homogeneous societies experienced a significant decline in socio-economic status where some of the largest privatization processes in the history of economics took place; state-owned resources were privatized, and entire institutions were either transformed or collapsed into an abyss of corrupt marketization. Mortality rates rose in nearly all post-communist European countries, and unemployment and inflation sky-rocketed (Stuckler et al., 2009). Citizens across post-communist societies were twice as likely to feel unsafe walking outside at night than in Western Europe (Holmes, 2009). Most contexts saw crime and corruption rise steeply, which led to widespread social strife and informal systems of exchange that were dominated by criminal groups.

Into the 2000s, however, an upsurge in economic prosperity, increases in longevity and lifespan (an increase of nearly 10 years) and decreases in corruption and crime occurred in all Central European states (McNamara, 2021), and in some Eastern post-communist states. Recent events in Ukraine and Russia have disrupted this trend and are likely to lead to adverse outcomes across both the Central and Eastern regions of Europe for the foreseeable future. Yet, even as recently as 2009, only 5 out of the 24 post-communist states had crime rates that were still trending upwards (Holmes, 2009). Interestingly enough, throughout the data gathering process, there was a clear relation between the number of sources identified and the total fatality rate. Higher fatality incidents received more media coverage and public attention, especially in cases that occurred in recent years (compared to those that took place in the 1990s). Such a dynamic has also been observed in the study of U.S. mass shootings in that major national news outlets are likelier to report on mass shootings that are very deadly (Silva & Capellan, 2019).

Identifying Cases

In total, 76 cases were discovered. Open-source methodology was implemented which reflects common approaches used in data gathering on active shooter events, terrorism, and school shootings (Silver et al., 2019). In identifying cases, the primary author as well as three graduate research assistants first over-viewed scholarly articles and books on topics related to mass murder in CEE. To our surprise, only a few articles fit the inclusion criteria, and these studies featured very few cases from CEE. Policy papers were then searched, and only one relevant study that included two cases from the regions under attention were identified. When an incident that fit our criteria was identified in results provided by search engines, the specific name of the offender along with the city and country of the shooting was searched as a follow up to obtain more information. After running these searches, more references on each shooting and greater details about characteristics and factors related to the shooting were obtained such as post-shooting investigations and trials. After searching through scholarly sources, the LexisNexis archive was explored. Here, eight different cases were identified based on Euronews articles that were in English.

Most cases were identified via Google and Yandex (which is the Russian equivalent of Google). The following terms and phrases either on their own or in combination with one another were searched: “public,” “shooting,” “European shooting,” “mass shooting in Europe”; these led to hundreds of different articles and reports about different cases that arose across the European continent. These two search engines provided us with information for nearly all cases. In detail, search terms in English, Russian and Ukrainian were used in both Google and Yandex. Where necessary, country-specific Google search indexes (e.g., Google.pl for Poland or Google.ro for Romania) were relied on. In the latter, several lower profile cases that arose in nations that do not have large populations (such as Romania) were identified and here, the utilization of country specific search engines was needed because international media did not report heavily on these incidents.

Coding Incident Characteristics

The most common type of source that was encountered were media reports. For each of the 76 cases in this data set, at least two sources were used, and each source was cross-checked by two or more different research assistants as well as the principal investigator. In instances where disagreements about coding case characteristics arose, in-depth reviews of each case were carried out in a collaborative manner. The extent of independent assessments and evaluations of characteristics was representative of what research methodologists refer to as equivalent conclusions (Lombard et al., 2002). Importantly, no variables in this data set have missing values. We purposefully collected all information relevant to the 24 different variables because we are cognizant that some methodological approaches, such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis and its variants (csQCA, fsQCA), cannot work and do not function with missing values. Thus, for any variable in which a value of 0 was coded, this means that the characteristic of the variable was not present for the incident to which the variable is associated with. Table 1 lists a summary of the frequencies of cases across each country in the MSCEE data along with the average fatality count.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

In terms of geography, of the 76 incidents, 53 arose in the Russian Federation, while all other states in this sample saw a relatively similar number of cases. There also are a number of cases that took place in Eastern Russia. Here, incidents in the Far East were nearly all military workplace shootings. Such cases appear to have been driven by a particular logic. In Russia and other former Soviet states, conscription has been mandatory for 18-year-olds, and conscripts have historically suffered from a practice known as “Dedovshchina” that has been carried out since the late Tsarist empire (Daugherty, 1994). This comprises a form of hazing that conscripts and new military members experience from their superiors, which are usually higher ranked officers. Here, hazing features beatings, physical subjugation and violence, bullying, confiscation of one’s belongings and even sexual abuse (Eichler, 2011). While not all shootings that arose in military institutions can be attributed to dedovschina, this factor likely has played a causal role amongst a larger set of strains experienced by offenders.

At this point in time, it is not plausible to infer that such characteristics of Russian military institution shootings fundamentally set them apart from noteworthy military institution shootings that arose in the United States over the last several decades. For example, if we consider cases such as the 2009 Fort Hood mass shooting or the 2019 Naval Air Station Pensacola shooting, these particular incidents were ideologically motivated, yet there have also been military institution shootings which featured bullying, such as 2014 Fort Hood as well as seemingly random incidents that were clearly not ideologically motivated. Next, Table 2 lists case-level variables that the dataset encompasses.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

The most lethal case in the MSCEE dataset is a rampage shooting that took place in a Chechnyan village in October of 1999. Here, an offender killed 35 people. The second most lethal case is more recent and likely known by some segments of western publics – the Kerch Polytechnic College shooting, which occurred in October of 2018 in Kerch, Crimea. Here, a fame-seeking, Columbine-sympathizing offender killed 20 people. Another interesting observation of case-level characteristics has to do with the fact that very few offenders were armed with more than one weapon when carrying out their attacks (22%). Further, Table 3 presents offender-level characteristics. The data also include ethnic classifications for all 76 offenders featuring the following ethnic groups: Chechen, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Polish, Czech, Tatar, Slovak, Albanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Dagestani, Georgian, Kazakh, Hungarian, Armenian, and Polish. As mentioned in earlier segments of this study, details on how variables were operationalized and coded are provided in the accompanying online codebook.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

Thus far, no cases carried out by female offenders have been identified in CEE states. In contrast, in the study of mass shootings in the United States, quantitative analyses have revealed that anywhere from 94% to 96% of offenders are male (Anisin, 2022b). A recent study on female mass shooters in the U.S. context identified 20 such cases in modern history (Silva & Schmuhl, 2022). In Figure 1, the age distribution of offenders is visualized according to attempted and completed mass shootings.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

When it comes to fame seeking mass shooters, this phenomenon is defined as follows: fame seeking mass shooters are driven by a desire to achieve cultural prominence through attracting media attention, writing manifestos, posting online about their attacks prior to carrying them out or even live-streaming their attacks while carrying them out. Such offenders often engage in copycat behavior by imitating prior “successful” mass shooters but may not necessarily imitate the exact behaviors of preceding mass shooters. Additionally, as Bushman (2018) points out, egocentrism and narcissistic traits are prevalent in fame seekers and are even potentially more significant than other motivating factors such as personal insecurities. More details on how fame seeking was coded can be found in the accompanying appendix. In terms of the low percentage of fame seekers in the MSCEE, these percentages are actually relatable to what the U.S.-based Violence Project has detected in fame seeking in US mass shootings: only 7% of 176 cases from the 1960s to present were carried out by offenders who were fame-seekers (Petersen & Densley, 2021). In a study on U.S. cases, Silva & Green-Colozzi (2019) compared 45 fame seekers to 263 non-fame seekers. The total number of fame seekers in the MSCEE data is also very small. With that being said, even if we consider their relative rarity, some of the most heinous cases in recent history were carried out by fame seekers, especially offenders such as the Sandy Hook or Parkland school shooters in the United States and the Kerch College shooting in Crimea.

The role of media in contributing to fame seeking motivations is clearly important and should be explored in future inquires. Lankford (2018) and Silva and Greene-Colozzi (2019) correctly point out that mass media promote the possibility of fame being attributed to mass shooters, albeit unintentionally. This happens through media attributing more coverage to offenders than to some of the most famous celebrities. In CEE contexts, there have been fame seekers that premised their behavior on the Columbine attackers, which indicates that the copycat process is one that has diffused and it is also likely that profit-seeking media dynamics in CEE states are similar to those found in the United States. For instance, the Crimean polytechnic college mass shooter, who was 18 years old at the time of the attack, killed 20 and injured 70 in 2018 and set off bombs in the institution’s cafeteria and library in a direct and strategic imitation of the Columbine massacre. The following year on May 27, 2019, a 7th grader brought an axe and Molotov cocktails to his school in a Russian village and attempted to hack his classmates to pieces and set the premises on fire (Shleynskaya, 2019). The disturbed young man confessed that the aforementioned offender was his hero after the attack. A day earlier in Poland, an 18-year-old also attacked a school, set off a bomb and shot two people. The offender was known to have attacked a girl with a machete a year prior, and preceding the school attack, he posted memes about Columbine on his social media profiles. These incidents have arisen in contexts that feature different socio-cultural characteristics than the commonly studied American context and they generally feature much stricter firearm regulations and lower rates of civilian gun ownership, yet media organizations in these contexts subsist within a larger liberal market structure that is based on viewership, ad-revenue, and similar click-driven profiteering.

In terms of ideologically motivated cases and extremist offenders in the MSCEE, there was a small percentage of such cases, and perhaps extremism in these regions is either not as prevalent as some would expect or manifests itself in different venues and modalities of society. Future inquiry can probe the differences and similarities between ideologically motivated mass shootings in CEE states with relation to other contexts, such as the United States. Finally, apart from the highly lethal village shooting mentioned earlier and the Kerch college massacre, only four other shootings claimed more than 10 lives.

Empirical Analysis

To investigate and identify potential differences and similarities between CEE mass shootings and U.S. cases, 48 cases from the CEE sample (all of which resulted in four or more fatalities), will be statistically assessed in relation to 101 cases drawn from a sample of data on U.S. mass shootings (1999-2020). This sample of cases stems to data that has been used in other inquiries carried out by the primary author of this study (Anisin, 2021, 2022b). This sample contains most of the deadliest mass shootings in U.S. history, including high profile cases that occurred in just the few decades including the shootings at Virginia Tech (2007), Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, CT (2012), Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, FL (2016), the Las Vegas concert (2017), and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL (2018). A full list of cases can be accessed in this study’s accompanying appendix. The variables and characteristics of the data were coded in identical manner as for the CEE sample. For the purpose of this analysis, cases that do not qualify as a mass shooting (i.e., cases that do not meet the four or more-fatality threshold) have been dropped from the CEE sample. This leaves us with a sample of 48 CEE mass shootings, which will be compared to 101 U.S. cases.

The following statistical analysis of both sets of cases will be carried through two sample t-tests. This test is common because it enables researchers to determine if the mean of a given dependent variable is the same in two independent groups (each group represents the CEE sample of cases and the U.S. sample of cases). This is also why I did not utilize other statistical tests such as Pearson correlations (which measures linear relations of continuous variables) or the Spearman rank correlation (which looks at rank values between continuous variables). There are no relations between the variables in both samples of cases which fulfills an important necessary assumption of a two-sample t-test as there is an independence of observations. Finally, each test was also run with consideration of unequal variance between the two samples – as there are more cases in the U.S. sample (101) than the CEE (48).

As statistical significance does not reveal information about potential effect sizes of independent variables, after the two-sample t-tests, potentially significant variables will be further assessed through the measure of Cohen’s d, which is a measure that identifies the effect size for a two samples t-test by dividing the mean difference by the standard deviation of the difference. This is a necessary follow up procedure that is carried out after means comparisons. Table 4 lists output from eight different two sample t-tests that were run. Means are listed along with p-values that are rated according to significance levels (standard deviations are listed in italics underneath means).

                         (Click table to enlarge)

These results reveal that the means of the first variable, fatalities, is not significantly different between groups (7.4 vs 8.2). In of itself, this is an interesting finding. The next variable, injuries, also misses out on being statistically significant, but this result does reveal that there is variance in fatality rates across both samples.

Next, the factor of ideological motivation is similarly present across both samples of cases (12% versus 18%), and the difference in means is not statistically significant. The same can be said for the variable of offender age, which interestingly enough is nearly identical (34.5 average age for CEE offenders and 35 for U.S. offenders). This brings us to the variable that is suggestive of probable mental illness in offenders. As coded, the characteristics of this variable capture whether an offender experienced psychiatric issues in his/her lifetime. It is important to keep in mind that the drawbacks of studying mental illness are multifaceted: this is a complicated variable to measure because many offenders may never have received a formal diagnosis prior to carrying out an attack (Fazel & Danesh, 2002). What’s more, a substantial number of offenders that take their lives after a mass shooting, and medical diagnostics cannot enable investigators to always identify if the person had been suffering from mental illness. Therefore, in coding this variable, we investigated whether an offender had experienced a history of encounters with mental illness based on whether he/she had suffered either from one of the following: schizophrenia, depression, anxiety disorders, addictive behavior, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. These characteristics were coded based on suspected information in the past history of offenders’ mental statuses as well as diagnostic (formal diagnoses made by medical professionals), along with post-shooting diagnostic inquires.

The U.S. sample features a higher prevalence of offenders that did experience psychiatric ailments and this effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. This low p-value indicates that there is a difference in means between the CEE and U.S. samples, but without considering the effect size, we cannot know how big this difference is, which brings us to the Cohen’s d measure. In the original Cohen’s d framework (Cohen, 1988), small, medium and large effect benchmarks were identified along the following values:  0-0.19 (small), 0.2-0.49 (medium), 0.5 and up (large). The Cohen’s d value for the aforementioned variable is .36, which indicates a medium effect size. Next, in the second significant variable that is identified in the results – group grievance – a very salient effect can be observed. This characteristic tells us that offenders were motivated by holding a grievance against a specific social group. This variable was coded according to a classification put forward by Capellan & Anisin (2018), with “1” constituting a group grievance held by an offender against a social group, social institution, or cultural group and “0” if no grievance was held by an offender. The importance of this condition is that when present, it usually determines the type of attack that an offender will carry out along with the primary underlying motivation. For instance, if a far-right extremist has a grievance against an abortion, he/she will likely attack abortion clinic locations that are emblematic of the practice of abortion. Likewise, if a young offender who was bullied as a child in school develops a grievance against the “cool kids” or a specific age of children in general, he/she may attack a school with that particular age group of students. If a disgruntled civilian has had issues with paying taxes and holds grievances against the federal government, he/she may attack an IRS office or similar governmental institution.

Of all variables assessed in this empirical inquiry, this particular variable is highly significant (at the 99% level) and is more than five times more prevalent in the U.S. sample (22% of U.S. cases versus only 4% CEE cases). The Cohen’s d estimate for this variable is .51 – indicating that it just meets the large effect size threshold. This finding warrants concentrated attention and theorization in future social inquiry.

                         (Click table to enlarge)

The last of the three identified variables that meet thresholds of statistical significance is the planning stage characteristic. This variable identifies whether an offender took extensive steps to plan his/her attack and was coded according to classifications put forward in Silver and colleagues (2019). It includes the following characteristics: offenders’ sketching out potential escape routes, identifying time patterns of civilian activity, researching the venue of the attack, having personal familiarity with the venue of the attack, recruiting others, joining an extremist movement, procuring of weapons, reading propaganda by prior offenders, reading literature on other offenders or a movement, training oneself to carry out violence, planning a getaway, planning more attacks, or using drugs or alcohol prior to the attack. The presence of at least two of these characteristics rules out random or spurious acts of violence. Interestingly enough, these results reveal that offenders in CEE countries planned their attacks to a greater extent than their American counterparts. This may indicate that there is a bigger mark of randomness inherent to the sample of U.S. cases under attention. With that being said, out of the three variables shown in Table 5, the Cohen’s d estimate of the effect size of this variable is the smallest.

Conclusion

This study has put forward a new sample of cases on attempted and completed mass shootings that span 15 different countries. Before the creation of the MSCEE, there was a massive gap in knowledge on demographic characteristics, determinants, and antecedent conditions of mass shootings in CEE states. The MSCEE provides researchers with a previously unexplored sample of cases that span a great geographical distance and numerous cultural contexts. These data have many different possible applications in research on mass shootings. They include cases that can be compared to cases observed in other countries and such comparisons may be carried out through a variety of methodological approaches. The 24 different variables featured in the data set should be useful to identify different correlates of mass shootings and likewise should enable researchers to advance knowledge on a range of questions. Although only an introductory analysis, this study’s empirical inquiry into differences and similarities between CEE and U.S. mass shootings offers a glimpse into how the MSCEE data set can be utilized.

The empirical analysis carried out in this study revealed how U.S. cases are just a bit more lethal, on average, than CEE mass shootings. This indicates that there are similarities in fatality rates across both contexts. The same cannot be said for injuries however, as U.S. cases tend to result in more injured victims. Among the key findings of this study’s analysis was that the factor of psychiatric ailment was significantly more influential in the U.S. sample when compared to CEE. Although the effect size of this variable was small, this is still a notable difference. Similarly, offenders in CEE contexts also planned their attacks and shared greater familiarity with the areas they attacked than their American counterparts. It might be the case that American mass shootings are more random and potentially geared towards attacking the general public rather than a particular set of social groups or people. This brings us to the most significant of differences between the two samples of cases that the analysis identified. While still a preliminary finding, I recommend that researchers probe the significance of the group grievance variable in future inquiries – nearly a fourth of all cases of the sample of U.S. cases under attention in this study were driven by group grievance, while only 4% of CEE cases were. This is a huge disparity and the effect size is statistically large. It could be that waves of political and cultural polarization that have arisen over the last decade in the US have contributed to the formation of group grievances, some of which have led individuals to carry out mass murder in the public sphere.

In the times ahead, scholars are encouraged to pursue similar forms of analyses as more data are gathered and potentially triangulated with observations and variables from not only the United States, but from Western Europe and different regions of Asia. As the incident frequency of mass shootings in CEE states does not appear to be slowing down, the MSCEE will be continuously updated. I expect that updated data will be released two times per year. My research team looks forward to engagement and collaboration with scholars who seek to add to knowledge of the determinants of mass shootings.

DATA

The data set, appendix, and codebook referenced in this article are available at a publicly accessible link: https://www.aauni.edu/programs/schools/international-relations-diplomacy/data-set-on-mass-shootings-in-central-and-eastern-europe/.

All analyses in this article were carried out using STATA. Upon publication of this article, the dataset will be hosted on a special website at the primary authors’ institution.


DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT

No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

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About the Author

Alexei Anisin, PhD, is the Dean of the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at the Anglo-American University in Prague, Czech Republic. The author of three monographs and over 20 scientifically indexed studies, Dr. Anisin has carried out qualitative and quantitative inquiries on political instability, rare forms of violence, and homicide, and holds a deep interest in international politics and historical change.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Anisin, A. (2023). Do mass shootings in Central and Eastern Europe differ from U.S. mass shootings? Insights from the MSCEE data set. Journal of Mass Violence Research. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR25974

Out of Sight, Out of Mind: An Analysis of Family Mass Murder Offenders in the US, 2006-2017

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Out of Sight, Out of Mind: An Analysis of Family Mass Murder Offenders in the US, 2006-2017

Madelyn L. Diaz Email the Corresponding Author,1 Kayla Toohy,1 Ketty Fernandez,1 Lin Huff-Corzine,1 and Amy Reckdenwald1

1Department of Sociology, University of Central Florida

https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR82831  |  Full Citation
Volume: 1, Issue: 1, Page(s): 25-43

Article History: Received June 1, 2021 | Accepted January 21, 2022 | Published Online February 21, 2022

ABSTRACT

In recent years, media attention has increasingly focused on sensationalized forms of mass murder across the United States, thereby diverting attention on the most frequent typology of mass murder events: family mass murders. The current study addresses limitations within this body of work and provides an analysis of demographic and case characteristics associated with distinct family mass murder offender types. The current study utilizes the USA Today database, Behind the Bloodshed, and public news articles to assess 163 family mass murder incidents that occurred from 2006 to 2017. Using this database, which defines mass murder as the killing of four or more victims excluding the offender, there were an average of 14 family mass murders annually, most often committed by a current or former intimate male partner using a firearm as the weapon of choice. Additional case characteristics were examined and revealed significant differences based on the gender of the offender as well as by victim-offender relationship type. Recommendations for future research include examining the impact of gun violence prevention responses in domestic violence cases and providing a comparative study of two and three victim counts to better inform law, policy, and the public about what is often hidden away as a private family matter.

KEYWORDS
family mass murder, family killings, offender/victim relationship, mass murder, familial homicides, familicides

Mass murder, defined as four or more victims killed excluding the offender, perpetrated by one or multiple offenders within a single event (Duwe, 2000, 2004, 2007; FBI, 2005; Fox & Levin, 1998, 2015), is an extremely rare form of violence, occupying less than 1% of all U.S. homicides (Fridel, 2021; Krouse & Richardson, 2015; Levin & Fox, 1996). Yet in recent years, public mass murder incidents have gained extensive attention within large-scale news reports and in scholarly literature (Croitoru et al., 2020; Duwe, 2007; Petee et al., 1997). Though coverage on public mass murder events is important, extensive coverage on select mass murders excludes discussions of the most common typology of mass killings.

A persistent finding in research suggests that over 50% of mass murder incidents lie within the familial unit (Bowers et al., 2010; Dietz, 1986; Duwe, 2000; 2004; 2007; Fox & Levin, 1998; Fridel, 2021; Levin & Fox, 1996; Petee et al., 1997; Taylor, 2018; Zeoli & Paruk, 2020). In one of the earliest attempts to create distinct typologies of mass murder incidents, Dietz (1986) introduced the term family annihilation within the psychiatric literature. These were cases where the entire nuclear family was killed by one or two other family members. The family annihilator, otherwise referred to here as family mass murderer, was identified as the male head of household who killed at least four family members within a short time and at one location (Fox & Levin, 1998; Levin & Fox, 1996; Ressler et al., 1988). Despite an increase in attention to public mass murder events, there is a surprising dearth of research examining the most common type of these events: family mass murders (FMM).

Research on FMM incidents generally appears as a byproduct within studies focusing on broader multiple-victim homicide trends (Bowers et al., 2010; Duwe, 2007; Fox & Levin, 1994; Karlsson et al., 2021; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014) and are limited to descriptive statistics (Fegadel & Heide, 2017; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014). Although the mass murder literature in general has grown in scope by beginning to examine differences among specific mass murder types (Duwe, 2016; Petee et al., 1997; Siegel et al., 2020), there remains a dearth of literature that examines possible heterogeneity among FMM incidents. As such, it is currently unknown if, and to what extent, offender, victim, and incident characteristics differ among FMM offender types.

To advance research on mass murder, the current study quantitatively analyzes FMM1 event characteristics. Specifically, we searched for differences among offender types by examining if family mass murder case characteristics are significantly different across gender and victim-offender relationship. To meet this aim, data from USA Today’s Behind the Bloodsheddataset were utilized to gather information on 163 cases of family mass killing incidents from 2006 to 2017. Each case was then matched with news articles through Nexis Uni and Google to obtain a more detailed overview of the offenders, victims, and event characteristics. The results from the present study add to familial and mass murder literature by providing a quantitative analysis of family mass murder types beyond descriptive approaches.

Literature Review

Past Research on Mass Murder 

Most research on mass murder has limited the methodological approach to descriptive case summaries with small sample sizes due to the rarity of these type of events. As such, mass murder offender typologies that have been identified by early scholars (see Fox & Levin, 1994; Holmes & Holmes, 1994; Levin & Fox, 1985; 1996; Petee et al., 1997) have seldom been empirically assessed in research, with the exception of a small number of recent studies (Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018). In one multivariate analysis comparing family, public, and felony mass murder events using the USA Today database, defined by incidents including 4 or more victims, Fridel (2021) found a number of significant differences across offender, victim, and incident characteristics. Fridel’s (2021) analyses suggest that incidents involving a history of domestic violence, romantic and familial difficulty, a greater number of child victims, occurring in the South, and the offender dying by suicide are more likely to be associated with a family mass murder than a felony mass murder. Additionally, Fridel’s (2021) findings suggest that family mass murder victims are more likely to be younger in age and of the same race as their victims (children or family members) when compared to both public and felony mass murders. The most significant differentiating factor between family, public, and felony mass murders were the type of victims involved.

In a separate study incorporating a multivariate analysis to examine mass murder incidents, Taylor (2018) examined possible differences in victim, offender, and incident characteristics based on an offender’s motivation to commit mass violence. Similar to Fridel’s (2021) results, Taylor (2018) found that offenders motivated by a relationship issue were more likely to kill a family member, die by suicide following the event, and be older in age than other mass murder offender types. Furthermore, her findings identified that relationship issues were present in over 40% of all mass murder cases and among these cases, a firearm was most often the lethal weapon of choice.

With research showing that gun availability substantially increases lethality in domestic violence situations (Campbell et al., 2003), scholars have begun to examine the potential link between domestic violence perpetration, firearm access, and mass murder. In an analysis of 89 offenders of mass shootings from 2014 to 2017, Zeoli and Paruk (2020) found about 30% of offenders had a suspected domestic violence history and 61% of these offenders, or 18.3% of the total, had come in contact with the criminal justice system for domestic violence. Among these individuals, only six offenders were eventually convicted of domestic violence-related charges. However, despite a conviction and qualifying for firearm restrictions, these offenders were still able to obtain a lethal weapon and execute mass killings.

In subsequent research examining 128 mass shootings from 2014 to 2019, Geller and colleagues (2021) found that about 68% of mass shootings were domestic violence related or the offender had a known history of domestic violence, and that these types of mass shootings resulted in a greater total of fatal and non-fatal victims (582 total victims) than non-domestic violence related incidents (352 total victims; see Geller et al., 2021). From these findings, some scholars have suggested that implementing stricter gun restriction policies against individuals with a domestic violence restraining order or a conviction of domestic violence could be one way to potentially lessen the opportunity of committing acts of mass violence (Geller et al., 2021; Taylor, 2018; Zeoli & Paruk, 2020). Others have similarly noted that individuals with personalities more likely to accept aggression behaviors as an appropriate solution to stress are more likely to also have a history of convictions for violent offenses, including intimate partner abuse (Peterson & Densley, 2019; Silver et al., 2018) and lethal forms of violence (Huff-Corzine & Corzine, 2020; Madfis, 2014).

Family Mass Murder

Literature on FMM is often included within more generalized research on mass murder as well as within more specific research analyses oriented on defining categories of multiple victim family homicides (e.g., Bowers, et al., 2010; Delisi & Scherer, 2006; Duwe, 2007; Karlsson et al., 2021; Liem & Koenraadt, 2008; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014; Liem et al., 2013). An important distinction between mass murder and the different types of multiple victim family homicides is that the former includes a broad definition of victims not limited to a specific type and includes cases with four or more victims. The latter employs categorical methods to analyze distinct types of multiple family homicides such as familicide (e.g., the killing of a spouse and one or more children), parricide (e.g., the killing of one’s parents), and siblicide (e.g., the killing of one’s siblings), and may include cases with one or more victims. Current mass murder literature, however, limits thorough discussions of possible heterogeneity among family mass murder instances as studies most often only examine how FMM cases are different from other types of mass murder (Dietz, 1986; Duwe, 2007; Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018). As such, studies examining multiple victim family homicides are useful to gain a more comprehensive understanding of specific offender, victim, and case characteristics. Notably, not all multiple victim family homicides fit the commonly accepted definition of mass murder events (4+ victims). Though recent work has suggested including multiple victim family homicide cases with 2+ or 3+ victims may offer additional insight to further understand acts of lethal violence in the family unit (Huff-Corzine & Corzine, 2020).

Cases involving the killing of multiple family members are often perpetrated by the husband or male intimate partner (Liem et al., 2013). The earliest attempt to further understand this phenomenon was completed by Frazier (1975), who identified two distinguishing motivators leading to the event as “murder by proxy” and “suicide by proxy.” “Murder by proxy” includes offenders who are motivated by anger and revenge aimed at their intimate partner following a threat of or actual withdrawal or estrangement (Websdale, 2010). In this scenario, children may also be killed because the offender sees them as an extension of the intimate partner (Liem & Reichelmann, 2014; Sillito & Salari, 2011; Wilson et al, 1995). Although the children are not regarded as the primary object of aggression, they are seen to be equally responsible for the offender’s feelings of betrayal caused by the intimate partner (Dietz, 1986; Fridel, 2021; Fox & Levin, 2011, Liem & Koenraadt, 2008; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014). Websdale (2010) further described these violent men as “livid coercive” because these offenders act out on profound feelings of anger and shame.

“Suicide by proxy” describes an offender who commits the murderous act to “protect” his family from the fate that would ensue without his financial support (Frazier, 1975; Websdale, 2010). These cases often involve offenders who have recently lost a job, face continuous unemployment, or increasing amounts of debt (Ewing, 1997; Fox & Levin, 2011; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014; Scheinin et al., 2011). Offenders most commonly view themselves as the provider and central figure of the family. Thus, when their ability to provide for their family is threatened, they may become suicidal and kill their family unit because they are seen as extension of themselves, in order to save the family from a life without the offender (Liem et al., 2013; Websdale, 2010; Wilson et al., 1995). Websdale (2010) classified this type of familicide offender as “civil reputable” and one who frequently dies by suicide following the event (Liem et al., 2013). Both distinctive familicidal offenders share a motivation marked by a sense of loss of control (Ewing, 1997; Liem & Koenraadt, 2008; Wilson et al., 1995).

Less frequent forms of multiple victim family homicides include a combination of parricides, the killing of one or more parents, and siblicides, the killing of one or more siblings. Current literature on these rare phenomena is mainly limited to case studies and descriptive statistics to explain offender, victim, and event characteristics. Findings show that most parricides and siblicides are committed by male offenders (Heide, 2013; Heide & Frei, 2010; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014; Marleau et al., 2006; Peck & Heide, 2012). In a recent study analyzing multiple family homicides, Liem and Reichelmann (2014) identified an extended parricide typology that involved cases of offenders killing their parents and siblings. They found that, similar to previous literature, most offenders were male, white, and did not typically die by suicide after the event. Compared to the other typologies identified in their study, these cases were the least likely to be premeditated and most often the perpetrator’s problems were not primarily related to the victims. The source of aggression stemmed from outside circumstances, such as intimate partner problems, unemployment, or drug/alcohol problems for which parents may be seen as partially responsible. Siblings became fatal victims as they were seen as extensions of the parents or simply witnesses that needed to be removed (Liem & Reichelmann, 2014).

To summarize, what is currently known about FMM offenders is that these instances overwhelmingly involve male perpetrators (Dietz, 1986; Duwe, 2000; 2007; Fegadel & Heide, 2017; Fox & Levin, 2011; Fridel, 2021; Liem et al., 2013), currently or formerly in a romantic relationship with at least one of the victims (Fox & Levin, 2011; Fridel, 2021; Liem et al., 2013), where firearms are frequently the weapon of choice (Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018), and many mass murder offenders have a recorded history of domestic violence (Fox & Levin, 2011; Fridel, 2021; Zeoli & Paruk, 2020). Additionally, among mass murder offenders with a recorded history of domestic violence, they are often not successfully restricted from acquiring firearms (Zeoli & Paruk, 2020) and involve greater fatal victim counts compared to mass murder offenders without a history of domestic violence (Geller et al., 2021).

Current Study

Previous literature on mass murder has primarily focused on the most sensationalized typologies (i.e., public mass murder) and research on multiple family homicides is generally limited to a small sample of case studies aimed to further understand only distinct subsets of familicide. Although recent scholars have begun to apply quantitative approaches beyond descriptive statistics to examine significant difference between unique types of mass murder incidents (Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018; Zeoli & Paruk, 2020), no studies to date have exclusively assessed the most frequent typology of mass murders. Consequently, there is an important gap in the literature that has yet to closely examine FMM cases to identify possible heterogeneity of victim, offender, and incident characteristics across offender types. As such, using the USA Today dataset, the purpose of the current study is to begin addressing this gap in literature by examining 163 U.S. family mass murder cases from 2006-2017 to assess significant differences by offender gender and victim-offender relationship.

Methods

To examine family mass murder incidents, the present study utilizes the open-access mass murder incident data from USA Today’s Behind the Bloodshed database. Based on the availability of data presented within this data source, the time period for the current study was limited to cases that occurred from 2006 to 2017 (see Overberg et al., 2016). The USA Today dataset is an interactive report that has been a preferred source by some scholars of mass murder events in recent research (Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018) as it overcomes known data reporting limitations of multiple victim homicide cases within the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) database (see Fox & Pierre, 1996; Overberg et al., 2016). Compiled by researchers, this dataset was created through a corroborated process involving verification among the FBI’s SHR, local police records, and news media reports. Mass murder cases in the USA Today dataset were defined as a mass killing of 4 or more victims, excluding the offender, in a single event. Events may have occurred throughout hours, days, or more as long as there was no definite cooling off period. For each case, USA Today used information on the social and familial distance between offender(s) and victims to separate cases into four distinct mass murder categories: family killings, public killings, felony killings, and other. For the present study, only cases documented as family killings were collected to confirm the validity of the information of each FMM incident.

After each case listed under family killings was collected from the USA Today report, similar to previous research (Liem & Reichelmann, 2014; Liem et al., 2013; Petee et al., 1997; Taylor, 2018), Nexis Uni was utilized to find more information on the case. Specifically, data were collected to document the age of the primary offender, accomplice(s) present, victim information, the location of the event, the weapon(s) used, whether the offender died by suicide, and the motivation or trigger for the mass murder event. Together with the location, a range of a week from the date detailed on the USA Today report was first used to find each case in the Nexis Uni database. If no articles were found or there were over 50 results from the search, the articles were further filtered by keywords, such as “family,” “murder,” “killings,” or the perpetrator’s last name if that information was available on the USA Today report. If, after this approach was complete, no article was located through Nexis Uni, Google was used to identify a news source that offered more details about the case (Liem & Reichelmann, 2014).

Inclusion Criteria

We define family mass murder as any event where four or more victims are murdered, not including the offender, in one or more locations in close proximity to each other, without a cooling off period, where a majority of the victims were related to each other and have an intimate or familial relationship with the offender. Cases were excluded if there was no familial relationship between the offender and the victims, even if all of the victims were related to one another.2

Of the 185 cases originally documented under family killings in the USA Today report, twelve cases were excluded from the study because they did not fit the definition of family mass murder (i.e., the killings occurred between cooling off periods, there were less than three victims, or there was no familial relationship between offender and a majority of the victims). An additional ten cases were removed because the offender was unknown. This left a total of 163 family mass murder cases with 163 primary offenders, 397 adult victims, and 361 victims under the age of 18.

Variables

Data were collected to obtain a comprehensive look at family mass murder incidents from 2006 to 2017 based on event characteristics, offender/victim characteristics, and motivations. The event characteristics of each case were documented by the year, the month, and the state where the family mass murder occurred. Following Fox and Levin’s (1998) structure of situational characteristics, cases were further broken down to the number of incidents that occurred in each Census region of the United States. The incident locations were grouped into three categories: residential setting, multiple locations, and public settings. Additionally, information on the weapon used for the killings was gathered and categorized by gun, other close contact weapon (e.g., knife, blunt force object), multiple methods (e.g., gun and fire, gun and knife), arson, and other/unknown if the method of killing did not fit into any of these categories or no information could be found.   

Offender and victim characteristics collected for the current study included offender type, the age of the offender, offender gender, the number of victims per incident, the number of minor victims per incident, whether the offender died by suicide, and whether the offender had an accomplice present. Of the 163 cases included in the study, offenders were grouped into four distinct types based on their relationship to the victims: current intimate spouse or partner, former intimate spouse or partner, direct family member, and distant family member. Cases were grouped under current intimate spouse or partner if at least one of the victims was currently married or in a relationship with the offender and the other victims were related to each other and/or to the offender in some way. The former intimate spouse or partner category included cases where at least one of the victims was once in a relationship with the offender but was estranged at the time of the mass murder incident. The remaining victims were either related to the offender or the former intimate partner. Offenders grouped under direct and distant family members included offenders who did not kill anyone they were or had been involved with in a romantic relationship with. Instead, FMM direct family member offenders only killed individuals within their immediate family unit, including parents, stepparents, siblings, and children, whereas FMM distant family member offenders killed individuals within their extended familial unit, including grandparents, aunts, and cousins.

As discussed above, there are several ways that prior research has categorized motives and triggers of offenders that commit multiple murders. The current study uses Taylor’s (2018) categories that build upon Petee et al.’s (1997) classifications of offender motivations. Although there were a handful of cases where no information could be found from our data sources on the offender’s motivation, most of the cases were categorized under one or more of the following: mental illness, financial problems, emotional triggers, and relationship issues. The mental illness of an offender was documented using explicit statements found in news sources made by law enforcement, family, or friends about specific mental health issues the offender had exhibited or was previously diagnosed with (Taylor, 2018). Financial problems were determined by information included in news sources that indicated that the offender was going through a financial hardship at the time of the event and was perceived to be one of the leading motivations for the killings. Emotional triggers were grouped by events that were motivated by a loss of a job or a documented dispute shortly before the mass murder incident. Relationship issues included cases where the offender experienced a recent loss of a relationship, had engaged in a fight with their current or former intimate spouse or partner, and/or had a history of familial disorder, or domestic violence accusations illustrated through statements by the offender or victim’s family.

Analytic Strategy

First, descriptive statistics were computed to examine the total number of family mass murders that occurred between 2006 to 2017 across all of our independent variables (Table 1). Next, to differentiate family mass murder cases across the offender’s gender and each of the four offender types, we conducted a series of bivariate analyses. Chi-square (χ2) tests were conducted for independent variables measured at the ordinal or nominal level and ANOVAs were conducted for independent variables measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement. Fisher’s exact tests were utilized when low expected counts were observed in bivariate chi-square analyses. Finally, to further examine if there are unique differences among family mass murder incidents across offender type, a multinomial logistic regression was performed. Considering that there were too few cases in the distant family member offender category, our dependent variable (FMM offender types) for the multivariate analysis was recoded to measure three distinct offender groups: current intimate partner, former intimate, and non-intimate, which combined the direct and distant family offender groups. Findings from the multinomial logistic regression will be used to determine relative risk ratios to understand which, and to what extent, victim, offender, and incident characteristics can predict the type of family mass murder offender over another. Unfortunately, due to the small sample size of female offenders, differences of family mass murder incidents across gender were not able to be analyzed. Given the exploratory nature of this study and the lack of statistical power as a result of the small sample size of FMM cases, coefficients with p ≤ 0.10 are reported as significant and discussed.

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Results

Demographic and Case Characteristics

Descriptive statistics for case characteristics of the entire sample are displayed in Table 1 (column 1). From 2006 to 2017, there were an average of 14 FMMs annually, with a range of 8 incidents that occurred in 2012 and 2013 to 20 incidents in 2009. Across the 12-year span, the most common months that these incidents occurred in were April (21 incidents) and August (18 incidents). Almost half of the FMM incidents occurred in the Southern region of the U.S. (48%) and the fewest number of incidents occurred in the Northeast (7%). Furthermore, most of the cases of FMM occurred inside a residential setting (83%). In a majority of cases, the offenders used a gun as their weapon of choice (67%), followed by other close contact objects (16%) or multiple methods of killings across victim types (13%).

The majority of cases involved offenders who were current or former intimate partners (39% and 26%, respectively), by marriage or by relationship, with at least one of the victims. Direct family members were involved in 27% of the family murder cases, while distant family members accounted for 8% of the cases. Almost all offenders were male (92%) with an average age of 35. A little less than half of the FMM cases were characterized by the offender dying by suicide following the incident (44%), and only a small percentage of the cases involved the offender acting with an accomplice (5%).

FMM offenders varied in the type and number of possible motivating factors preceding the event. The average number of motivations recorded per FMM incident were 1.2. The most common motivation for offenders stemmed from relationship issues from a current or former intimate partner, with 62% of the cases falling into this category. This included family units that experienced a long history of familial disorder, those cases with associated statements of domestic violence, as well as those reported to have experienced a recent separation between the offender and one of the victims. Reports of mental illness experienced by the offender were identified as one of the motivational factors for nearly a quarter of FMM incidents (23%). Within this category, some offenders claimed that committing these acts were “a part of their destiny,” were knowingly suicidal, or had been previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder or schizophrenia. Emotional triggers, such as recent job loss or a recent prior dispute, accounted for 19% of the offender’s primary motivating factor in the cases. Finally, financial hardship was identified in 17% of the family mass murder incidents.

Bivariate Findings

The first set of bivariate analyses were conducted to examine the differences between FMM cases involving male and female offenders (Table 1, columns 2 and 3). The bivariate tests revealed significant gender differences in offender type and the likelihood of a case characterized by mental illness of the offender. To reiterate, reports of offender mental illness were captured through explicit statements found in new reports that identified specific symptoms of mental illness exhibited by the offender, irrespective of a formal mental illness diagnosis. The adjusted residuals revealed that there were significantly (χ2 = 7.66, p < 0.05) more cases of female offenders that were immediate family members (61%) than expected, and there were significantly fewer cases of male offenders who were direct family members (24%) than expected if gender and offender types were independent of each other. In other words, family mass murders committed by female offenders did not commonly involve romantic partners (current or former) as murder victims, whereas family mass murders committed by males overwhelmingly did. Cases with female offenders were significantly (χ2 = 9.15, p < 0.01) more likely to include reports regarding mental illnesses (64%) than expected compared to cases with male offenders (20%).

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Next, bivariate analyses were conducted to assess the differences among cases based on the four offender types (Table 2). Findings suggest FMM cases with offenders under the direct family member category were less likely to occur in the Midwest (9%) than expected and cases with offenders under the distant family member category were more likely to occur in the Northeast (23%) than expected (χ2 = 14.55, p < .10). Recorded cases where the offender was categorized as a former intimate partner had the highest percentage of arson related killings (10%) as the primary method of murder. Cases with offenders categorized as current intimate partners were more often than any other category to have been perpetrated with a firearm (77%). Finally, cases where a distant family member had committed the mass murder were more likely than expected to involve multiple methods (31%) to carry out the incident (χ2 = 13.38, p < .10).

Significant results also revealed meaningful differences in age, gender, number of minor victims, suicide, and motivational factors across FMM cases based on the four offender types. Current and former intimate partners tended to be older than other offender categories, with the average ages of 39 and 35 years, respectively (χ2 = 7.62, p < .001). Direct family member offenders were more likely to be female compared to other offender types (18%; χ2 = 7.66, p < .05). Cases with offenders that were distant family members exhibited the youngest average age at 27. Cases with current intimate partner offenders were more likely to involve the killing of more victims under the age of 18 years (2.48; χ2 = 3.24, p < .05) and die by suicide following the family mass murder incident (59%; χ2 = 18.83, p < .001) compared to the other offender type cases. Interestingly, none of the cases of distant family member offenders involved suicide following the incident.

Excluding financial problems, motivations exhibited statistically significant differences in offender types. Comparisons and analysis of adjusted residuals revealed cases with former intimate partner offenders were less likely to have public reports of mental illness (7%) than expected, whereas cases with direct family member offenders were more likely to have reports of mental illness (45%) than expected (χ2 = 15.83, p < .001). Cases with offenders under the distant family member category were more likely than expected to be motivated by emotional triggers (50%; χ2 = 7.84, p < .05). Finally, it was found that cases with former intimate partner offenders were more often characterized by relationship issues (85%) as the leading motivational factor of the family mass murder incident, whereas relationship issues were less likely than expected a motivating factor for cases of direct family member offenders (39%; χ2 = 7.66, p < .001).

Multivariate Findings

Multinomial logistic regression was performed in order to examine the effect of victim, offender, and incident characteristics on the probability of a family mass murder involving a current intimate offender, former intimate offender, or a non-intimate offender (Table 3). The relative risk ratios will be interpreted to understand which characteristics are associated with the relative risk of a FMM incident involving a specific offender category relative to the reference group. Current intimate partner FMM offender was set as the reference group for the first two comparisons in Table 3 (Current intimate partner offender [reference] vs. Former intimate partner offender; Current intimate partner [reference] vs. non-intimate partner). Former intimate offender was set as the reference group for the last comparison (Former intimate partner [reference] vs. non-intimate partner). Significant variables with relative risk ratios above one indicate that the FMM incident is more likely to be associated with the comparison category of FMM offenders, while significant relative risk ratios below one suggests that the FMM incident is more likely to be associated with the reference category of FMM offenders.

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Current intimate partner FMM offenders vs. Former intimate partner FMM offenders

Two significant outcomes emerged when examining offender and incident characteristics that significantly predict the relative risk of a FMM incident involving a current intimate partner offender compared to a former intimate partner offender: the number of minor victims and offender firearm use. More specifically, for every one unit increase in the number of minor victims, the odds of the FMM incident involving a former intimate partner offender relative to a current intimate partner offender are 40% lower, controlling for all other variables. FMM incidents using a firearm have odds of involving a former intimate partner offender that are 70% lower relative to a current intimate partner offender, controlling for all other variables. In other words, FMM incidents with a greater minor victim count and FMM incidents involving a firearm are more likely to fall into the current intimate partner FMM offender category over the former intimate partner FMM offender category.

Current intimate partner offenders vs. non-intimate partner offenders

The offender age was the only significant outcome when examining offender and incident characteristics that significantly predict the relative risk of a FMM incident involving a current intimate partner offender compared to a non-intimate partner offender. For every one unit increase in the offender’s age, the odds of the FMM incident involving a non-intimate partner relative to a current intimate partner offender are 6% lower, controlling for all other variables. Put differently, as an offender’s age increases, it is more likely the FMM incident involves a current intimate partner than a non-intimate FMM offender type.

Former intimate partner offenders vs. non-intimate partner offenders

In the final multinomial logistic regression model examining offender and incident characteristics that significantly predict the relative risk of a FMM incident involving a former intimate partner offender compared to a non-intimate partner offender, three significant outcomes emerged: reported offender mental illness, relationship issues, and the number of minor victims. FMM incidents with a reported offender mental illness have odds of involving a non-intimate partner offender that are 428% higher relative to a former intimate FMM offender, controlling for all other variables. In other words, cases with non-intimate partner offenders are significantly more likely to have reports of mental illness. FMM incidents with a reported relationship issue have odds of involving a non-intimate partner offender that are 81% lower relative to a former intimate FMM offender, controlling for all other variables. Stated differently, FMM incidents with a reported relationship issue are more likely to involve former intimate FMM offenders than non-intimate partner offenders. Finally, for every one unit increase in the number of minor victims, the odds of the FMM incident involving a non-intimate partner relative to a former intimate partner are 43% higher, controlling for all other factors. This finding suggests that FMM incidents with greater minor victim counts are more likely to involve a non-intimate partner offender.

Discussion

In recent years, there has been an increase in studies conducted on mass murder with a particular focus on public mass shootings (Duwe, 2020; Petee et al., 1997; Siegel et al., 2020) as well as significant contributions to multiple victim family homicide literature (Bowers et al., 2010; Karlsson et al., 2021; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014). Yet, there are limited studies that have analyzed characteristics of the largest aggregate of mass murder occupying over 50% of cases – incidents that occur within the family. To fill this gap in the literature, this study quantitatively analyzes 163 FMM incidents in the U.S. from 2006 to 2017 across offender types. It is important to restate that the results from this study are based on a small sample of family mass murder incidents and therefore should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the findings in the current study advance mass murder research by identifying distinct case differences among family mass murder offender types and providing a structure for future multivariate approaches to study FMMs.

Similar to Fox and Levin’s (1998) early work on mass murder, most cases occurred in the Southern region of the U.S. and took place in a private residence (Fox & Levin, 1998; Fridel, 2021). Additionally, in support of previous literature, FMM offenders were most often male, older in age, and chose a firearm as their primary weapon (Duwe, 2007; Fox & Levin, 1998; Fridel, 2021; Huff-Corzine et al., 2014; Taylor, 2018). Though the mental health of an offender is commonly a dominant discussion following a mass murder, consistent with previous research (Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018), a little less than one fourth of our sample of FMM cases included offenders with a reported mental illness concern and a little less than half of the total sample of cases involved offenders dying by suicide (Fridel, 2021). As expected, the most common motivation among the family mass murder incidents included in this study was a relationship issue between the offender and one of the victims. To reiterate, these cases included reports of a recent loss of a relationship, a known fight between a current or former intimate partner offender and at least one of the victims, history of familial disorder, and reported past domestic violence events.

When comparing cases of male and female offenders, results from our bivariate analysis revealed statistically significant gender differences in offender type and motivation. More precisely, cases with female offenders were less likely to involve a killing of an intimate partner during the family mass murder incident and more likely to have reports of mental illness as the leading motivation, whereas cases with male offenders most often involved the killing of an intimate partner and predominantly involved reports of a relationship issue as motivation for the killing. It is important to note, however, that significant gender differences observed between FMM offenders are reported based on a small sample of women offenders. Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution until additional studies perform similar analyses to compare FMM gender differences using a bigger sample of female offenders.

From our analysis comparing cases across four offender types (current intimate partner, former intimate partner, direct family member, and distant family member), key findings from our multivariate analyses identified statistically significant differences in the weapon used, offender age, number of minor victims, as well as motivation. Though firearms were the most common weapon used across each offender type, cases with offenders that were a current intimate partner to at least one of the victims were the most likely to use a firearm than other FMM offender types. Current intimate partner FMM offenders were also more likely to kill a greater number of minor victims when compared to former intimate partner FMM offenders and more likely to be older in age when compared to non-intimate partner FMM offenders.

Though relationship issues were the most common motivation reported in the total sample of cases, bivariate results highlight cases involving offenders under the former intimate partner category were the most likely to be characterized by relationship issues as the motivating factor for committing the mass family murder. This pattern was also identified in our multivariate model. When compared to non-intimate FMM offenders, FMM offenders who were a former intimate partner with at least one of the victims were more likely to be motivated by a relationship issue.

Policy Implications

There are several key policy implications that may be taken from our findings. Research examining the relationship between mental illness and incidents of mass violence most often suggests that there is a much weaker association than what is represented in media reports (see Skeem & Mulvey, 2020). For studies that rely on informal mental illness reports of an offender gathered through news reports, scholars have identified mental illness to be a concern with only a quarter of offenders (Duwe, 2007; Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018). Limited studies that have collected formal psychiatric histories found an even smaller percentage (less than 20%) of adult and juvenile offenders with documented mental disorders (Fox & Fridel, 2016; Meloy et al. 2001; Skeem & Mulvey, 2020). Though media reports immediately following a mass murder event often highlight the mental health of an offender, our results support previous work to suggest that mental health is not as prominent among offenders as publicized.

A second dominant topic to mass murder responses often involve broad gun violence prevention policies, including ineffective suggestions to enact bans on assault rifles infrequently used in most mass murder incidents (Duwe, 2007). Considering that a majority of mass murder offenders obtain their firearms legally (Fox & Fridel, 2016), recent scholars have urgently suggested it is important to consider gun violence prevention policies aimed to decrease violence overall (Duwe, 2020). More precisely, if a large impact is to be made on reducing mass murder incidents, it may be important to begin by turning more attention to state and federal level domestic violence responses. Not only were relationship issues one of the primary motivations for family mass murders in our study, but offenders of other subtypes of mass murder have also noted reported histories of domestic violence prior to the attack (Fridel, 2021; Taylor, 2018; Zeoli & Paruk, 2020).

When firearms are present in a home with a suspected domestic violence offender, or anyone likely to use violence to deal with social stressors, it not only exponentially increases the risk of homicide against their intimate partner (Campbell et al., 2003) but also elevates the risk that there will be multiple victims as well (Smucker et al., 2018). In a recent analysis (Zeoli & Paruk, 2020), scholars found that among mass shooters with mention of domestic violence histories gathered from media reports, 40% did not have any formal contact with the criminal justice system for domestic violence. This leaves 60% of mass shooters in this study to be known by law enforcement to have a history of violence. Not only is the lack of criminal justice involvement among potential domestic violence offenders congruent with larger patterns of domestic violence responses in the U.S., but this study also illuminates on a number of missed opportunities by law enforcement which could have potentially prevented lethal acts of violence (see Zeoli & Paruk, 2020). Using 2005-2015 data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to analyze police responses to domestic violence, findings indicated that only 39% of victimizations reported to law enforcement resulted in an arrest or charges filed (Reaves, 2017). This statistic is especially concerning given that an even smaller percentage of these cases likely resulted in a formal domestic violence conviction, actions to prevent future purchase of a firearm, or relinquishment of any firearms in an offender’s possession. As such, noncriminal responses to address potentially violent domestic violence offenders are particularly crucial. Noncriminal responses to domestic violence include domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) firearm restrictions, extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs), and firearm relinquishing polices. In recent studies, authors have found that states with laws that prohibit individuals with a domestic violence-related restraining order from possessing firearms and also require the relinquishment of firearms from the individuals’ home are associated with lower state-level intimate partner homicide rates (Diez et al., 2017; Vigdor & Mercy, 2006; Zeoli & Paruk, 2020; Zeoli & Webster, 2010; Zeoli et al., 2017).

To increase the impact of current policies against potentially violent offenders, there must first be an effort encouraging families of domestic violence to report acts of violence to the police through assurance that cooperation in this process would be positive and end with a just outcome (Zeoli & Paruk, 2020). This may arguably be the biggest obstacle to overcome as research notes there are many barriers that discourage reporting of domestic disputes, such as victim fear of retaliation and discrimination (Campbell et al., 2003; Diez et al., 2017; National Domestic Violence Hotline, 2015). These barriers are especially true for minority communities. Despite higher rates of domestic violence against racial and ethnic minority women compared to White women, Black women are not only are they less likely to report abuse to law enforcement, but domestic violence offenders are less likely to be arrested when cases involve Black victims (see McCormack & Hirschel, 2021). Future research should continue to examine not only reasons why families of domestic violence do not report to the police, but also their understanding of the reporting process and awareness of life-saving firearm restriction policies against potentially violent offenders. Furthermore, there needs to be a push to adopt more effective, uniform procedures to prevent individuals with a domestic violence restraining order against them and offenders convicted of domestic violence from possessing a firearm. This includes mandatory reporting to a national firearm purchasing database as well as non-discretionary court mandated policies to relinquish firearms from the residence of perpetrators of domestic violence (Zeoli & Paruk, 2020).

Limitations

With every study there are limitations, and this study is no exception. First, we did not cross-reference cases included in this study to the FBI’s supplementary homicide report (SHR) due to known limitations of how multiple victim homicides cases are documented (Fox & Pierre, 1996; Overberg et al., 2016). However, it may be useful for future studies to cross-reference family mass murder incidents to more official data sources, such as SHR or the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS; see Huff-Corzine & Corzine, 2020; Szalewski, 2020). By doing this, researchers may collect more comprehensive demographic information that may be missing from media sources. Second, while media often contains more detailed information than official data sources of mass murder incidents (Duwe, 2007; Liem & Reichelmann, 2014; Petee et al., 1997; Taylor, 2018), missing information or inaccuracies of case details gathered by media reports is possible. Also, as a result of relying solely on news media sources, the race of offender(s) and victims were not taken into account to avoid false assumptions of the racial identity of any individual based upon incomplete information provided by news reports. Lastly, results from the current study are based on a very small count of female offenders (N = 13) and a small count of FMM offender types. As such, our findings are not generalizable to FMM incidents outside of the scope of this study. 

Future Research

Due to the lack of research on family mass murder incidents, there are several suggestions for future scholars to add to the literature on this topic. Future research should continue to examine case details of family mass murder incidents by collecting additional data on more specific motivations. For instance, similar to Liem and Reichelmann’s (2014) study of patterns of multiple family homicide, it would be beneficial to assess relationship issues into more detailed motivation categories such as past domestic violence convictions, presence of a restraining order, or child custody disputes. Moreover, though the current study analyzed mass murder incidents based on the most commonly adopted victim threshold (a minimum of four victims as defined by the FBI), future studies should also consider examining FMM cases with three or more victims. Broadening the inclusion criteria for family mass murder incidents will allow for a similar analysis to be conducted for smaller family types as well as increasing the statistical power to conduct a multivariate analysis with a bigger sample size of cases and to substantiate results from the current study. Additionally, as family mass murder represents the most extreme form of family violence, future work comparing family homicides with one fatal victim to cases with two, three, and four or more victims may reveal further insight to distinguishable characteristics of single victim family homicide vs. mass murder incidents. It is currently unknown if, and how, these different family homicide types are unique or similar to each other.

Conclusion

Our study has begun to bridge the gap in literature by providing an analysis of U.S. family mass murder cases from 2006 to 2017. Results from the current study support that there is heterogeneity within family mass murder incidents, highlighting key differences based on an offender sex and victim-offender relationship type. As expected, one of the leading motivations for a family mass murder attack stemmed from a relationship issue between the offender and at least one of the victims. The current study highlights the importance for future scholars to begin paying more attention to family mass murders – the largest aggregate of mass murder events. In the end, efforts need to focus on improving strategies to prevent potentially violent offenders, especially in domestic settings.

NOTES

  1. In this study, family mass murder is defined as any event where four or more victims are murdered not including the offender, in one or more locations in close proximity to each other, without a cooling off period, where a majority of the victims were related to each other through a relationship to the offender.
  2. For example, on May 14th, 2015, a mass murder incident occurred involving an offender that was a former employee of one of the victims. In addition to killing a former employer, the offender also killed his former employer’s wife, son, and housekeeper after extorting the family of $40,000 (Brown et al., 2015). This incident was excluded from our analysis because although the majority of the victims were connected by a familial relationship, the offender is not a family member by blood or an intimate relationship with any of the victims.
  3. Due to the small sample size, variable selection was carefully considered. Variables that showed a significant bivariate relationship with the offender relationship, with the exception of offender’s gender, were included in the multivariate model. Offender’s gender was unable to be included in the final model because the majority of cases involved male offenders.


DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT

No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

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About the Authors

Madelyn L. Diaz is a PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Central Florida, where she also received her M.A. in Applied Sociology and B.A. in Criminal Justice. Her research interests include lethal and non-lethal forms of gender-based violence, more specifically sexual victimization, post-victimization health outcomes, human trafficking, and the unequal impact of violence across marginalized communities. She has published in Crime & Delinquency, LGBT Health, and Sociation.

Kayla Toohy is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Central Florida, received her B.A. and M.A. from the University of Memphis in Criminology and Criminal Justice where she also received a graduate certificate in Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Her research interests include violent crime and lethal violence, particularly regarding macro-level geospatial studies of homicide in United States cities. Toohy’s work is published in the American Journal of Criminal Justice, Homicide Studies, and Applied Geography.

Ketty Fernandez, M.A. is a PhD candidate (ABD) in the Department of Sociology at the University of Central Florida. Her research interests include violence against women, with an emphasis on domestic violence and sexual victimization among women of color, human trafficking, and racial/ethnic inequalities. Her work appears in Criminal Justice Policy Review, Sociation, and Policing: An International Journal.

 Lin Huff-Corzine, PhD is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Central Florida. Her research on lethal and non-lethal violence spans three decades with work on homicide examining topics including but not limited to lynching, domestic violence, regional variations, transportation effects on lethality, human trafficking, and more recently mass murder. Dr. Huff-Corzine’s publications can be found in edited collections as well as journals such as Homicide Studies,Justice Quarterly, Violence and Victims, Social Forces, Victims and Offenders, Criminology, and Deviant Behavior.

Amy Reckdenwald, PhD is an Associate Professor in the Sociology Department at the University of Central Florida. Her research interests include violent victimization and offending; particularly as it relates to domestic violence and intimate partner homicide. Her work appears in journals such as Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, Criminology, Homicide Studies, Feminist Criminology, Journal of Criminal Justice, and Violence and Victims

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Diaz, M. L., Toohy, K., Fernandez, K., Huff-Corzine, L., & Reckdenwald, A. (2022). Out of sight, out of mind: An analysis of family mass murder offenders in the US, 2006-2017. Journal of Mass Violence Research, 1(1), 25-43. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR82831


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Changing Media Framings of School Shootings: A Case Study of the Parkland School Shooting

Changing Media Framings of School Shootings: A Case Study of the Parkland School Shooting

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Changing Media Framings of School Shootings: A Case Study of the Parkland School Shooting

Jennifer LaRose Email the Corresponding Author,1 Jose A. Torres,1 and Michael S. Barton1

1Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University

 

https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR11874  |  Full Citation
Volume: 1, Issue: 1, Page(s): 44-81

Article History: Received February 26, 2021 | Accepted July 12, 2021 | Published Online August 11, 2021

ABSTRACT
The Parkland school shooting that occurred on February 14, 2018, ranks among the deadliest high school shootings in recorded history with 17 injuries and 17 casualties. Like other mass school shootings, this event garnered extensive media coverage, but little research has been conducted to examine how media framing for this event compares with previous school shootings. This study examines the framing of the Parkland school shooting by location over time using the Social Coping Model, which describes how collectives cope with and heal from traumatic events. Specifically, this study compares frames of front-page news articles from three local news outlets and three national outlets across three time periods in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. The results indicate the coverage of the Parkland shooting was similar to previous shootings, but the results also suggest a shift in media coverage. The implications for this shift are explored in the context of a changing media landscape while also noting the importance of the Social Coping Model towards understanding the dynamic process of framing school shootings.

KEYWORDS
media, mass shootings, school shootings, news outlets, framing

The United States has experienced several high-profile mass school shootings over the past 50 years, but such events were not discussed as a social problem until the incident at Columbine High School in 1999 (Altheide, 2009; Elsass et al., 2014; Muschert, 2007; Muschert & Carr, 2006). Columbine was different from previous school shootings because it was covered by cable news media (Murray, 2017; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014) and extensively by traditional print media (Chyi & McCombs, 2004). These types of events are often sensationalized within the media and produce a copious amount of media coverage (Muschert, 2007; Schildkraut et al., 2018). Accordingly, the media have become a significant avenue for school shootings research because consumers primarily experience these events through the coverage (Schildkraut et al., 2018). Within this line of work, scholars have examined the media coverage of prominent mass school shootings such as Columbine (Altheide, 2009; Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Larkin, 2009), Virginia Tech (Fox & Savage, 2009; Hawdon et al., 2014), and Sandy Hook (Murray, 2017; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). The findings from these studies suggest local media outlets closer to a mass school shooting tend to focus on the victims, shooter, and local community, while national media outlets tend to focus on macro issues related to shootings such as gun control.

The shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, on February 14, 2018, was widely covered by media outlets for an extended amount of time.1 The Parkland shooting resulted in seventeen deaths and seventeen injuries. To date, only a few studies have examined media coverage and framing of this event, despite it being one of the deadliest high school shootings. Understanding how this shooting was covered is important considering most of the information the average person knows about mass shootings comes from the media (Schildkraut et al., 2018). In addition, media consumption of mass shooting news stories has been found to be positively associated with increased fear about experiencing this type of event (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Kupchik & Bracy, 2009; Levin & Wiest, 2018; Morrow et al., 2016), increases in gun legislation (Luca et al., 2020), and increases in gun ownership (Porfiri et al., 2019).

There is significant variation in the methods and focus of the few media studies that have focused on the Parkland shooting. For example, Aslett et al. (2020) conducted an analysis of tweets derived from both gun rights and gun control groups following the Parkland shooting to identify how each group respectively framed the problem. Rees et al. (2020) analyzed print media coverage to identify contributing factors to the Parkland shooting. Finally, Holody and Shaugnessy (2020) analyzed print media coverage of the Parkland shooting with a focus on comparing the salience and valence of fifteen frames across local and national outlets. While each contributes to the literature on the Parkland shooting, mass shootings, and media behavior, they do not account for how the media did or did not change their framing of the Parkland shooting in the weeks after it. That is, these studies of the Parkland shooting do not account for the dynamic process of framing (see Chyi & McCombs, 2004). Framing as a dynamic process suggests that the frames relied upon by the media in the immediate aftermath of the shooting may be different from those relied upon months after it has happened.

The current study extends previous research about media framing of school shootings to the Parkland incident by analyzing front-page coverage of the shooting published between February 15, 2018, and April 20, 2018, in The New York Times, USA Today, The Washington Post, Orlando Sentinel, Sun Sentinel and Tampa Bay Times. It utilizes methods established by Hawdon et al. (2014), who analyzed print media coverage of the Virginia Tech shooting through Pennebaker and Harber’s (1993) Social Stage Model of Coping.2 We extend this and prior work by examining how the distance between a print media organization and the Parkland community influenced the framing of the event across three time periods. Finally, by applying the Social Coping Model to a shooting beyond the Virginia Tech shooting, we attempt to provide a reliable coding schema that fosters cross-event generalizability and comparison.

Literature Review

Media and Mass Shootings

While definitions vary, many scholars define mass shootings as incidents that result in the deaths of four or more people by gunfire, excluding the offender (Duwe, 2004; Fox et al., 2020; Krouse & Richardson, 2015; Lankford & Tomek, 2018; Meloy et al., 2001; Peterson & Densley, 2019). Despite variation in how mass shootings are defined, most individuals indirectly experience mass or school shooting events through the media. For example, in the year after the Columbine High School shooting, the three major news networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) crafted over 300 stories about the shooting (Robinson, 2011). Thus, analyses of media coverage about mass shootings are instrumental for the development of knowledge about incidents themselves, media behavior, and the impacts of such events.

Researchers have concluded mass shootings are portrayed in the media for an extensive amount of time and not all covered in the same manner. For example, in an analysis of New York Times articles from 2000 to 2012, Schildkraut et al. (2018) found that race/ethnicity, specifically the shooter being of Asian and other descent, and the number of victims were the most important factors in portraying these events in the media. Similarly, an analysis of television coverage of mass shootings from the three major television networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) over a twenty-five year span (1989-2014) found that mass shootings with ten or more fatalities receive more coverage than shootings with six to nine fatalities, which in turn receive more coverage than when there are less than six fatalities (Luca et al., 2020). Another important factor is the location of the shooting. Here, research has found that shootings taking place at government buildings (Fox et al., 2020; Silva & Capellan, 2019) or in schools (Fox et al., 2020; Schildkraut et al., 2018; Silva & Capellan, 2019) often take precedence in coverage over shootings that occur in other locations.

Scholars have also been able to tie media coverage of mass shootings to specific social consequences. First, increased media attention on these events has been linked to fear of such incidents. In a survey of 212 adults, Kupchik and Bracy (2009) found that those fearful of mass shooting victimization were more interested in reading a story about a mass shooting. Likewise, an analysis of school crime and violence news published by USA Today and The New York Times found that these sources persistently remind readers about the potential of school violence and frame school crime as getting worse (Levin & Wiest, 2018). Media outlets often reference the last extreme school shooting to emphasize the devastation of the latest attack (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Schildkraut, 2016). This distorts the audience’s views of the actual event and can lead to an audience developing more punitive attitudes or a general sense within the public that the number of shootings increased (Schildkraut et al., 2015). Thus, media framing can continue to generate fear of school shootings, despite evidence that the number of events has have declined (Haan & Mays, 2013).

Finally, research has evidenced the impact of mass shooting coverage on future shooters, the dissemination of mass shooting information, and gun related issues. In an ethnographic analysis of the media coverage involving three school shootings (Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook), Murray (2017) suggests stories of shootings can enable future shooters by providing copious amounts of information to the public about the offenders.3 Similarly, Sumiala and Tikka’s (2011) examination of YouTube videos about four mass school shootings (Columbine, Virginia Tech, Jokela, and Kauhajoki) found that YouTube facilitated the circulation of videos about school shootings including videos produced by shooters themselves. This circulation promotes violent social imaginaries and can blur what is considered professional news versus non-professional news content (Sumiala & Tikka, 2011). Finally, a recent study of mass shootings over a twenty-five year period finds that a single mass shooting leads to a 15% increase in the number of firearm bills introduced within a state in the year after an incident and is correlated with increased television news coverage (Luca et al. 2020). To complement this finding, an analysis of tweets derived from gun rights groups and gun control groups following the Parkland shooting found each group used Twitter to advance their respective policy narratives (Aslett et al., 2020).

Media Framing and School Shootings

Framing is an important tool used by the media when presenting information (Chermak, 1994; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Surette, 2015). Media outlets frame information with a specific narrative and reframe stories to recycle them. Entman (1993) argued that framing was the process of selecting specific aspects of a “perceived reality” and making them prominent to define a problem, discuss the causes, make moral judgments, and possibly finding a solution. Scheufele and Tewsbury (2007) wrote that framings are “invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues…efficiently and in a way that makes them accessible to lay audiences because they play to existing cognitive schemas” (p. 12). Thus, how the media chooses to frame news is significant as it can affect consumers in a variety of ways, including gaining public support on an issue or the furthering of political arguments (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

Scholars have specifically focused on media framing of mass school shootings. This interest increased dramatically after the highly publicized shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 (Murray, 2017; Muschert & Carr, 2006; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). School shootings represent a unique form of extreme violence because of their location and the greater likelihood that youth are victimized by these types of incidents. Since Columbine, analyses of media framings about school shootings have been instrumental for the development of knowledge about these incidents, media behavior, and the impacts of such events. For example, analyses of newspaper coverage of Columbine and nine other shootings concluded that coverage of these events were focused on individuals immediately after their occurrence, but later, these events were discussed in a larger social context that evoked conversations about issues, such as gun control (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Muschert & Carr, 2006). In addition, a comparative content analysis found that coverage of the Sandy Hook shooting more often focused on the actions of the educators involved rather than focusing on the shooter when compared to the Columbine shooting (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Finally, Frymer’s (2009) examination of print and television news media surrounding the Columbine shootings concluded that the media perpetuated a narrative of “youth violence and alienation” (p. 1390). Recently, Rees et al. (2020) conducted a root cause analysis involving 282 articles from ten online new sources to identify contributing factors to the Parkland shooting. They found that factors fit within four themes: policy (gun legislation), person (mental illness), environmental (culture), and equipment (large ammunition).

Much of the early research on media framing of school shootings only examined coverage from The New York Times (see Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Muschert & Carr, 2006; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). These studies brought forth valuable insights, but they were unable to examine differences in framing across media outlets. Holody and Shaugnessy (2020) addressed this gap by comparing local and national print media coverage of the Parkland shooting and focusing on comparing the salience and valence of fifteen frames. The study found that both local and national print media framed the shooting negatively (valence), while mostly framing their coverage of the shooting around issues of gun control (salience). In another study, Hawdon et al. (2014) provided a content analysis of 854 news stories about the Virginia Tech shooting collected from The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, and Roanoke Times. The findings suggested media location and time affected which frame was used. Specifically, the location of the news source impacted which aspects would be accented in the presentation of the story. Importantly, the study found that the focus of the coverage would change in the weeks after the shooting, and how the focus changed depended on the media location. To summarize, media outlets often frame mass shootings utilizing a variety of techniques. Further, evidence suggests that over time, both the framing of a shooting and the amount of coverage of a shooting garners can shift (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Hawdon et al., 2014; Holody, 2020; McQuail, 2010).

Theoretical Framework/Foundations

The current study follows in the logic established by Chyi and McCombs (2004) concerning the study of framing “as a process over time” (p. 26). They offered a pathway for cross-event generalizability for framing research through a schema that took into consideration “space” and “time.” Space here refers to categorizing frames that emerge from event coverage by their socially distant qualities. These frames refer to how the event is presented in the media by focusing on individual victims (individual frame), the community where the event occurred (community level frame), the larger geographic area surrounding the event (regional level frame), society or national significance (societal frame), and international significance (international frame). Time refers to categorizing frames by whether event coverage invokes either the past, present, or future. They then applied this framing schema through a content analysis of 170 New York Times articles covering the Columbine shooting. With respects to space, the study found that most of the coverage evoked the societal frame by discussing the shooting through the larger social context and focusing on issues like gun control. Finally, the study found that coverage tended to focus on the present with respect to time.

The Chyi and McCombs (2004) study offered a framing schema that could be used to understand media framing across different school shootings. Importantly, the study also evidenced that framing was a dynamic process, that frames were subject to change throughout the course of an events lifespan. That is, they found that even while the coverage favored the societal frame, the majority of coverage that evoked the societal frame came later in the month following the event. While this was a significant finding, the study was limited to one media outlet (The New York Times) and an analysis of media coverage spanning a month. This left room to expand on framing as a dynamic process. In addition, the study’s use of space and time is limited to how they are evoked within coverage. That is, news coverage of a shooting can discuss societal issues surrounding these incidents (space) while also discussing them with reference to the past, present, or future (time). We suggest an additional approach to understanding the significance of space and time towards the dynamic process of framing is to address how physical space, and time influence the dynamic process of framing. That is, if frames can change in the aftermath of a school shooting, how does a media outlet’s location intersect with time since the shooting to influence how it is framed?

Hawdon et al.’s (2014) analysis of media coverage about the Virginia Tech shooting answered these questions by applying the Social Coping Model, which emphasizes the coping and healing of the collective after a traumatic event and how this process plays out in stages across time. Using survey data following the Loma Prieta Earthquake and the start of the Persian Gulf War, Pennebaker and Harber (1993) found that individuals would talk and think about these events the most in the first few weeks following the event, but discussions and thoughts would return to normal by six to twelve weeks. Based on the results, Pennebaker and Harber (1993) suggested that individuals proceed through three phases while coping with the aftermath of an event. The Emergency Phase occurs two to three weeks after an event when most discussion occurs because the event is fresh in the minds of the public. Next, the Inhibition Phase occurs three to six weeks after an event, when members of the society no longer openly discuss the event but continue to think about it. Finally, the Adaptation Phase occurs when members of the society no longer discuss or think about the event.

We argue that, after a high-profile school shooting, the media may simply be framing the various stages of collective coping as outlined by the Social Coping Model. Despite its relevance, the only study to apply the Social Coping Model to print media coverage of a mass school shooting is Hawdon et al. (2014). That study proposed that the local media should be printing more stories about the Virginia Tech shooting due to proximity, but that as a result of competition and relationship building, they would likely avoid discussion of broader issues (i.e., gun control), and focus on the victims and the community in the immediate aftermath of a mass shooting (i.e., the Emergency Phase). They found that most of the sampled articles were published during the Emergency Phase, with publication declining throughout the following phases as predicted by the Social Coping Model. In addition, while overall coverage of the Virginia Tech shooting declined, local papers were found to be more likely to continue publishing articles during the Inhibition and Adaptation Phases than national newspapers. The cross-event generalizability of the Social Coping Model remains unknown given that the study only focused on one shooting. The current study addresses this gap by applying the Social Coping Model to the Parkland school shooting, which allows for the possibility of comparing the dynamic framing of two high-profile shootings.

Based off previous literature (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Hawdon et al. 2014; Muschert & Carr, 2006; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014), the particular saliency of both location and time in influencing the media’s framing is a principal interest of the current study. Specifically, the Social Coping Model, as applied by Hawdon et al. (2014), is primarily used to guide this study. In line with this framework, we seek to answer the following research questions and test the associated hypotheses:

RQ1: What is the media location’s impact on the amount of coverage of the Parkland shooting across the three stages of the Social Coping Model?

H1: Local papers will print more stories regarding the shooting than national papers.

H2: Local papers will be more likely to report on the shooting during the Adaptation Phase.

RQ2: What is the media location’s impact on the framing of the Parkland shooting across the three stages of the Social Coping Model?

H3: During the Emergency Phase, local papers will be more likely to focus on the shooter.

H4: During the Emergency Phase, local papers will be more likely to focus on victims.

H5: During the Emergency and Inhibition Phases, national papers will be more likely to focus on broader issues.

H6: During the Adaptation phase, the number of articles focusing on new information about the shooting will differ by location of the media.

RQ3: What is the media location’s impact on framing of the Parkland community across the three stages of the Social Coping Model?

H7: During the Emergency Phase, local papers will be more likely to depict the afflicted community as experiencing collective trauma and grief.

H8: During the Emergency Phase, local papers will be more likely to depict community solidarity.

H9: During the Emergency Phase, local papers will be less likely to focus on conflict in the local community.

Methodology

Data

The current study used a purposive sampling strategy to collect and analyze a sample of 325 articles from six newspapers about the Parkland shooting published between February 15, 2018 and April 20, 2018. The start date of February 15th was selected because it was the day after the shooting, while April 20th marked the end of the three-week period covered by the Adaptation Phase. The six newspapers included three local newspapers (Tampa Bay Times, Sun Sentinel, and Orlando Sentinel) and three national newspapers (USA Today, The New York Times, and The Washington Post). Local newspapers were purposefully chosen based on their location in relation to Broward County and readership. The Tampa Bay Times (2019) was considered Florida’s most circulated newspaper, followed by the Orlando Sentinel (Agility PR Solutions, 2019). The Sun Sentinel is in Broward County, where Parkland is located. An equal set of national newspapers were selected for overlap with Hawdon et al. (2014) and readership. At the time of the analysis, USA Today ranked number one in terms of readership, followed by The New York Times (Misachi, 2017). While The Washington Post ranked seventh, it was included for its significance in the Virginia Tech shooting (see Hawdon et al., 2014).

National and local outlets were selected to analyze geographic differences in media framing. Articles that met the inclusion criteria of pertaining to the Parkland shooting, presenting the victims of the shooting, discussing the community, or presenting news concerning broader issues (i.e., gun control policies or mental health) were retained for subsequent analysis. LexisNexis and NewsBank were used to search for articles pertaining to the shooting. The search terms included: Parkland, Parkland school shooting, and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. The results were narrowed by timeline (February 15, 2018 – April 20, 2018), publication type (newspapers), location (Parkland, Florida), and news company.

A deductive or a priori coding strategy was used. This procedure relied on the determination of field codes of those used by Hawdon et al. (2014). This allowed for appropriate comparison between two separate mass shootings while also providing the chance to ensure reliability and validity of the coding scheme developed by Hawdon et al. (2014). Each article was coded based upon 1) focus (i.e., the overall frame such as articles focusing on the shooter or victims); 2) reporting signs of community solidarity; 3) reporting of division or conflicts occurring after the shooting; and 4) whether the Parkland community was depicted as damaged or collectively grieving. The current study investigates each of these frames by the geographic coverage of media outlets across time. Specifically, it investigates the frames of the sampled articles according to the three phases defined by the Social Coping Model. Phase 1, the Emergency Phase, covered the first three weeks after the shooting (February 15 through March 7, 2018). Phase 2, the Inhibition Phase, covered the three weeks after Phase 1 (March 8 through March 29, 2018). Finally Phase 3, the Adaptation Phase, covered the three weeks after Phase 2 (March 30 through April 20, 2018).

Variables

Table 1 displays the conceptualization and operationalization of our frames. Frames were housed within two overarching categories: focus and community impact. Our coding schema (focus, community impact, and location) draws from Hawdon et al. (2014) to provide cross-event generalizability of the coding schema and comparison of media framings across two separate shootings (i.e., framing of Virginia Tech vs. Parkland). The mutually exclusive coding of the news articles’ dominant frame was based on their focus on a) the shooter, b) victims, c) broader issues, and d) news. For example, an article that discussed the shooter and his background in addition to information about the victims (those who were killed and those who were involved but not injured) were coded as shooter-focused because the article began and ended with details about him (McMahon et al., 2018). The next category concentrated on the impact of the Parkland shooting on the community. Here articles were coded for a) community solidarity, b) divided and conflicted, and c) grieving and shattered. Articles were coded as reporting signs of community solidarity, division or conflict, grief, or not reporting these signs. As such, these categories are not mutually exclusive, and articles could present signs of community solidarity in addition to signs of grief and/or conflict. Finally, newspapers’ media location was coded as local or national for most of the analyses in this study. The Tampa Bay Times, The Sun Sentinel and The Orlando Sentinel were considered “local” papers, while The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today were coded as “national” papers.

To establish inter-coder reliability, two coders coded 65 of the 325 articles (20%) and Cohen’s kappa scores were generated. Scores were .713 for community damaged/grieving, .742 for community solidarity, and .732 for community division/conflict. Scores reflected substantial agreement above established threshold (see Gottschalk, 2014). An additional round of discussions was conducted between the two coders to increase agreement before one coder then coded all 325 articles.

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Analytical Strategy

We began hypothesis testing (H1) by assessing the number of articles about the Parkland shooting published on the front page of each of the newspapers in the sample by phase of the Social Coping Model. Hypotheses two through nine were tested using a series of Fisher’s exact tests of independence to compare the relationship between media coverage and location during each phase of the Social Coping Model. This test was assessed rather than a Pearson’s chi-square, as was done in the Hawdon et al. (2014), because of the sample size per category and expected values within categories being smaller than five (Connelly, 2016; Kim, 2017). Pearson’s chi-squared tests assumes that the sample is large and is an approximation test, whereas the Fisher’s exact tests “runs an exact procedure especially for small-sized samples” (Kim 2017, p. 1520).

Results

Overall Coverage by Media Location and Phase

As a reminder, we examine differences in media framing by location of the media outlet across three phases or time periods following the shooting. The Emergency Phase captures the three weeks after the Parkland shooting (February 15 through March 7, 2018), the Inhibition Phase is three weeks after the Emergency Phase (March 8, through March 29, 2018), and the Adaptation Phase is the three weeks after the Emergency Phase (March 30, through April 20, 2018). Table 2 depicts the number of articles included in the sample about the Parkland shooting published on the front page in each of the newspapers. From February 15, 2018, to April 20, 2018, the Sun Sentinel published a total of 153 articles, the Orlando Sentinel published 36 articles, and the Tampa Bay Times published 60 articles. Nationally, The New York Times published 24 articles, USA Today published 22 articles, and The Washington Post published 30 articles.

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First, we hypothesized that local papers would publish more stories about the shooting. Table 2 shows that, combined, the three local newspaper companies accounted for 249 articles (76.62%) of the 325 shooting-related articles that were sampled. This supports the first hypothesis that local papers were more likely to print stories about the shooting than national papers. Moreover, while the local papers published 105 (65.21%) of the articles during the Emergency Phase, they accounted for 99 (86.09%) of the published articles during the Inhibition Phase and 45 (91.84%) of the published articles during the Adaptation Phase. The local media’s dominance in coverage is corroborated in Table 3, which explores focus frames by location and by phase.

Results partially supported hypothesis two, which predicted the media company’s location would impact coverage of the Parkland shooting in the Adaptation Phase (p = 0.053). Here the number of articles covering Parkland shows that local media coverage dominated this stage, whereas national media coverage began to dissolve completely as local newspapers published forty-five articles and national newspapers published four articles (92% versus 8%). As expected, local papers covered the shooting heavily and dwarfed coverage provided by national outlets, even as overall coverage declined in the two months after the Parkland shooting.

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Focus by Proximity of Paper by Phase of Social Coping Model

Next, we examined the media’s location impact on coverage that was either shooter, victim, or broader issues focused across each phase (Table 3). We expected local media to focus more on the shooter and victims during the Emergency Phase compared to national media (Hypothesis 3 and 4 respectively), while national papers would instead focus on broader issues during the Emergency Phase and through the Inhibition Phase (Hypothesis 5). Our results suggest that local media, when compared to national media, did not differ significantly in their focus on the shooter or victims in the Emergency Phase. While the local media published more shooter and victim focused articles than national media in the immediate aftermath of the shooting these results reflect that the national media did not shy away from covering the shooter or the victims either. Thus, the third and fourth hypothesis are not supported.

During the immediate aftermath of the shooting (i.e., Emergency Phase), most of the media attention was placed on broader issues. That is, both local and national media focused more on broader issues than other focuses (around 61%). That the local media was heavily focused its immediate coverage on issues related to shootings was not expected. In fact, the local media continued to fixate its attention on broader issues during the second phase, the Inhibition Phase, which was also not expected. During the Inhibition phase, local papers published sixty-four articles framed around broader issues while national papers published twelve articles. This partially supports Hypothesis 5, but Table 4 does not show a significant relationship between location and the broader issues focus in either of the phases. Finally, we expected a difference in reporting new details of the shooting by media location during the last phase, the Adaptation Phase (Hypothesis 6). Here we see that the relationship between location of the media location and framing is significant (p < .05). Specifically, national media were reporting new details more than expected nearly two months after the shooting, suggesting that the new details warranted national attention. The implications of these results are explored further in the discussion.

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Community Impact by Proximity of Paper by Phase of Social Coping Model

Next, we examined the media locations impact on covering the community across each Phase (Table 5). We expected local media to focus more on community grief, solidarity, and conflict during the Emergency Phase when compared to national media (Hypothesis 7, 8, and 9 respectively). Interestingly, despite being one of the deadliest school shootings, we find that, during the Emergency Phase, both local and national media portrayed the Parkland community as grieving the least, with only 8.49% of local and 10.90% of national articles depicting the community in this manner. In fact, during the immediate aftermath of the shooting, the majority of coverage about the community by both local and national media centered around community conflict. Here, 29.25% of articles published locally reported signs of conflict, while 32.73% of articles published nationally reported signs of conflict. These results collectively portray media outlets concerned with capturing conflict over grief, yet also show that both national and local outlets did not significantly vary in their coverage of these attributes. Thus, we find no support for hypothesis seven and nine. Finally, we found no support that coverage of community solidarity by local and national media outlets significantly differed during the Emergency Phase. Here, local papers were slightly more likely to portray signs of solidarity than national newspapers (7.55% and 7.27%, respectively). Surprisingly, we find that during the second phase, the Inhibition Phase, this difference is significant (p = .004). During the Inhibition Phase, local papers printed signs of solidarity in 15.15% of articles, while national papers reported signs of solidarity within 50% of their published articles. While this exemplifies the dynamic process of framing, it suggests that there may have been a possible trigger for the change in how the shooting was framed during the Emergency phase as opposed to the Inhibition Phase. Given that this was not expected, the implications for differences found in the Inhibition Phase are explored in the discussion.

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Discussion

The current study analyzed temporal variation of print media framing of the Parkland shooting at both the local and national levels to answer questions related to the three stages of Pennebaker and Harber’s (1993) Social Coping Model. Specifically, we assessed whether media location influenced how much coverage the Parkland shooting received, as well as how the incident and community response were framed, over time. Hawdon et al. (2014) examined similar questions in their application of the Social Coping Model to the Virginia Tech shooting, but the generalizability of this framework to other shootings was not assessed prior to this study. The Social Coping Model suggests that changes in discussions about traumatic events, like school shootings, occur in three stages: the Emergency Phase (2-3 weeks after an event), the Inhibition Phase (3-6 weeks after an event), and the Adaptation Phase (6-12 weeks after an event). When applied to a mass shooting, the Social Coping Model suggests that most discussions about the event occur in outlets geographically proximate to events and within the first three weeks before steadily declining. Specifically, the decline in discussion surrounding the event occurs with media outlets further away from an event and later among more media outlets closest to the event. By applying the Social Coping Model to coverage of the Parkland shooting, we were able to assess the generalizability of this model and provide a deeper understanding of dynamic process of framing of school shooting events.

Our findings support previous research that found newspaper companies that were geographically proximate to shootings printed more articles than national newspaper outlets across all phases of the Social Coping Model (Hawdon et al., 2014; Holody, 2020; Holody and Shaughnessy, 2020; McQuail, 2005). Specifically, during the Inhibition (March 8 through March 29, 2018) and Adaptation Phases (March 30 through April 20, 2018), we found local papers continued reporting about the shooting at about the same rate, while national newspapers printed less than half of the articles published within the phase before. This is consistent with media framing studies on mass shootings regardless of the setting (see Holody and Daniel, 2016). Overall, the sustained coverage driven by local media outlets suggests that they maintain considerable buy-in and attachment to school shootings that occur in their area.

Our findings suggest there were only a few ways in which the coverage of the Parkland shooting resembled coverage of shootings from the past. A month after the Parkland shooting, national media outlets published more new details about that shooting than expected when compared to local media. While we have limited research to draw from, Hawdon et al.’s (2014) study on the framing of the Virginia Tech mass shooting displayed the same pattern. That national media continues to cover details of school shooting well after they happen signifies that these outlets continue to acquiesce to public interest in school shootings.

Findings suggest that coverage of broader issues remains central to the media following a mass school shooting regardless of their location or time since the event. Immediately following the Parkland incident, local newspaper articles focused more on broader issues, which is like the coverage after the Virginia Tech (Hawdon et al., 2014) and Sandy Hook (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014) shootings. In fact, our findings suggest no difference in coverage of broader issues, victims, or the shooter by media location across any phase. This finding corroborates that of Holody and Shaugnessy (2020), who found that local and national media were similar in their framing of the Parkland shooting, using a different sample of local and national media outlets than the current study. We suggest that this may be a trend because of the increased visibility of mass shootings (Elsass et al., 2016) or the media’s interest in agenda setting surrounding mass shootings (Jashinsky et al., 2017; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). However, we suggest that this will need to be further analyzed.

The media framing of the Virginia Tech and Parkland shootings characterized the ways in which communities responded to tragedies, but there were some important differences in how such responses were framed. Regardless of location, the media concentrated on aspects of community solidarity after Parkland but reporting this mattered more during the Inhibition Phase than the Emergency Phase. This was different from the framing of the community response of the Virginia Tech shooting, where solidarity was not reported as much during the Inhibition Phase than the Emergency Phase (Hawdon et al., 2014). The shift of coverage towards community solidarity by local and national outlets exemplifies the dynamic process of framing that Chyi and McCombs (2004) alluded to in their research about the framing of the Columbine shooting. In their study, they found that the framing of societal issues related to the Columbine shooting were most salient immediately after the shooting but dissipated within a month. Our finding suggests that Parkland evidenced a kind of stalled solidarity where immediate attention went elsewhere. This finding may be explained by the media’s portrayal of the Parkland students’ and community’s unity when protests began on March 24 across the nation. The Parkland survivors organized the March for Our Lives protest within weeks following the shooting (Grinberg & Muaddi, 2018) and were not fearful of using the media to their advantage. Thus, it appears that regardless of venue (i.e., college or high school campus), community solidarity efforts emerge in ways that become significant stories themselves.

Our findings also support the notion that media response to mass school shootings over time may be shifting with respect to the portrayal of community conflict and grief. Both were topics that the local media discussed immediately after the Virginia Tech shooting, but coverage quickly diminished into the Inhibition Phase. After Parkland, local newspaper companies published more content specific to grief and conflict, but only with respect to the latter did coverage continue into the Inhibition Phase. Overall, the way in which the media portrayed the protests during Parkland signifies that capturing community solidarity and conflict was more significant than portraying a grieving community. This could also mean that the community was able to cope after the Parkland shooting more quickly than communities where other mass shootings occurred. It could also mean affected communities may be quicker to act on mass shootings compared to previous events. Indeed, our results suggest coverage of the Parkland shooting was more likely to discuss conflict than the coverage of Virginia Tech shooting, regardless of media location. This speaks to the form of conflict that sprung forth following Parkland—gun control efforts. This is corroborated by Holody and Shaugnessy (2020), who suggested that the framing of Parkland may have disrupted common framing of mass shootings given the saliency of activism within their study of Parkland coverage.

Conclusion

Continued research into the media framing of school shootings remains critical given the power of the media to influence policy (Robinson, 2005; Sacco, 1995; Shanahan et al., 2008). Luca et al. (2020) found that a single mass shooting leads to a 15% increase in the number of firearm bills introduced within a state in the year after a mass shooting and is correlated with increased television news coverage. Thus, it is likely the media coverage of the Parkland shooting hastened the policy creation time and contributed to the numerous bills passed after the shooting. We found evidence that the print media response to the Parkland emphasized the security of schools and school safety. In the aftermath of the shooting, former Florida governor Rick Scott signed the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which addressed gun access, education policy, and school safety (Wilson, 2018). This also made Florida the sixth state to pass a red-flag law (Gaudiano, 2018). Similar gun control policies were developed and implemented throughout the nation (Astor & Russell, 2018; Vasilogambros, 2018; Wilson, 2018). Thus, the media’s framing of Parkland may have contributed to legislative pressures to act.

There are several limitations to the current study. The Social Coping model outlines a specific timeline; however, future studies should consider extending this. This is especially important in cases where the perpetrator was alive after the shooting event—as was the case for Parkland. Studying a longer period would allow researchers to examine the ways in which the media reminds local communities of a critical event. For events where the shooter survives, we would expect that court proceedings would continue to be locally covered and these proceedings should be analyzed in relation to how they expand on initial framing of the event and how framing of the proceedings may be unique. We suggest this could extend on shooter-focused media studies and the cultural logic of circulation articulated by Sumiala and Tikka (2011).

In addition, this study only analyzed print media coverage. Future research should also investigate media coverage of shootings across multiple forms of media (i.e., social media, digital, other print sources), especially as readership of print newspapers declines. This would allow researchers to compare media coverage of the same event covered on different platforms (i.e., social media). Additionally, future research should further explore how individuals engage with frames. We suggest this could be done through a survey extending on the work by Levin and Wiest (2018), which found those fearful of mass shootings are more likely to engage with coverage of these events. This could also be accomplished by extending on the work by Aslett et al. (2020), which found individuals can engage frames, such as gun control, on social media.

Nonetheless, our findings lend cross event-validity to the use of the Social Coping Model as a framing schema. The application of this framing schema demonstrates that framing changes across time by location. Importantly, the use of this framing schema allowed for a comparison to a prior high-profile shooting, Virginia Tech, since it was also analyzed via the Social Coping Model (see Hawdon et al., 2014). While this study provides support for Pennebaker and Harber’s (1993) Social Coping Model when evaluating media coverage of school shootings, we encourage continued use of this framing schema to assess the continued generalizability of this model.

NOTES

  1. Hereafter referred to as the Parkland shooting.
  2. Hereafter referred to as the Social Coping Model.
  3. The study also included the mass shooting at the Aurora movie theater (Murray, 2017).


DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT

No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

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About the Authors

Jennifer LaRose is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. She received her M.A. in Sociology from Louisiana State University and her B.A in sociology from Murray State University. Her primary research interests are in mass shootings, school shootings, media, and the media’s portrayal of these shootings.

Jose A. Torres, PhD is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. He received his M.A. in criminal justice from Norfolk State University and his Ph.D. in sociology from Virginia Tech. His primary research interests involve police legitimacy, race and policing, urban policing, and community policing. He has published in Criminology and Public Policy, Critical Criminology, and Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice.

Michael S. Barton, PhD is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. His research interests are in the areas of criminology and urban sociology, with much of his research focusing on the importance of neighborhood change for crime. He has recently published in several academic outlets including Homicide Studies, Crime & Delinquency, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, Urban Studies, Social Science Research, Deviant Behavior, and PLOS One.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
LaRose, J., Torres, J. A., & Barton, M. S. (2021). Changing media framings of school shootings: A case study of the Parkland school shooting. Journal of Mass Violence Research, 1(1), 44-61. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR11874

 


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A Rose By Any Other Name: Problems in Defining and Conceptualising Serial Murder with a New Proposed Definition

A Rose By Any Other Name: Problems in Defining and Conceptualising Serial Murder with a New Proposed Definition

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A Rose by Any Other Name: Problems in Defining and Conceptualising Serial Murder with a New Proposed Definition

Wayne Petherick Email the Corresponding Author,1 Shuktika Bose,1 Amber McKinley,and Candice Skrapec3

1Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University
2Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University
3Department of Criminology, California State University Fresno

https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR85123  |  Full Citation
Volume: 1, Issue: 1, Page(s): 4-24

Article History: Received February 10, 2021 | Accepted May 3, 2021 | Published Online June 4, 2021

ABSTRACT
The prevalence of serial murder is low; however, it has been the focus of much academic and popular attention. Despite a considerable research base on serial murder, there is still debate as to how it should be defined. This article examines often used definitions of serial murder, followed by a critique of some of the main components of these definitions. From this, a definition is advanced with rationales for the inclusion of the characteristics in the proposed definition. This analysis provides for some clarity in the identification of serial murder and those aspects of the crime used to define it.

KEYWORDS
serial murder, spree murder, mass murder, cooling-off period, dormant period

Despite the understanding that serial murder is uncommon (Schlesinger, 2001), it has been popular among both professional and lay audiences (Knoll, 2006). Serial murder was popularised in the 1980s and 1990s by movies, television shows, and written works by current and former investigators and criminal profilers. In the academic literature, several works, such as the Crime Classification Manual and Sexual Homicides: Patterns and Motives, both written by members of the FBI’s Behavioural Analysis Unit and their associates, brought this type of multiple murder to the fore.

There is both interest in and an impressive research corpus on serial murder; however, debate remains over fundamental issues such as how the term is defined, how many victims are required before serial murder is identified, and the role of motive. A cursory examination of the literature shows that definitions are as varied as offenders themselves, though there are some commonalities running throughout research and literature. This article canvasses the literature on serial murder, providing an examination into the various definitions provided and critique of the common components of these definitions, before proposing a definition with the accompanying rationale for each component.

History of the Term

Serial murder, similar to murder itself, is likely as old as human criminal interaction although the term and its study is relatively recent. Alongside the contention surrounding definition, there is no universal agreement as to the origin of the term serial murder. While some lay claim, evidence suggests the term, or at least the concepts behind it, have existed for considerably longer. Contributing to the problem is the understanding that claims made regarding origin are uncritically accepted and repeated in the literature, causing further confusion.

One of the most cited sources for the term serial killer is [retired] FBI agent Robert Ressler, who claims this in both of his true crime works. In the first, Whoever Fights Monsters:

At Quantico, I taught subjects ranging from abnormal psych to interviewing techniques; and I discovered that I was a pretty good teacher…We got to go on the road for our training sessions, both nationally and internationally. It was at one of those international sessions that I coined the term serial killer, now in much use. (Ressler & Shachtman, 1993, p. 45) 

Then, in I Have Lived in the Monster, his subsequent memoir:

During my tenure at the FBI, I interviewed more than a hundred murderers in prison and became one of the world’s leading profilers of criminals, applying my expertise to hundreds of unsolved crimes, often helping local police forces to identify murderers and bring them to justice. As part of my attempt to understand multiple murderers, in the mid-1970s I coined the term serial killer. (Ressler & Shachtman, 1998, p. 1)

According to his memoirs, Ressler joined the FBI in 1970 (in New Agent Class 70-2) and then moved to the Behavioral Sciences Unit (BSU) in the mid-1970s. His above claim is therefore supported by these dates. In a later publication, Kocsis and Irwin (1998) state “prior to 1980 there was no specific term for serial murders or serial crimes in general” (p. 6). Both of these claims will now be examined through the lens of historical literature.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, former Chief of Police Pierce Brooks created a system to help identify and trace serial killers. At the time, computer systems were prohibitively expensive and a nationwide network and database for information sharing was non-existent. In 1981, when such systems became available, Brooks introduced the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP) and in 1984 the National Centre for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) was established, then VICAP and the NCAVC merged (Geberth, 2006). Regarding Brooks’ involvement in the origin of the term serial murder, Egger (1998) suggests:

The term serial murder was first used sometime in 1982 or 1983. The criminal investigative pioneer Pierce Brooks, who conceptualised the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program currently being run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), may have been the first to use the term serial. However, others, such as retired FBI agents, claim to have used the term first. No one is certain who coined the term, but it has been with us ever since. (pp. 4-5)

Psychiatrist Donald Lunde published Murder and Madness in 1975, and discussed both single and mass murders, providing distinguishing characteristics of the two:

In common usage of the term, mass murder is applied to someone who kills a number of people, usually for no apparent reason or for an apparent but perverse (often sexual) reason. Psychiatric and legal literature sometimes makes a distinction between mass murder and serial murder, with mass murder referring to a crime in which a number of victims are killed, usually by one person in a single episode – for instance, the killing of eight student nurses by Richard Speck in Chicago in 1966 – and serial murder referring to a number of murders by a single person over a period of months – or, occasionally, years. Each killing is usually a discrete episode, but there is usually a common motive, method, and/or type of victim; for instance, the series of murders of prostitutes in England attributed to Jack the Ripper. (Lunde, 1975, p. 47)

A publication date of 1975 does not preclude Ressler reading Lunde, though this would argue against Ressler’s claim of ownership. Lunde’s citation of the distinction created in the psychiatric and legal literature at or before his publication’s time would indicate that the terms had been utilised for some time prior to the commencement of Ressler’s employment in the BSU.

The Meaning of Murder by James Brophy is an earlier source of the term than any of these other works, first published in 1966 in the UK, and in 1967 in the USA. Brophy distinguished between other mass-victim crimes like genocide, stating:

A serial murder is a very different matter. Its essential character is repetition at intervals of time, and as soon as a number of murders are established as a sequence it becomes clear that the community has to reckon with an unidentified murderer, a murderer still at large, and a murderer who has taken on himself the guilt of the supreme crime not upon one occasion and under pressure of circumstance but by deliberate intention, and so will presumably continue the series. (Brophy, 1967, p. 166)

Therefore, Brophy not only utilised the term specifically, but also recognised its “essential character” of repetition over time.

In 1949 Frederic Wertham, a German-American psychiatrist, published The Show of Violence and was one of the first to systematically discuss the effects of violent media on children’s development. While the first, his work has also been recently criticised for over stating the impact of media on children, and also the focus on potential negative effects while ignoring potential positive effects of media consumption. One such critique of Wertham’s book The Seduction of the Innocent notes (Tilley, 2012, p. 386):

Ultimately, I found that, despite its accolades and its central role in moving comics further to the cultural sideline’s, Wertham’s Seduction included numerous falsifications and distortions. This articles documents specific examples of how Wertham manipulated, overstated, compromised, and fabricated evidence – especially that evidence he attributed to personal clinical research with young people – for rhetorical gain.

More recent research and evidence also suggests that early claims of the negative effects of media violence were overstated (see Drummond et al., 2020 as one such example).

Wertham also discussed mass murders, a term he putatively utilised for what are now called serial murders:

History in textbooks records mostly murders of the type called by the French magnicides, meaning murders of “big” people – kings and presidents, rulers and leaders. But the vast majority of murder victims are little people. They are the thirty-odd unemployed and friendless youths of the Haarman case; the socially frustrated women and lonely widows of Landru; the hundred and eighty-odd known peasant children killed by Gilles de Rais; the underprivileged coloured and white children of Albert fish; the outcast acquaintances of Jack the Ripper; Marcel Petiot’s sixty-three hounded refugees from Gestapo terror. What is true for such mass murders is less conspicuous but equally true in the aggregate for single murderers. (Wertham, 1949, pp. 259-260)

Haarman was a German serial murderer, Landru and Petiot, French serial murderers, and de Rais a serial murderer and leader in the French military. Jack the Ripper and Albert Fish are both well-known serial murderers from England and America, respectively.

Despite all of the above using the term, its first use actually appeared in the professional literature in 1930, when Ernst Gennat of the Berlin Criminal Police published Die Düsseldorf Sexualverbrechen in Kriminalistische Monatshafte (roughly translated as The Düsseldorf Sexual Criminal in Criminal Monthly). The article discussed the crimes of Peter Kürten, a German serial murderer known as ‘The Düsseldorf Monster’ or ‘The Vampire of Düsseldorf’. In this article (translated with some assistance from the original “Old German”), Gennat states (1930):

The question of whether the so-called Flehe child murder – the killing of children H. and L. (no. 9) – is to be added to the account of the “serial killer”, is difficult to decide. It would remain to be tested whether the circumstances of the killing of A. allow the conclusion that the perpetrator from that case can also be considered as murderer of L. and H. (p. 29)

Notwithstanding possible translation issues, the original German passage states, “auf das Konto des “Serienmörders” zu setzen ist, ist schwer zu entscheiden.” Serienmörder translates to series/serial killer or series/serial murderer and indicates that this is most likely the first use of the term in the professional literature. Despite the above evidence, some works today continue to cite Ressler as the original source (see Miller, 2014).

What is Serial Murder?

Serial murder belongs to one of three types of multiple victim homicide (serial, spree, and mass murder); however, this general distinction potentially includes terrorist acts, genocides, professional assassins, and others. Serial murder, spree murder, and mass murder are all crimes involving an individual acting alone or with others to kill more than two victims, either in a single time and place, or in multiple events in different places. Geberth (1996) is usually attributed as the source for the distinction of these types.

One issue in defining a problem is the specificity of the definition used. Specific definitions potentially capture less cases for study and exclude cases that should be included, and broad definitions potentially capture more cases whilst potentially including cases that should be excluded. Specific definitions comprised of numerous variables may be less suitable to serial offender identification early in a series when little is known, or the cases not linked.

It is important to understand the different ways that serial murder is classified as “defining the term determines the problem” (Skrapec, 2001, p. 11). This has implications for investigating and researching serial murder as the definition impacts upon changes to investigative procedures and also the sample size employed by researchers. For example, establishing the threshold at two victims invariably involves a larger sample of offenders than a threshold of three or four victims. According to Hickey (2013), the definition used for serial murder “must clearly be as broad as possible” (p. 32) though as stated this would likely include cases that should not be included.

Kocsis (2000) argues that of all the issues plaguing the study of serial murder, one of the most significant is the definition used. Knoll (2006) elaborates by noting that the study of serial murder has been hampered by the lack of a unified definition, before providing the view that most experts agree “the offender must have killed at least two victims in temporally unrelated incidents” (p. 64). Basic definitions range from one or two characteristics whereby (1) multiple victims are killed (2) over time (see Hickey, 2013; Jenkins, 1994; Mohanty, 2004), through to a more complex array of characteristics (see Adjorlolo & Chan, 2014; Egger, 1998).

Victim Count

One of the greatest sources of variability is the number of victims. Holmes and Holmes (2002) state that victim count is one of the defining characteristics, indeed, “the primary difficulty is the lack of agreement on victim counts, with different researchers use [sic] varying cut off points” (Dowden, 2005, p. 8). Kocsis and Irwin (1998) note that a common understanding of the term serial crime relates to the number of victims, and that the criterion of a minimum victim tally is entrenched in conceptualising serial crime. They state, “a practical limitation of using minimum offence numbers is that for any given offender the number of known offences may be less than the number of offences actually committed by that person” (Kocsis & Irwin, 1998, p. 199). Indeed, there are numerous examples of investigators discovering more victims once an offender is apprehended.

Burgess (2006) states a “serial murderer kills more than two victims with a cooling-off period between the killings and involves more than one location or crime scene” (p. 437) The definition for cooling-off period is “the state of returning to the murderer’s usual way of life between killings.” While not providing a definition per se, Liebert (1985) weighs in on issues of classification in that:

The problem of definition in serial murder is subject to interpretation of the crime scene for theories regarding motivation for murder. The assumption formulated when conceptualising apparently random events under the term serial murder is that one or more persons are murdering over a span of time and definable space and that there is a common denominator of motivation in otherwise random killings. (p. 188)

Several common characteristics are included including motivation (lust, terrorism, or cultism), which is a common denominator, different physical spaces where the killings occur (“definable space”) and, the span of time over which the killings occur (a cooling-off period), though the actual time between events is not discussed. A span of time implies multiple killings, suggesting at least two.

Dietz (1985) suggests that a:

Requirement of 10 murder victims and killing incidents for inclusion in the category of serial killers is good for the purpose of looking at one extreme and conceptually homogenous group of offenders, but it is too high a threshold for certain purposes, such as alerting law enforcement agencies to a series of crimes in progress. (p. 487)

Dietz suggests that killers who kill less than five victims are more heterogeneous than those who kill more than five, with the latter group falling into five different categories: psychopathic sexual sadists, crime spree killers, functionaries of organised criminal operations, custodial prisoners and asphyxiators, and supposed psychotics. Taking this into account, Dietz lowered the victim count threshold to five; however, there was no attempt to explicate the reasons for the chosen threshold.

Pinto and Wilson’s (1990) use of the term includes offenders who kill two or more people in separate events, with a time interval between offences. This definition implies multiple victims, multiple locations, and the passage of time. These authors exclude professional and contract killers, and anyone driven by political motives. Later research by Mouzos and West (2007) used a definition from the Crime Classification Manual that includes a higher victim count. This involves three or more victims that are “repetitive sequential homicides” (p. 1), further noting that serial murderers have a “similarity of subject or purpose” (p. 1), requiring more than three victims that are part of the same pattern, and also the same or similar motive satisfying internal need or desire. Consequently, it may be inferred that the repetitive sequential component of this definition is the separating factor between serial murderer and mass murder, where killings all occur in one event.

Egger (1998) provides one of the most comprehensive definitions in the literature, providing a seven-point classification specifically for law enforcement:

A serial murder occurs when (1) one or more individuals (in many cases, males) commit(s) a second murder and/or subsequent murder; (2) there is generally no prior relationship between victim and attacker (if there is a relationship, such a relationship will place the victim at a subjugated role to the killer); (3) subsequent murders are at different times and have no apparent connection to the initial murder; and (4) are usually committed in a different geographical location. Further, (5) the motive is not for material gain and is for the murderer’s desire to have power or dominance over his victims. (6) Victims may have symbolic value for the murderer and/or are perceived to be prestigeless and in most instances are unable to defend themselves or alert others to their plight, or are perceived as powerless given their current situation in time, place, or status within their immediate surroundings, examples being (7) vagrants, the homeless, prostitutes, migrant workers, homosexuals, missing children, single women (out by themselves), elderly women, college students, and hospital patients. (p. 5)

This exhaustive definition includes several common components and sets the victim count at two. It further identifies the victims as typically strangers who often belong to groups that society views as disposable (homeless, drug addicts, prostitutes), with the murders occurring in different times and in different geographic locations (different times, different places), and with a personal rather than profit-based motive and personal meaning for the offender.

Jenkins (1994) sets the minimum number of victims at four but does not explain why. Taking into consideration that this work was written in the “early days” of serial murder research, it is a reasonable assumption that this is simply a reflection of the uncertainty among researchers at the time of how high (or low) the bar should be set. Like Jenkins, Fox and Levin (1998), in a lengthy treatise, also proposed their minimum victim count to four. These authors acknowledge this distinction is “more than just arbitrary” (p. 408) and will help “distinguish multiple killing from homicide generally. By restricting attention to acts committed by one or a few offenders, our working definition of multiple homicide also excludes highly organised or institutionalised killings” (p. 408). They later added that one or more offenders commit the murders, spanning days, weeks, months, or years, suggesting this higher number is more helpful than victim counts of two or three. As noted above – minimal victim numbers aside – incidents where one offender kills more than one victim are still relatively low. As such, incorporating a higher victim count in the definition to accommodate this may not be necessary.

Keeney and Heide (1995) draw upon Keeney’s (1992) definition that serial murder is “the premeditated murder of three or more victims committed over time, in separate incidents, in a civilian context, with the murder activity being chosen by the offender” (p. 7). They note this definition excludes military activities and political assassinations, but includes healthcare workers, parents who murder children, professional assassins, and those who kill multiple spouses or partners. This definition departs from almost all others in which “hits” committed by professional assassins are excluded. Keeney and Heide (1995) use a victim count of three as this was consistent with that used by the FBI at the time.

Skrapec (2001) suggests a return to the original concept of Lustmörd, which is killing for its own sake or where the killing is the primary motivation. Serial murder is defined as “three or more forensically linked murders committed by the same person(s) over an extended period of time and where the primary motivation is personal gratification” (Skrapec, 2001, p. 22). This definition excludes some types of killers included by others, such as professional hitmen and terrorists. Importantly, this definition stipulates that the primary motivation for serial murder is personal gratification and that cases are forensically linked. This should limit the murders included through questionable practices (such as offender confessions or dubious behavioural case linkage) but may unnecessarily exclude cases where the offender has been careful or is forensically aware making available evidence inconclusive or absent. This is an important component, however, and will be included in the proposed definition.

Mohanty (2004) provides a rather confusing definition of serial murder, where “killing occurs over a period of time and sometimes for years. Killing tends to be one by one and there may be a pattern or victim trait” (p. 216). No further explanation is provided for any individual components of the definition, and several aspects (including the behaviours representing them) are missing.

The FBI commanded authority status on the definition throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and many sources deferred to the FBI cut-off of three victims. However, it should be noted that the most recent FBI definition (Morton & Hilts, 2008) is that serial murder is “the unlawful killing of two or more victims by the same offender(s), in separate events” (p. 9). It is noted that this definition is based on a gathering of subject matter experts who proposed that the definition should include (Morton & Hilts, 2008, p. 9):

  • One or more offenders;
  • Two or more murdered victims; and
  • Incidents occurring in separate events, at different times.

An original technical work to come out of the FBI study on convicted sexual killers in the 1970s and 1980s (see Burgess & Ressler, 1985) was the Crime Classification Manual (CCM) now in its second edition (Douglas et al., 2006). This was a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders type classification system for violent crimes, including a chapter on mass, spree, and serial homicide. Each type includes victimology and crime scene indicators, among others, with examples. In it, Burgess (2006) states that:

Serial murder generally involves three or more victims. What sets this category apart from the two others is a cooling-off period between murders. The hiatus could be days, months, or years. In other words, the serial killer is not killing with frequency.

A serial killer usually goes after strangers, but the victims tend to share similarities such as gender, age, or occupation. Although he prefers a certain look or background, it does not mean he will not substitute another victim if he cannot find his intended target. (p. 461)

Haggerty (2009) states that “a serial killer is someone who has killed three or more people who were previously unknown to him” (p. 169). The male pronoun is used because “almost all instances of serial killing have involved male perpetrators” (p. 184), though this excludes a number of female offenders who have traditionally bucked the serial killer trend, despite many of them having higher victim tallies than male offenders (see Gurian, 2011; Harrison et al., 2015; Kelleher & Kelleher, 1998).

Homant and Kennedy (2014) define serial murder, and provide associated commentary, by stating that “with serial killing, the same person (or persons) commits three or more murders with a cooling-off period intervening” (p. 342). They then suggest:

Our definition…raises two minor issues that should be dealt with here. The first concerns the cooling-off period. Holmes & Holmes (1998) suggest 30 days as the minimum period for distinguishing spree from serial killing. There is sometimes a grey area here, such as, for example, when a serial killer such as Ted Bundy starts to decompensated [sic] and kills with increasing frequency, perhaps with only a few hours separating events…The second issue concerns the number of killings required for someone to be considered a serial killer…Three killings seems to be required in the most popular definition of serial killing since they are enough to provide a pattern within the killings without being overly restrictive. This is not to say that someone who has “only” killed twice does not “qualify” as a serial killer. Indeed, someone who has only killed once may well be a serial killer, psychologically speaking, who has simply not yet acted on his impulses or has lacked the opportunity (perhaps being arrested after the first homicide). Insisting on three separate homicides simply lends more assurance that a given person is a suitable example of a serial killer. (p. 432)

Homant and Kennedy include a propensity caveat, setting their minimum count at three. They identify a problem with arbitrary cooling-off periods like Holmes and Holmes (2009), stating the important point that the offender temporarily satisfies whatever led them to kill.

Siegel (2011) states that “criminologists consider a serial killer, such as Dennis Rader, to be a person who kills three or more persons in three or more separate events. In between the murders, a serial killer reverts to his or her normal lifestyle” (p. 169). Siegel sets the victim count at three and introduces the requirement of three separate events, with the latter not being common to most other definitions. This definition includes the cooling-off period where the offender returns to their normal life. In another criminological text, Brown, Esbensen, and Geis (2010) simply state that “serial killers commit repeat acts of murder over time.” No further information about victim count or other criteria are provided. Andrews and Bonta (2014) state that “serial murderers are usually defined as murderers who have at least three victims over an extended period of time” (p. 488), later suggesting there are no obvious goals to the killings, as with professional killers or those seeking revenge.

Like Egger, Hickey (2013) provides a lengthy definition, stating that:

Serial murderers should include any offenders, male or female, who kill over time. Most researchers now agree that serial killers have a minimum of two victims (FBI, 2008). Usually there is a pattern in their killing that can be associated with the types of victims selected, or the method or motives for the killing…Serial murderers include those men and women who operate within the confines of a city or a state or even travel through several states as they seek out victims…Some victims have a personal relationship with their killers and others do not, and some victims are killed for pleasure and some merely for gain. Of greatest importance from a research perspective is the linkage of common factors among the victims. (p. 33)

Adjorlolo and Chan (2014) examined several research and legal definitions of serial murder before proposing their own with three keys elements (p. 490):

  • Two or more forensic linked murders with or without a revealed intention of committing additional murder;
  • The murders are committed as discrete event(s) by the same person(s) over a period of time; and
  • Where the primary motive is personal gratification.

Adjorlolo and Chan (2014) suggest that this definition departs from previous attempts and includes “the legal and scientific requirements for associating murders to suspects” (p. 490), though this was previously suggested by Skrapec (2001).

As observed from these definitions, there is considerable disparity between authors on such factors as victim count which ranges from two to four, which groups to include or exclude (for example, professional killers), and the aspect of motive. Only Skrapec (2001) and Adjorlolo and Chan (2014) propose that the killings must be forensically linked. This paper now turns to the various problems with each aspect of the definitions, focusing on the problems with victim count, cooling-off period, and motives.

Problems with victim count

In the investigative domain, establishing the actual number of victims is paramount because it dictates investigative resources, such as the number of investigative personnel assigned or establishing a task force or major incident room (Petherick, 2014). Leaving the decision too late in the series will have the adverse side-effect of an increased victim count, which presents a community safety issue.

Community safety has many facets including not only keeping the victim count to a minimum, but also catching an offender in a timely manner, and processing them through the Criminal Justice System (CJS) such that the potential for justice is maximised while potential error is minimised. This latter is important because public safety and public confidence in the CJS are linked (Keane & Bell, 2013). The identification of a serial offender will also assist in developing a clear picture of how and which victims are targeted. This information can be disseminated to the public through briefings and the media in order to educate and inform the public comprising the victim pool.

In research, establishing the number of victims is crucial as this establishes a threshold at which to include or exclude cases in any study population. The set-point dictates the study’s sample size, whereby two victims’ leads to a larger sample size than a victim count of three, which leads to a larger sample size than four, and so on.

Arguments of seriality rest, at least in part, on the confidence one can have in discerning or determining a pattern of sameness. In this instance, sameness stems from the base understanding that there is the same cause (same offender(s)) and the same effect (more than x number of victims). While the most valid way of ascribing a number of victims to a single offender or offending group is through a thorough investigation where linking is done by forensic evidence though this may be more of an ideal than a reality. Therefore, accounts given by offenders themselves may be a way to establish victim count though this is a less-than-ideal way to establish how many are killed by each murderer. Henry Lee Lucas claimed to have killed as many as 400 victims, though he was convicted of substantially fewer, with many questioning the accuracy of his claims. Any offender can misrepresent their actual number of victims owing to the fallibility of memory; being glorified in the media; the celebrity that comes with assisting police with their inquiries; or prolonging capital crimes’ charges by offering new or better information on open cases. Any claimed victim count must be tempered with more tangible means to establish the number of victims.

Definitions involving high victim counts may be counterproductive by prohibiting the correct classification of an offender who is prone to reoffend. If the victim count is set at three or more less cases will be captured by excluding those offenders that only murder two prior to being caught. Such a threshold ignores a critical feature of the serial offender: the crimes are prone to repetition.

Knoll (2006) suggests that “while serial murder is a universally terrifying concept, it is an extraordinarily rare event” (p. 64) and Dietz (1985) suggests part of the lack of understanding of serial murder is because of its extremely low base rate. After conducting a comprehensive review of all attempts to estimate the size of the problem, Gresswell and Hollin (1994) conclude that “estimating the current prevalence of multiple murder is…fraught with peril” (p. 6).

In Australia from 2012-2014, a total of 510 homicides across the country were recorded with a total of 512 victims and 549 offenders (Bryant & Bricknell, 2018). The authors of this report note that “in 24 incidents multiple victims were killed—23 incidents involved the death of two victims and one incident involved three victims (n=24; 5%).” This 5% figure not only includes serial murder, but also includes the related types of spree and mass murder. This means that within this data set, serial murder is an exceptionally rare event. The importance of this will be discussed in the proposed definition at the end of this paper.

For the United States, Schlesinger (2001) suggests specific serial murder data were not collected in US statistics at the time of his article’s publication, but that serial murder is still rare despite claims to the contrary. Studying the incidence of serial murder over a ten-year period in the US state of Virginia, Morton and McNamara (2004) show that the prevalence of serial murder was only 0.5%, while Jenkins (1994), studying serial murder between 1940 and 1985 in the United Kingdom (UK), suggests that the small number of cases makes worthwhile statistical analysis difficult. Jenkins also claims “there is usually at least one and occasionally two of these very unusual offenders pursuing a career of serial murder at any given time” (p. 5). Burgess suggests that there are about 35 serial killers in operation in the USA, and that this is a conservative estimate. No source for this estimate is provided, though other authors point to an unidentified FBI source from the 1980s (Miller, 2000).

Estimates of serial murder prevalence are usually predicated on an examination of preferred targets (females as the most typical victims), or serial murder victims as a proportion of the total number of victims of homicide, or as a proportion of missing persons. One such estimate by Quinet (2007), drawing upon existing databases, unidentified dead, and misidentified dead, suggests there are an additional 182 to 1832 victims of serial killers in the USA each year. Of course, these estimates are based on the belief that these missing persons are murder victims and not just missing persons.

Due to the relative infrequency of multiple murder, an offender is said to demonstrate a tendency to kill more victims once a second victim has been killed. This side of the argument implies the victim count should be set low to two victims so as to properly include those who are identified early in their career but were prevented from committing further offences. This also allows for the appropriate allocation of law enforcement resources and accompanying public safety notifications.

Case Linkage

It may not always be possible to attribute all of the offences committed to the responsible offender, with Kocsis and Irwin (1998) stating that “the definition of serial crime in terms of (known) offence numbers could therefore be said to be potentially under inclusive” (p. 199). Despite the reality that some offenders confess to all of their crimes, some will be reluctant to confess to crimes that have not been definitively linked unless there is some incentive to do so, such as a reduced sentence, or being able to serve concurrent sentences for all offences committed. It is also a reality that police will often suspect an offender of having committed more offences, but for one reason or another, they cannot be charged with them. For example, Francis Michael Fahey, a serial murderer in the state of Queensland, Australia, was convicted of only two crimes despite being suspected of having killed more, with some crimes dating back many years and in different locations. In a definition requiring three or four or more victims, Fahey would not be classified as a serial killer.

Cooling-Off Period

Throughout much of the literature, the idea of a cooling-off period has been treated as if self-evident. That is, it requires no definition or explanation, nor any description of what a cooling-off period may involve or require, nor indeed any idea of how this came to be a part of the definition for serial murder. This problem persisted from the first use of the term, seemingly introduced by the FBI in their early definition of serial murder and was only more recently defined. Considering that the cooling-off period is integral to the majority of definitions used with serial homicide and is a core distinction between different types of multiple murder, it is not unreasonable to expect that the origins and meaning of cooling-off be reasonably explicated in the literature. To date, this has not been the case.

Skrapec (2001) suggests that a cooling-off period was first introduced into the definition by Ressler and colleagues (1986), who referred to time breaks between offending “as minimal as two days to weeks or months” (p. 79, cited in Skrapec, 2001, p. 16). Skrapec then suggests that the cooling-off period is not necessarily helpful, being of questionable utility in helping us understand serial murder:

If “cooling off” is intended to connote a kind of psychological refractory period through which the killer must cycle before he can kill again, it does not make sense to stipulate a period of time (e.g., two days to weeks or months) since this would vary even within the same individual depending upon internal factors and external circumstances. That is, in addition to the biological and psychological makeup of the offender, circumstances operate to render him ready – or not – for his next killing. The essential point of distinction would appear to be that the killings occur as discrete events over an extended period of time, and not as part of a more limited crime spree. (Skrapec, 2001, p. 16)

Turvey (2012) implies that he is the first author to operationalise the cooling-off period, despite it having existed for some time, ostensibly without precise definition until this point:

What precisely constitutes a cooling-off period has been ill defined in the literature. That ends now. A cooling-off period, or cooling interval, refers to the psychological component that makes serial murderers so horrible to the imagination; it refers to the interval during which the offenders psychologically disconnect, separate, or compartmentalise themselves from the behaviours and motives that led to, or culminated in, homicidal behaviour and then reintegrate back into their non-criminal lives and activities.

It should be noted that the cooling interval does not refer to the entire time between offences, only the time it takes to psychologically extract and reintegrate. Once reintegrated, serial offenders may enter an extended period of dormancy, or they may go back out and engage in victim-seeking behaviour the very next day – all depending on how they feel. There’s no predicting which will be the case. (p. 543)

Problems with the cooling-off period

There are several problems with the cooling-off period as currently used though most notable is that a cooling-off period was introduced to distinguish serial from spree murder and was not the product of research or data. This means that the cooling-off period was brought into the literature and uncritically accepted, then repeated and incorporated into various definitions over the last three decades. Essentially, it is not possible to know whether offenders actually cool-off or whether they simply do not offend for periods, for any number of reasons. It is just assumed that they do.

Another longstanding problem is that cooling-off has been ill-defined, with no useful definitions or understanding of exactly what was meant by, or to be included in, any given cooling-off period. As noted above this has been partially remedied with attempts made to better understand what this term may mean. Additionally, among authors discussing the concept, the actual time frame for a cooling-off period can range from virtually zero (Turvey, 2012) to hours, days, weeks, months, or years (Burgess, 2006; Fox & Levin, 1998; Hickey, 1986; Keeney & Heide, 1995) or just through the use of a broad term “over a period of time” (Geberth, 2006; Hickey, 2013).

As Skrapec (2001) notes, this differs according to the offender’s inner psychological and biological drives, and there is no “set period” that demarcates one offence from the next. It may be inferred that this time period therefore ranges from nothing to virtually anything. Because of this, cooling-off periods will be unhelpful in identifying a serial murderer and will only become clear after any given murderer has been identified and the crimes fully investigated and linked. Until that point, the time interval between offences will be of limited utility in identifying the crime series, in fact, we would argue it may be misleading.

A fourth problem with the cooling-off period as dictated by a period of psychological or emotional disconnect is that this is a subjective process relative to the observer. If an offender does not commit an offence for a period of 30 days, returning to work and family, this may appear to a third party to be an emotional disconnection in the offender; a separation of his criminal and non-criminal self. He has, for all intents and purposes, cooled-off. However, as Egger (1998) notes, serial murderers spend a great deal of time fantasising about, and preparing for, future crimes. During this time, they may have been trolling for victims while driving children to school or going to work, buying items in preparation for their next crime while doing family grocery shopping, reliving sexual assaults while with an intimate partner, or like David Berkowitz, psychologically reliving their crimes by returning to past crime scenes. It is difficult to ascertain to what degree this offender has really cooled-off, if at all.

During this time, offenders may be actively searching for victims but are prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond their control such as not having access to a victim pool, relationship and work commitments occupying the offender’s time, investigative pressure bringing about new leads and clues about the offender’s identity, and media coverage alerting the victim pool to danger. These are just a few reasons why offenders may not be able to acquire new victims. The point is this: the non-offending period may not be dictated by a cooling-off from their offending self, but rather an enforced period of dormancy by factors outside of their control.

This period may also be characterised by general fantasy behaviour, which itself may be employed as a coping mechanism. For example, Dogra et al. (2012) provide a case report of a serial killer in Delhi, India. Historical information on the offender suggests that he engaged in “masturbation since age of 14-15 years” and “had thoughts about cutting and eating someone since adolescence” (p. 306). They also note that “Mr. Koli had difficulties in dealing with emotional situations and tended to use denial, avoidance, and escape into fantasy (i.e., escaping from the real situation), mainly lethal ones” (p. 309). It is implied that Koli engaged in fantasy behaviour throughout his period of offending, from 2005 – 2007 when he was 30 to 32 years of age. Therefore, even when not offending, Koli was not cooling-off.

Consequently, definitions for serial murder implying a disconnect may be a misrepresentation of what the offender did during this time, based on incorrect assumptions made by external observers about an offender’s mental state and behaviour. At the least, this requires a faulty assumption that because the offender has not committed a crime that he has psychologically removed himself from them. In fact, quite the opposite could be true during this time. The psychological preparation during this time may be a rising arc culminating in a higher victim count.

Skrapec (2001) argues not that offenders do cool off but that they can. That is, some offenders will spend time disconnecting while others will not, with most spending some of their time thinking about and planning for offending, while at other times returning to a normal semblance of life as a father, husband, employee, and otherwise gainful citizen (for example, BTK, Dennis Rader). Before they are apprehended it is not possible to know what they have been doing, and this has not been studied systematically to date. Only two studies were identified in the research for this paper.

The first was by White (2016), who hypothesised that the “duration of the dormant periods in serial homicide cases could potentially demonstrate a quantifiable pattern to predict future offences” (p. 6). The second was by Osborne and Salfati (2015), who examined factors influential to the cooling-off period and the actual period between offending (M = 186.12 days, N = 90). It should be noted that in both of these publications the authors do not critically examine the theoretical basis of cooling-off periods, they simply use them as a basis for determining factors that may influence this time period.

Apart from issues of validity and reliability associated with delineating and interpreting cooling-off periods, there is another problematic reality. Skrapec (2001) uses the example of Ted Bundy, who killed two victims on the same day, seemingly without cooling-off between homicides. Committing clusters of offences at sometimes and spreading offences out over others presents a conundrum for definitions that stipulate cooling-off periods. Would there then be a need to distinguish murder sprees within series of murders?

With a cooling-off period, it may not be the time itself (that is, the duration between offences), but rather what that duration represents or its significance to the offender. If, during this time, the offender is able to disconnect from the murders and return to a semblance of non-offending life, then it may be argued that he has “cooled-off”. This period will be, as identified in the myriad of definitions, idiosyncratic and peculiar to individual offenders sometimes being short, sometimes being long.

If a cooling interval is utilised in a definition for serial murder, the issue that arises is period of time. Most definitions incorporating a time of disconnect provide a span of days, weeks, months, or years, whilst others provide a discrete time such as a specific number of days. Until now, few researchers have examined how long the average cooling-off is though there has been little further exploration as to the best time period for this. This is likely to differ both within and between offenders with some returning to their non-offending life quicker than others or not at all. As such, it is suggested herein that the term cooling-off period and what it is alleged to represent be abandoned. This will be further discussed in the proposed forthcoming definition.

Perhaps the most fundamental question to be asked is why an offender would have to cool-off or somehow emotionally detach from his crimes at all. Little attention has been paid to this issue beyond a few authors who dedicate some small space to it: that is Turvey (2012), Fox and Levin (1998), and Levin and Fox (2008).

According to Turvey (2012), it is the cooling-off period that renders serial murder such a horrible crime to contemplate, and the rationale for this is contained within his definition, which again states:

A cooling-off period, or cooling interval, refers to the psychological component that makes serial murderers so horrible to contemplate; it refers to the interval during which the offenders psychologically disconnect, separate, or compartmentalise themselves from the behaviours and motives that led to, or culminated in, homicidal behaviour and then reintegrate back into their non-criminal lives and activities. (p. 543)

Fox and Levin (1998) further this argument by stating that this cooling-off period is linked to offenders being able to kill without the associated psychological dissonance:

The compartmentalisation that allows for killing without guilt is actually an extension of an ordinary phenomenon used by normal people who play multiple roles in their everyday lives. An executive might be heartless and demanding to all his employees at work but be a loving and devoted family man at home. Similarly, many serial killers have jobs and families, do volunteer work, and kill part-time with a great deal of selectivity. Even the cruelest [sic] sexual sadist who may be unmercifully brutal to a hitchhiker or a stranger he meets at a bar might not even consider hurting family members, friends, or neighbours. (p. 422)

Levin and Fox (2008) simply restate their previous position. The cooling-off period then is about guilt mitigation or elimination.

Motive

Definitions that focus on victim count or cooling intervals may be missing a large part of the picture. Victim count and cooling-off periods alone can capture any number of other types of murder such as killings during time of war, acts of terrorism, genocide, and professional killings. To differentiate serial murder from these other types, some suggest that motive should also be a factor in any definition (Ferguson et al., 2003; Skrapec, 2001).

Jenkin’s (1994, p. 23) notes that “excluded are cases where the offender acted primarily out of political motives or in the quest of financial profit.” These homicides are usually excluded from consideration of being serial murders because the motives are perceived to be different, and serve primarily personal (thrill, control, and power among others) or sexual motives. For this reason, professional hitmen and war criminals are excluded from being labelled serial murderers. According to Skrapec (2001), it is the personal gratification derived from the killings (whether through financial gain, sexual orgasm, or domination of others) that underlies their motivation and distinguishes them from killings expected as part of some professional role. This issue, however, will be revisited in another paper by the first and third author.

Problems with motive

While it is acknowledged that motive is a necessary component of any definition, two problems are noted. The first is that motive is poorly understood (Leonard, 2001; Petherick, 2015; Turvey, 2012). This means that any attempt to understand motive in an open offence series may not be fruitful in terms of classifying crimes. By extension, where the motive is poorly understood or unclear, the classification of a serial crime may be confounded until such a point as more information becomes available, or where other evidence points to the possibility that a serial criminal is in operation, in which case the motive is a moot point. For example, the assertion that the motive in any case was sexual will assume that the sexual gratification was a motive in itself, and not just a behaviour that may represent an underlying psychological state such as anger or the desire to establish a relationship (see Groth, 1979; Groth et al., 1977; Petherick, 2015; and Petherick & Sinnamon, 2014 for a discussion on the different offence motives).

Similarly, the motive is not always clear or readily apparent (Muller, 2000). This means that even when an appropriately qualified individual is trying to understand the motive, there may not be enough information on which to assess it. This is either because the investigation and forensic examination of evidence are in the early stages or because the offender has been careful not to leave evidence that may reveal the motive. Further, those sources of information that may be most fruitful (such as a victim who can testify as to what was said and done) will be absent as the victim is deceased.

The second issue with motive is what is known as behavioural consistency (Bateman & Salfati, 2007; Harbers et al., 2012; Hazelwood & Warren, 2003; Petherick & Ferguson, 2012; Salfati & Bateman, 2005). That is, the behaviour will remain relatively consistent across an offence series, and if not, the motive may appear between offences. If the offender has different motives or should his motive change, the crimes may appear to be the work of different offenders. As stated by Gresswell and Hollin (1994), typologies used to understand serial murder fail “to pick up interactions between the killer, the victims, and the environment, and do not appear to be flexible enough to accommodate a killer who may have different motives for different victims or changing motives over time” (p. 5).

Propensity

In this regard, propensity refers to the innate likelihood of repeating a behaviour; specifically, committing another murder. It could be argued that once a second offence is linked through valid means, the propensity requirement is met. As previously stated, because the rate of serial murder is low, once an offender has committed that second offence, he has not only met the minimum victim count, he has demonstrated a propensity to reoffend. As such, criteria for this would be redundant and therefore not needed within a definition.

Another issue with a propensity requirement is that, should they be apprehended before committing another offence, the propensity will never be fully realised, along with victim count and most other criteria. As such, the propensity will be an unknown until the second offence, which as stated above, makes this requirement redundant. It is therefore suggested that, as with the cooling-off period, the idea of a propensity to reoffend be abandoned. This will also be discussed in the proposed definition below.

Proposed Definition

This paper examined a number of widely used definitions of serial murder in the academic and law enforcement literature. It is acknowledged that it does not include every single definition in the literature, though we believe those discussed represent a healthy cross-section. A number of problems with these definitions and their formulations were identified and discussed.

Based upon the review of previous definitions in conjunction with a systematic examination of problematic issues, the following definition of serial murder is proposed, after which the rationale for each of the criteria will be provided:

  1. Serial murder involves the killing of two or more victims by the same offender(s);
  2. In separate offences with a non-offending period between offences;
  3. The offences have been reliably linked;
  4. The motive for these offences is personal, rather than corporate, organisational, or institutional in nature.

Two or More Victims

The number of victims should be set low at two, which is consistent with the standard now employed by the FBI (Morton & Hilts, 2008). This is because once two offences have been identified there is a need to change the investigative strategy and adopt measures conducive to increasing public safety. This allows for the accurate classification of a serial murderer who is likely to repeat offend but may be apprehended before they kill subsequent victims.

Committed by the Same Offender(s)

This criterion should be self-evident. The same offender(s) must be involved in at least two of the murders to be considered a discrete serial murder event.

In Separate Offences with a Non-Offending Period

The crimes must be committed as separate offences or they would be more accurately described as spree or mass murders, depending on victim count. We are also the first to suggest discarding the notion of a cooling-off period or cooling interval in favour of a more neutral non-offending period. This has been adopted for the reasons stated previously in this paper about the problems with the cooling-off period. This still satisfies the requirement that the offender departs from his offending behaviour, and that the offences occur over a period of time but places no judgement on what they are doing during this time.

Reliably Linked

Cases must be reliably linked by an appropriately qualified expert. Case linkage is one such practice and is defined as “a police practice whereby crimes that may be the work of the same offender(s) are identified from an analysis of crime scene behaviours” (Woodhams & Bennell, 2015, p. 1). Two types of links can be made: the investigative link is defined as a “general class connection between one or more cases that serves to inform the allocation of investigative resources” (Turvey, 2012, p. 657), while a probative link is considered court-worthy and is defined as “evidenced by either a unique offender behaviour, or a unique offender signature that is shared across two or more cases, with limited behavioural dissimilarity” (p. 659).

Without embarking on an entirely separate treatise on the various types and utilities of linkage measures, it is sufficient to say that the linkage must be made using generally recognised and acceptable means of connecting the crimes. This could include commonly accepted scientific means such as DNA and fingerprints, behavioural case linkage by the appropriately qualified individual, or the belief of an experienced detective coupled with a low base rate of occurrence in their jurisdiction.

This discussion begs the question “who exactly is an appropriately qualified individual”? This would depend largely on the type of linkage being done and the qualifications of the individual doing the linkage. We arbitrarily identify two main types of case linkage and have labelled them “hard” and “soft”. Hard case linkage is that done through the examination of physical evidence, with the two most notable examples being DNA analysis and fingerprinting. Thus, an appropriately qualified individual would be a forensic or other scientist who is an expert in DNA or fingerprint analysis. On the other hand, a “soft” linkage is that done through an analysis of behaviour to determine the similarities and differences in modus operandi (what the offender did that was necessary to successfully complete the crime) and so-called signature (those ritual or fantasy elements that are not necessary for the successful completion of the crime). This type of linkage is far more problematic in terms of identifying who may be qualified though it is suggested that, at a minimum, the individual possess advanced degrees in the behavioural sciences complimented by studies or training in the physical sciences including many aspects of crime reconstruction. Further bolstering one’s qualifications in this area would be admission as an expert in case linkage in a court of law, though this is not without its own set of problems (as one example, see Justia US Law (2001) in State v. Steven R Fortin, where the Court identified the testimony of retired FBI profile Roy Hazelwood as problematic despite Hazelwood originally being admitted as an expert).

Further consideration must be given as to the purpose of the case linkage. If the purpose is to assess two or more crimes to determine whether they are the work of the same offender to argue for the allocation of more resources, then it could be argued that the threshold for qualifications is less than expert testimony in a court of law.

The Motive is For Personal Gratification

It may be inferred that the propensity to reoffend is inherently linked with the motive to reoffend. That is, one must be motivated to commit subsequent offences, with the implication that the physical or psychological need that drove the initial offence has not been satisfied, resurfaces, or changes over time. This would exclude cases of homicide committed by soldiers during war, genocide (and other religious and/or political murders committed over time), gang members, and those by professional assassins. This latter type of homicide can be problematic in terms of this definition and most others, in that it excludes the professional killer who, in between his contracts, may kill simply for gratification. Two of the authors (AM & WP) are currently investigating this issue, which will be the subject of a future publication. This latter type of homicide can be problematic in terms of this definition and most others, in that it excludes the professional killer who, in between his contracts, may kill simply for gratification. The definition proposed by the authors above suggest that professional killers such as Richard Kuklinksi can be included within the broader definition of serial murder as they meet each criterion:

  1. Kuklinski killed two or more victims.
  2. The murders occurred in separate offences, in different locations with non-offending periods in between.
  3. Kuklinski’s offences have been reliably linked by an appropriately qualified individual.
  4. Kuklinski killed for personal profit, which can otherwise be known as personal gratification.

That research is being undertaken in Australia (1960-2021) and, is testing the premise that hit-men, gangland killers, professional killers or contract killers could be classified as serial murderers, as per the definition in this article.

As with case linkage, the authors suggest motivational analysis be performed only by those who are appropriately qualified using accepted typologies and methodologies that have been derived empirically or are based on rigorous theories. Again, foundational and advanced degrees in the behavioural sciences combined with further studies in crime reconstruction are suggested. Suggested considerations for determining motive are provided by Petherick2015) and include examining all available physical evidence, conducting a thorough victimology, and crime scene considerations such as evidence of planning and preparation, crime scene type and location, and whether the crime scene was selected or opportunistic, among others.

Generally speaking, the crimes of gangs and terrorist organisations are not considered serial murder because their acts advance the group by establishing ideological dominance (as in the case of terrorism) or geographic or commercial dominance (as in the case of gangs fighting over “turf” or establishing control of an area to monopolise drug trade in the region). These differ fundamentally from “typical” serial murders who kill for personal reasons such as enjoyment, control, or thrill. That is not to say that gang members do not also occasionally kill for these reasons, we argue that is not the primary reason for the killings.

Conclusion

This article provided a systematic review of the history of the term serial murder and deconstructed the various definitions over time according to victim count, the linkage of serial crimes, a cooling-off period, motivation, and propensity. Problems with the various definitions have been discussed. Subsequent to this examination, the authors proposed a definition that bypasses theoretical and practical issues with the definitions to date and provides a more realistic and useful definition of serial murder. The authors feel that the most problematic component of previous definitions has been the idea that offenders cool-off between crimes. This is something that was accepted uncritically and integrated into many definitions of serial murder until recent times. One interesting aspect of future research, therefore, would be to conduct a study of serial offenders to determine to what degree the idea of a cooling-off period actually happens, or whether offenders spend much of their non-offending time reliving prior offences, as well as fantasising about and planning for future offences.

Beyond the academic merits of being technically accurate, the correct identification of a case as serial relies entirely on a valid definition capturing the most cases possible while accurately excluding cases which should be classified in other ways. Not only does this set the stage for valid research to be carried out where the definition sets the goal posts for inclusion and exclusion criteria, there are other investigative and legal benefits also. When law enforcement is confident that a serial murderer is active, they can change the strategy of investigation to incorporate experts on serial crimes, establish task forces and major incident rooms, and provide public safety notifications regarding such things as victim targeting. From a legal standpoint, the identification of a murder series may provide for an aggravating factor to be used during sentencing, thus allowing for more dangerous offenders to be removed from society. For these reasons and those discussed elsewhere in this paper, the authors believe that a good definition is not just one important factor, it is the most important factor in the discourse of serial offenders.

Author Note: We acknowledge that there are female serial murderers. For the sake of consistency and ease of reporting, we use the terms he/his throughout.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflicts of interest were reported by the authors.

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About the Authors

Wayne Petherick, PhD is currently Associate Professor of Criminology in the Faculty of Society and Design at Bond University on the Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia. Wayne teaches in the areas of Applied Crime Analysis and Criminal Profiling, Forensic Criminology, and Crime and Deviance. Wayne’s areas of interest are stalking, interpersonal crime, and managing and de-escalating customer aggression. Wayne has written numerous textbooks including Forensic Criminology, Profiling and Serial Crime, Applied Crime Analysis, and The Psychology of Criminal and Antisocial Behaviour.

Shuktika Bose is a Clinical Psychologist and Adjunct Teaching Fellow in the Faculty of Society and Design and Office of the Core Curriculum. Shuktika completed her BPsySc. from Griffith University, Australia, and both her BSocSc (Psych) (Hons) and MPsych (Clin) from Bond University. Shuktika is a Bond University lecturer in Criminology, and tutor in Psychology and Core Curriculum. Shuktika provides psychological services in youth mental health and previously in corrective services. She was the 14th International Visiting Researcher with the Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, completing an eight-week research project in 2017 addressing: “Psychological First Aid: Models, Cultural Differences, and Implications for Implementation in Singapore.” Her research areas include psychological first aid in the aftermath of violent extremist attacks, community perceptions of crime, and perceptions of domestic and family violence victimisation.

Amber McKinley, PhD is a Clinical and Forensic Victimologist and a senior lecturer at Charles Sturt University’s (CSU) Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security (AGSPS), based in Barton, ACT. She coordinates and lectures in JST345 – Theoretical, Applied and Forensic Victimology and Human trafficking and transnational organised crime. She holds a Bachelor of Liberal Studies from the University of Western Sydney, a Master of Criminal Justice from Monash University and a Doctor of Philosophy from Bond University. Her doctoral thesis was completed with the NSW Police Force and entitled, “Homicide Solvability and Applied Victimology in New South Wales, 1994-2013. Her current research includes vicarious trauma in first responding personnel; compare and contrast the ‘FVEYS’ militaries sexual offence records and prevention models; stranger sexual assault, outcomes for victims of sexual violence, the impact of COVID 19 on sexual abuse and family and domestic violence, as well as victims of serial homicide in Australia from 1820-2021. Amber works as a (Specialist Reserve) Squadron Leader in the Royal Australian Air Force and works with the Joint Military Police Unit where she researches and writes reports on sexual offences and sudden death for the Provost Marshal-ADF. She also lectures at the Defence Force School of Policing.

Candice Skrapec, PhD is a Psychologist and Criminologist who has researched psychopathy and serial murder and consulted as an investigative profiler since 1984. She is currently Professor Emerita in the Department of Criminology at California State University Fresno and is Coordinator of the Forensic and Behavioral Sciences Option for the B.S. degree in Criminology. Courses she regularly teaches include the Psychology of Crime, Forensic Behavioral Sciences, and the Biology of Criminality; all are presented from an interdisciplinary perspective. For more than two decades, Dr. Skrapec has interviewed incarcerated serial murderers in different countries. Like the rest of us, she is interested in what makes them tick. Her quest to answer this question has taken her on an incredible journey into the minds of scores of offenders. She has worked extensively with and trained police in Canada, Mexico, and the United States and is regularly asked to consult with law enforcement officers, attorneys, the media, movie and documentary producers, and authors of fact and fiction books—particularly in the areas of criminal psychology, serial murder, and investigative profiling. Dr. Skrapec is a recognized expert in the field of forensic behavioral science and has presented before many international audiences. Police from departments around the world contact Dr. Skrapec to assist in active and “cold” criminal cases.

CITATION (APA 7th Edition)
Petherick, W., Bose, S., McKinley, A., & Skrapec, C. (2021). A rose by any other name: Problems in defining and conceptualizing serial murder with a new proposed definition. Journal of Mass Violence Research, 1(1), 4-24. https://doi.org/10.53076/JMVR85123

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